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ABSTRACT
Of One Mind: Proposal for a Non-Cartesian Cognitive Architecture
Linda Cochrane, PhD
Concordia University, 2014
Intellectually, we may reject Cartesian Dualism, but dualism often dominates our everyday 
thinking: we talk  of  “mental”  illness as though it  were non-physical; we tend to blame 
people for the symptoms of brain malfunctions in a way that differs from how we treat other 
illnesses. An examination of current theories of mind will reveal that some form of dualism 
is not always limited to the non-scientific realm. While very few, if any, cognitive scientists 
support  mind-body dualism,  those  who  support  the  view  of  the  mind  as  a  symbol-
manipulator are often constrained to postulate more than one cognitive system in response 
to the failure of the symbol-system model to account for all aspects of human cognition.
In this dissertation, I argue for an empiricist, rather than a realist, theory of perception, for 
an  internalist  semantics,  and  for  a  model  of  cognitive  architecture  which  combines  a 
connectionist approach with highly-specialized, symbolic, computational component which 
includes  functions  that  provide  input  to  a  a  causally-inert  conscious  mind.  I  reject  the 
symbol-system  hypothesis  and  propose  a  cognitive  architecture  which,  I  contend,  is 
biologically-plausible and more consistent with the results of recent neuroscientific studies. 
This hybrid model can accommodate the processes commonly discussed by dual-process 
theorists and can also accommodate the processes which have proved to be so problematic 
for models based on the symbol-system hypothesis.
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Over the latter half of the last century, developments in physics, chemistry, biology, and 
computer science have led to a predominantly (scientific) realist view of the world and a 
computational theory of mind (CTM) which has dominated particularly in philosophies of 
mind and language, in psychology, and in linguistics. In this dissertation, I argue for an 
empiricist  (neo-Kantian),  rather  than  a  realist,  theory  of  perception,  for  an  internalist 
semantics,  and  for  a  model  of  cognitive  architecture  which  combines  a  connectionist 
approach with a computational theory. In this model,  computation, as defined by CTM1, is 
restricted to the cognitive processes involved in encoding thoughts in a form required for 
input to the conscious mind and for re-use in non-computational thought processes.
 1.2 BACKGROUND
Cognitive science is founded on the idea that we can learn much about the brain from the 
computer and a major tenet of cognitive science is that the mind is a symbolic system. 
Supporters of the position that we have symbol-processing minds, contend that the mind 
has a structure analogous to that of a digital computer. In this view, thoughts2 are higher 
level brain states with a syntactic structure; thought processes are computational operations 
defined over such structures; and computational operations are sensitive only to the formal, 
syntactic properties of the structures. Not all cognitive scientists agree on the identification 
of brain and computer, but most cognitive scientists support some form of the Symbol-
System Hypothesis (SSH) with  some taking SSH literally; some regarding SSH as nothing 
more than a helpful metaphor or research-provoking analogy; and still others holding that 
the brain is some type of computer but not a symbol-manipulator.
In 1960, Hilary Putnam proposed the computer analogy as an answer to mind/body 
dualism: the body was like computer hardware (the physical computing machine); and the 
mind was like the computer software (the program controlling the operation of the com­
puter). Turing Machines are simple abstract computational devices the purpose of which is 
to aid in investigating the extent and limitations of what can be computed. Mental states 
1 Zenon  Pylyshyn  (1993),  a  proponent  of  SSH,  claims  that:  mental  processing  is  Turing-type  computation; 
knowledge is  encoded by properties of  the brain in  the same general way that  the semantic  contents  of  the 
computer's representations are encoded, namely, by physically instantiated symbol structures.
2 Thinking may be defined informally as: having the faculty of thought; capable of a regular train of ideas; a mental  
activity, not predominantly perceptual, by which one apprehends some aspect of an object or situation based on 
past learning and experience.
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can be compared to the functional or “logical” states of a computer, but humans, unlike 
computers, are often inconsistent in their patterns of preference and choices and their ra­
tional preference function can change with time. In other words, humans are “Probabilistic 
Automata” (Putnam 1967).
A thinking computer would have to have action-directing inner-processes that match 
humans in adaptability  (Copeland 1993).  Unfortunately,  designing such a computer  has 
proved highly problematic and, further, the hypothesis that the mind is a symbol-manipulat­
or tout court has problems of its own. Even though mental states can be compared to the 
functional or “logical” states of a computer, even Putnam observed that “[I]t is somewhat 
unlikely that either the mind or the brain is a Turing Machine” and it is “more likely that the 
interconnections among the various brain states and mental states of a human being are 
probabilistic rather than deterministic and that time-delays play an important role” (Putnam 
1967). Jerry Fodor, one of the strongest supporters of SSH, argues that Turing's account of 
computation is, in at least two respects, local given that it does not look past the form of 
sentences to their meanings, and that it assumes that the role of thoughts in a mental pro­
cess is determined entirely by their internal (syntactic) structure. It can be shown that there 
are several rational processes which are not local in either of these respects. Fodor states 
that, even though “Turing's theory of computation is far the best thing that we could offer”:
Wherever either semantic or global features of mental processes begin to make 
their presence felt, You reach the limits of what Turing's kind of computational 
rationality is able to explain.  As things stand, what's beyond these limits is not a 
problem but a mystery. (Fodor 1998b)
 1.3 DISSERTATION THESIS
I argue in this dissertation that Fodor's “mystery” is a result of insisting on the idea that the 
brain is, at least in most respects, some kind of Turing-style computer; that is, of insisting 
that computation over symbols is the best model of human cognition. I take the position 
that Connectionism provides the best model of cognition and that the intuition that cognitive 
processes constitute computation over symbols arises from the way these processes appear 
to  the conscious mind. In the model I am presenting, the conscious mind is like a computer 
screen  in  being  an  “interface”  to  the  hidden,  non-conscious,  cognitive  processes,  and 
whatever thoughts are encoded in a form that can appear in the conscious mind are like 
computer interface icons. The “icons” that appear in the conscious mind, like the icons on a 
computer screen, are causally-inert – they appear to consciousness only after the relevant 
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cognitive processes have taken place3. In the model I am proposing, all commonly discussed 
features of consciousness (such as visual awareness, self-consciousness, and qualia) are 
encoded as “icons” in the conscious mind through much the same mechanisms. The search 
for  neural  correlates  of  consciousness  is  an  empirical  matter,  but  one  possible  area  of 
research might be as to whether the “appearance” of icons in the conscious mind is possibly 
the result of the activation of a form of “alarm” system which is normally the result of a 
physiological  reaction  (e.g.,  an  increase  in  epinephrine)  in  response  to  stress  whether 
environmental or psychological. What would differentiate the human conscious mind from 
that  of  other  sentient  beings  is  that  some  icons  in  the  human  conscious  mind  are 
linguistically-encoded.
The connectionist approach, which holds that the mind is not like a computer but is a 
network with multiple connections between simple active units, is, I contend a better can­
didate as a model of human cognition. It can accommodate local, as well as the global men­
tal  processing which which has proved so problematic for  symbol-manipulation theories. 
One basis for the symbol-manipulation model is, I believe, a non-substantiated reverse-en­
gineering from the surface structure of natural language. The apparently sequential nature 
of thought processes is deceptive and is a result of the encoding of thought processes in a 
form which has proved suitable for communicating with oneself (“inner voice” or “inner lan­
guage”) as well as with conspecifics. I reject the claim that logical reasoning relies on a lan­
guage of thought that uses a syntactical structure reflected in that of natural language. The 
appearance that it is so reliant results, I contend, from assuming that the form of the reas­
oning as it appears to consciousness is actually the form of the reasoning processes them­
selves. This reverse-engineering is no more justified than using it to claim that the structure 
of the output from a digital computer is the structure of its internal processes; that the 
icons on a computer screen resemble the computational processing that they represent.
Thoughts  that  can be “broadcast”  to  the  conscious  mind are  sequential  and are 
amenable to being explained in symbol-manipulation terms, but many, perhaps most of our 
cognitive processes do not appear to be translatable into a symbolic or a language-like me­
dium. Input to the cognitive processes, items in the conscious mind, and output as public 
communication are all sequential combinations of symbols and syntax which are very suited 
to being explained using the symbol-manipulation theory, but processes using the massively 
3 This analogy of the conscious mind as a computer screen, with “icons” representing but not resembling thoughts 
that appear to it, is owed, in part, to Donald Hoffman's proposal that we should think of “our sensory systems as  
constituting a species specific user interface. A user interface, like the windows interface on your laptop, is useful  
because it does not resemble what it represents” (Hoffman 2010).
3
parallel neural architecture of the brain are better explained and described by the use of a 
connectionist model. The proposed hybrid cognitive architecture, which takes into account 
recent developments in psychology, neuroscience and linguistics, is, in addition, more cap­
able of answering the traditional questions raised by philosophers of mind and philosophers 
of language.
 1.4 DISSERTATION OUTLINE
The structure of the arguments supporting the thesis of this dissertation is as follows:
• Chapter 2 sets the background for  supporting semantic internalism which is the 
position  underlying the design of the cognitive architecture presented in the final 
chapter.  Different  theories  of  perception  are  examined  and  rejected  because 
positions taken in the realist versus empiricist debate are relevant to which theory of 
semantics is supported. A realist position is reflected in the externalist semantics 
that has dominated philosophy of language since Putnam's influential 1975 paper 
“The Meaning of 'Meaning'”. While it is possible to be both a supporter of semantic 
internalism and a realist, this chapter presents arguments against any of the realist 
positions and argues for adopting a neo-Kantian position on we perceive the world 
and develops some of the background assumptions used in developing the hybrid 
cognitive architecture proposed in the final chapter. Chapter 2 includes some detailed 
examination of  those philosophical  theories  advanced since the “Linguistic  Turn”4 
which have had such a strong impact on developments in cognitive science  (e.g., 
the Computational Theory of Mind, the Language of Thought, and so on).
• Chapter 3 discusses various important theories of cognitive architecture, including 
the  representational/computational  and  connectionist  models  and  identifies  their 
main strengths and weaknesses. Many of the main arguments, especially from philo­
sophy, in support of the Computational Theory of Mind and the symbol-system hypo­
thesis are examined. Arguments are then presented in support of the connectionist 
model as being more consistent with psychological and neuroscientific evidence and 
as more biologically plausible.
• Chapter 4 presents an analysis of several dual-process and dual-system theories of 
mind before offering, in Chapter 5, an alternate view which, I contend, is more con­
sistent with current neuroscientific  evidence. These dual-process and dual-system 
4 “Linguistic Turn” is the term given by Richard Rorty (1967) in reference to the focus of philosophy, and other  
disciplines in the humanities, on the relationship between philosophy and language.
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theories are examined in detail in order to identify those attributes which are crucial 
for any theory of mind and, hence, for the cognitive architecture which is the subject 
of this dissertation.
• Chapter 5 presents arguments for a hybrid cognitive architecture which combines a 
connectionist model with a computational model. Computation over symbols, in this 
model, is restricted to the components used for encoding and decoding items which 
may be “broadcast” to the conscious mind or re-used as input to other cognitive pro­
cesses. Arguments are offered that the proposed cognitive architecture has the at­
tributes which are associated with standard views of the differences between the two 
systems of dual-process and dual-system theories as identified in Chapter 4. Possible 
objections to the model I am proposing are presented and discussed. The chapter 
concludes with some suggestions for research projects.
--------------------
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2. AN INTERNALIST SEMANTICS
 2.1 INTRODUCTION
After reading Hilary Putnam's influential 1975 paper “the Meaning of 'Meaning'” in which he 
famously stated that “meaning just  ain't  in  the head”,  we cannot fail  to notice that  he 
adopted certain metaphysical positions. In making his claim, he assumed that there is a 
mind-independent world, that that world is structured (“nature is carved at the joints”), that 
the way we perceive entities in the mind-independent world directly reflects that structure, 
that  natural  language  can be studied as  an external  artifact,  and that  there  is  a  non-
psychological component to the meaning of linguistic terms. In this chapter, I reject his 
externalist semantics and the underlying assumptions.
The adoption or design of a cognitive architecture is constrained by whether the un­
derlying theory of semantics is externalist or internalist. While it is, in principle, entirely 
possible to endorse both a cognitive architecture based on the symbolic computational mod­
el and an internalist semantics, most supporters of the symbolic computational model, espe­
cially its most outspoken advocates among philosophers of mind and philosophers of lan­
guage (Jerry Fodor, Hilary Putnam, Zenon Pylyshyn, Steven Pinker, and many others), sup­
port some form of semantic externalism. The rival cognitive architecture, connectionism, is, 
in contrast, inconsistent with semantic externalism; its design renders it necessarily intern­
alist. Given that I argue for a cognitive architecture that is predominantly connectionist, I 
also argue for an internalist semantics and, hence, need to counter arguments presented in 
support of externalism.
In this chapter, I examine and criticize different theories of perception and advocate 
an empiricist, neo-Kantian position. I argue that we can never know the world as it is, that 
we cannot know the objects of experience as things-in-themselves. Positions taken in the 
realist versus empiricist debate are also relevant to which theory of semantics is supported. 
A realist position is reflected in the externalist semantics that has dominated philosophy of 
language since Putnam's influential 1975 paper “The Meaning of 'Meaning'”. The neo-Kan­
tian position I am advocating leads to support for an internalist semantics. 
Chapter 2 is divided into three parts:
• Part I consists of arguments in support of an empiricist, neo-Kantian position  con­
cerning the   relationship  between  the  mind  and  the  external,  mind-independent 
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world.  I  argue that  sensory input and perceptual  processing of  the input cannot 
provide direct access to a mind-independent world and, further, that advances in 
physics, quantum mechanics in particular, undermine the realist’s view that reality is 
two-way-independent of appearance.
• Part II presents arguments for an internalist semantics. I take a cognitive stance and 
argue that treating natural language as if it were a mind-independent object leads to 
puzzles and paradoxes which do not arise for internal language theorists. I argue 
that, contrary to Putnam's famous statement that “meaning just ain't in the head” 
(Putnam 1975), meaning cannot be anywhere else. I then offer an internalist per­
spective which owes much to the I-Language approach to linguistics (see Chomsky 
1980, 1986, 2000/2005, 2006; Isac & Reiss 2008; and others) and to Jackendoff's 
“Unconscious Meaning Hypothesis” (Jackendoff 2012).
• Part III presents conclusions supporting an internalist approach which forms one of 
the assumptions used in the selection of the cognitive architecture proposed in this 
dissertation.
 2.2 PART I – WHY EMPIRICISM
While most thinkers accept the existence of a mind-independent world, they do not all agree 
on how we perceive that  world;  they posit  different theories  of  perception.  Theories of 
perception include those of  common-sense (or “naive” or “direct”)  realism for which the 
senses  provide  a  direct  awareness  of  the  external  world;  scientific  realism for  which 
scientific theories provide, or may eventually provide, a true account of the world;  anti-
realism which  either  denies  the  objective  reality  of  certain  types  of  entities 
("unobservables"),  denies  truth  conditions  to  verification-transcendent  statements  about 
these entities, or, in its  constructive empiricist version, holds that all  that is required of 
scientific  theories is that they be  empirically adequate; and  empiricism for which claims 
about the world rest solely on experience and for which knowledge about the external world 
is always subject to revision being no more than probabilistic and tentative. 
 2.2.1 Realism and Empiricism
For scientific realists, progress in science leads to theories that are closer to the truth about 
objective  reality,  and  the  belief  that  it  is  possible  to  transcend  experience,  thereby  to 
discover the causes of events even in the absence of direct observation. The empiricist 
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position, on the other hand, rests on the assumption that,  as Immanuel Kant observed 
(Kant 1963:B xix), we can never transcend the limits of possible experience. For empiricists, 
things-in-themselves belong to absolute reality and are unknowable as such since we are 
unable to take a “God's eye view” which would enable us to compare mind-independent 
entities with our experience of them; we are denied a point of view that would enable us to 
see the world unfiltered. We are, nonetheless, able to think of objects of experience as 
things in themselves “otherwise we should be landed in the absurd conclusion that there can 
be appearance without anything that appears” (Kant 1963:B xxvi).  Empiricists can thus 
accept that there are mind-independent entities that act as the causes of our experiences 
even though these entities are unknowable.
Newtonian physics and Euclidean geometry have been extremely successful in help­
ing us  understand and describe empirical reality (the reality of our experiences). When con­
structing buildings or bridges, when sending a man to the moon, we continue to use Newto­
nian mechanics because these activities are restricted to the medium-sized objects, dis­
tances, and velocities of our empirical reality. We may attempt to transcend the limits of ex­
perience, but continuing scientific advances, particularly those of quantum physics, separate 
our empirical world of experience further and further from the world as it may be in itself.  
Newtonian physics is not only a useful way of describing and coping with empirical reality, 
but is a reflection of the way the human cognitive capacity synthesizes the manifold of rep­
resentations. Our experiential frame of reference conforms to Newtonian principles because, 
as Kant claimed, these “concepts of reason are not derived from nature; on the contrary, we 
interrogate nature in accordance with these ideas, and consider our knowledge as defective 
so long as it is not adequate to them” (Kant 1963:A645/B673). Donald Hoffman has re­
cently presented arguments from natural selection for a similar position to that of Kant's:
Nowhere in evolution, even among the most complex of organisms, will you find 
that  natural  selection  drives  truth  to  fixation,  i.e.,  so  that  the  predicates  of 
perception (e.g., space, time, shape and color) approximate the predicates of the 
objective world (whatever they might be). (Hoffman 2009)
Unlike realist theories, neo-Kantian empiricism about empirical reality and things-as-they-
are-in-themselves does not involve metaphysical claims, but only the epistemological claim 
that we have can have no knowledge of such mind-independent entities: we may accept 
that there are mind-independent entities which act as the causes of our experiences, but 
these entities are unknowable.
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 2.2.2 Perception and the Senses
Whether thinkers believe in the existence of an independent external world or not, they can 
agree that a person must be constituted in a way that makes experience possible, and they 
can also agree that having such a constitution is not sufficient for experience. While we can 
agree that an entity we experience as inanimate, a rock for instance, cannot itself have 
experience, we can also agree that, even though having the right constitution would provide 
the potential for experience, something more is required for having experience. Stimuli as 
well  as  sensitivity  to  stimuli  are  both  required.  Put  simply,  sensory  information is  also 
necessary for experience, whether such information is received through the senses of sight, 
hearing, touch, smell, and taste, or through bodily sensations like pain. There are both 
subjective and objective conditions for having experience of an “external” world.
Our interface with the world is provided by many different types of sensory receptors 
which are encoded by sensory transducers the output of which are used by the brain to 
build a model of the world. Sensory transducers convert input stimuli to electrochemical sig­
nals.  Many  different  types  of  sensory  transducers  have 
evolved to respond selectively to different types of input 
(light waves, sound waves, chemical and mechanical stim­
uli, electric and magnetic fields, and so on.) Each sensory 
receptor transmits a discrete signal which is part of an in­
put vector of signals constituting one sensation event. Dif­
ferent modalities can interfere with each other as demon­
strated by,  for  instance,  the  McGurk  Effect  which  shows 
very neatly how what we see affects what we report hear­
ing. In addition, the brain is plastic and malleable: sensory 
input can physically affect brain organization, an example of which is the enlargement of the 
hippocampus of London taxi drivers after training involving extensive use of spatial memory 
(Maguire et al., 2000).
Visual modality is usually privileged in most discussions of sensation and perception 
which is not surprising given that sight is the pre-eminent sense required for human surviv­
al. However, even a cursory examination of the physical structure of the visual system will 
show that it is insufficient for an explanation of visual perceptions. What we “receive” in the 
brain are the results of large numbers of discrete signals resulting from the stimulation of 
many individual rods and cones in the retina of the eye. The brain then has to assemble 
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these electro-chemical signals into a meaningful image. Stimulation by individual photons is 
the only means of communication between the objects around us and our visual system5; 
yet, despite the lack of organization in the retinal stimulation, perceptions  are organized. 
Furthermore, humans are able to adapt to visual distortions, thus implying that additional 
conditions are required for a coherent and complete account of experience. 
Psychologists tend to favour either bottom-up (data-driven) or top-down perceptual 
processing. Bottom-up perceptual processing is unidirectional,  starting at the retina and 
proceeding to the visual cortex with analysis of the input being increasingly complex at each 
stage in the visual pathway (see Gibson 1966). In top-down processing, contextual informa­
tion is used in pattern recognition and, thus for this theory, perception is a constructive pro­
cess (see Gregory 1970). Many philosophers and psychologists (e.g., Jerry Fodor and Steph­
en Pinker), as well as evolutionary psychologists (e.g., Leda Cosmides and John Tooby) re­
ject the top-down approach by arguing that perception is impenetrable to a subject's back­
ground knowledge. Fodor argued that sensory transducers convert input stimuli to electro­
chemical  signals  and  produce  output  which  is  lawfully  dependent  on their  input  (Fodor 
1983:40). The evidence he uses to demonstrate his mod­
ular view of perception is the Müller-Lyer illusion as shown 
in Illustration 2. Even if we know that the two horizontal 
lines in the illusion are equal, we, nevertheless, continue 
to see one line (the bottom line in this case) as longer 
than the other.  This  informational encapsulation of  the 
perceptual modules limits the extent by which perception 
can be a constructive process (Fodor 1983) at least in the early processing stages. This pos­
ition would, at first glance, appear to be contrary to Hoffman's theory of visual intelligence 
(Hoffman:1998) which he describes as a constructive process. Hoffman's visual intelligence 
is, however, a rule-based process in which (as argued by supporters of modular theories 
such as Fodor's) a subject's theories, beliefs, and background knowledge play no part. For 
Hoffman, “visual worlds” are constructed from ambiguous figures such as those in and be­
low, in conformance to visual rules not background knowledge (Hoffman 1998:24). Hoffman 
5 This  is  not  completely  accurate because  the visual  system can be activated by converting  signals  of  other 
modalities into a form similar to normal visual input: that is, the visual cortex may be recruited for identifying 
sound-encoded objects.  For  instance,  Dr  Peter  Meijer  (senior scientist  at  Philips  Research Laboratories  in  the 
Netherlands) developed The vOICe system (the three middle letters standing for "Oh I See") which works by  
translating images from a camera on-the-fly into highly complex soundscapes, which are then transmitted to the 
user over headphones. After considerable practise, it is possible for some subjects to  see complete images with 
depth and texture.
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Illustration 2: Müller-Lyer Illusion
notes that there is a fundamental problem of vision namely that the “image at the eye [the 
image cast on the retina] has countless possible interpretations” (Hoffman 1998:13) but the 
Muller-Lyer illusion indicates that the brain rapidly and unconsciously processes information 
about length and size before any other stages in the perceptual process. This is not to say 
that all stages/modules in the perceptual process are informationally-encapsulated but only 
those (early) stages which construct images in conformity to visual rules and not to the sub­
ject's background knowledge.
In  the  preceding  discussion,  it  must  be  emphasized  that  there  is  a  difference 
between perception of an object and perception of a fact. Fact perception involves know­
ledge and beliefs, and therefore involves the whole cognitive apparatus, whereas object per­
ception does not – knowledge, beliefs, and theories are, however, required for rending the 
percept “meaningful”. Philosophical theories vary on whether we apprehend, in object per­
ception, external objects or internal objects (representations of the objects or ideas in the 
mind), but, whether or not the senses are input systems or input modules, it is doubtful 
that any theory of perception proposes that inputs (such as photons) are directly sent to the 
mind without some form of preprocessing. 
 2.2.3 Scientific Theories and Empiricism
Advances in physics and technology have vastly expanded our understanding of reality (or, 
rather, what reality might be like to account for our experiences of it) but this does not go 
hand-in-hand with a more direct access to the entities which science postulates as real. In 
fact quantum mechanics, as it is currently formulated, supports the view that we can never 
form  a  true  picture  of  the  world-as-it-is-in-itself  because  of  the  actual  role  that 
measurement and observation play in the theory’s  description of fundamental  reality  — 
because of the role the observer plays, quantum theory cannot provide a picture of reality 
that is absolutely independent of the observer.
Further, we experience acceleration as a detectable change in velocity in a three-di­
mensional space, not as a curved line in spacetime as defined in Einstein's Special Theory of 
Relativity and Minkowski's Spacetime Theory. It is likely that we evolved three-dimensional 
space detection modules because the greatest acceleration that we could experience in the 
environment of evolutionary adaptation, consistently enough to affect evolution, was accel­
eration due to gravity which produces a radius of curvature in spacetime so large relative to 
human dimensions as to be undetectable without the use of advanced technology. There is, 
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apparently, no evolutionary advantage for humans to be able to experience curves in space­
time, any more than there was an evolutionary advantage for humans to be able to hear in­
fra-sound or see ultraviolet waves.
We experience time as absolute and uni-directional — we evolved in such a way as to 
experience proper time, or time in an inertial frame. Our cognitive functions have evolved 
such that we experience only the three-dimensional cross-section of spacetime. No matter 
how our technology advances, our realm of possible experience is restricted to empirical 
reality; technology cannot provide us with unmediated experience of the world as it is in it­
self. The external world of possible direct human experience has four dimensions (three 
spatial and one temporal) and contains medium sized objects, medium length distances, 
and medium velocities — in other words, the human cognitive faculties have evolved in such 
a way as to render the infinitesimally small objects and distances postulated by Quantum 
Mechanics and the extremely large objects, distances, and velocities postulated by General 
Relativity outside their frame of reference. 
Perception can be defined as the active process of selecting, organizing, and inter­
preting sensory information; it is the method by which sensations  (sensory information, 
sense-data) are interpreted. A physical account would be that sense organs absorb energy 
from stimuli in the environment and sensory receptors convert this energy into neural im­
pulses which are then transmitted to the brain. Perception is the result of the brain’s organ­
izing the sensory information and translating it into something meaningful, however “mean­
ingful” may be defined. 
 2.3 PART II: WHY AN INTERNALIST SEMANTICS
The traditional conception of meaning assumes that to know the meaning of a lexical item, 
sentence,  predicate,  or  such  like,  is  to  be  in  a  particular  psychological  state  (e.g., 
perception, belief, memory) which represents entities in the world and properties of those 
entities. There is  a relationship between this conception of meaning and that of  certain 
philosophers of science who, in discussions of the observational-theoretical division, refer to 
the the truth  or falsity of observation  sentences and the role that sense contents play in 
their tokening (see Maxwell 1962:3-15). These philosophers of science thereby hold that 
sense contents are conceptual in nature, that is, that they have a representational content 
which could act as a premise or conclusion in an inference. “Observation statements” are 
public entities by definition and presuppose (and are expressed in the language of) some 
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possible fallible theory or theories. Perceptions, on the other hand, are not public but are 
directly  accessible  to  the  observer  –  access  to  percepts  is  privileged.  The  scientific 
observation statement “the Earth goes around the Sun” requires a theory which contradicts 
common-sense perceptions – we still talk of the Sun setting or rising even if we accept the 
solar-centric theory. Based solely on unaided sensory input, our  mental representation of 
the Sun is of something that moves, but a scientific theory can modify interpretations of the 
input.
A representational mental state is “about” something – it has intentional content. In 
answering the question of how intentional states (specifically  de dicto intentional mental 
states6) come to have the particular content that they do, contemporary philosophers tend 
to favour one of two main positions: internalism, whereby mental contents are sufficient to 
fix intentional content; and  externalism, whereby mental contents are not sufficient and 
that “meaning ain't in the head” or, at least, is not completely “in the head” (Putnam 1975). 
Externalism is a thesis for which the property of a particular intentional mental state (e.g., a 
belief, a desire, an intention) is individuated by how the person having that property is re­
lated to the external world. In other words, the content of a person's thoughts and the 
meanings of the terms he uses to express them are dependent on his external environment. 
Internalism, in contrast, is a thesis for which a person's having the property does not de­
pend on any relation to the external world. It should be emphasized that internalism does 
not deny that factors in the external world may causally influence whether or not the person 
has mental states with the property, but only holds that properties of intentional states are 
not individuated by relationships between an person and the person's external environment 
– identical factors in the external world could causally influence two different individuals to 
token intentional states with different properties depending on their individual intrinsic prop­
erties – both may experience a flash of black and yellow, for instance, which causes one to 
token an intentional state with the content 'tiger” but in the other an intentional state with 
the content 'sunflower'. Putnam's 1975 paper gave rise to an externalist semantics which is 
widely accepted in the cognitive science community, especially by many philosophers of 
mind and psychologists. Putnam arrived at this position by, in part, extending Saul Kripke's 
causal theory of reference (see Kripke 1971, 1972/80).
6Externalism and internalism disagree on de dicto intentional mental states which attribute propositional attitudes 
(mental states, like  belief, held by the individual toward a proposition) in a manner that produces referentially 
opaque contexts (that is to say, substituting co-referring terms within their scope may change the truth-value of  
the sentence.) In English, the propositions are introduced with ‘that-clauses’. ‘John believes that George Sand was 
a Frenchman' is syntactically de dicto: 'John believes that Amandine-Aurore-Lucille Dudevant was a Frenchman' is 
not true despite the fact that 'George Sand' and 'Amandine-Aurore-Lucille Dudevant' are co-referential. 
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 2.3.1 The Causal Theory of Reference
The causal theory of reference (hereafter the “K-P theory”) is the theory that names refer to 
their  referents  by  being  causally  connected  to  them  in  some  appropriate  fashion.  A 
particular token of a name will belong to a causal chain of such tokenings which originated 
in an "initial baptismal" event (frequently of “ostension”) when the referent was present. 
Putnam does, however, extend this to the possibility of the “baptismal event” taking place in 
the absence of the referent. In either case, names refer "rigidly" to their referents in that 
they refer to this referent in every possible world in which that referent exists.
K-P theory in itself only becomes tendentious when extended beyond a theory about 
the referent of a proper name to a claim that the meaning of a lexical item is its reference. 
The causal chain linking the proper names and their referents is mediated by the linguistic 
community  but there  is, in fact, rarely a single, homogeneous community to ensure that 
there is one and only one causal chain linking a specific name with a specific referent. There 
is no ultimate linguistic authority. A simple example is that of 'billion' which has different 
referents in UK and American English (a million million and a thousand million respectively). 
We can, of course, just rely on calling the UK and American 'billion' terms different, homo­
phonic terms but, by the same token, we can just call 'Londres' of Kripke's Pierre7 a homo­
phone of 'Londres' in the linguistic community of Kripke's translator because 'Londres' and 
'London' are not co-referring in Pierre's idiolect. Referentialist theories have a tendency to 
require proliferation of homophones to account for the variations in reference for a term. 
This is discussed further below in regards to, for instance, natural-kind terms and natur­
al-kind terms qua natural kind terms (e.g., 'water' referring to water which happens to be a 
natural kind and 'water' as a natural-kind term); and to terms which have changed mean­
ing/reference over time (e.g., 'meat'  which originally referred to food generally but now 
refers to edible animal flesh, and 'fish' which was originally used to refer to all “creatures 
that live in the sea” but was co-opted by biologists to refer to a subset of sea creatures.)
7Kripke (1979) proposed a thought experiment in which a mono-lingual speaker of French, Pierre, believes to be 
pretty a certain city which is called 'London' by English-speakers and which he calls 'Londres'. After seeing many  
pictures of the city, he sincerely assents to the sentence “Londres est jolie”. Pierre moves to London and learns 
English by the direct method of language acquisition. He becomes a normal speaker of English and one of the 
things he learns is  that  the city  in  which he is  now living is  called 'London'.  Unfortunately,  he moved to an 
unattractive part of the city and comes to assent to the sentence “London is not pretty”. That is to say, he does  
not, upon reflection, sincerely assent to 'London is pretty'; he, in fact, sincerely and reflectively assents to 'London  
is not pretty'. Pierre's holds seemingly contradictory beliefs (“Londres est jolie” and “London is not pretty”) without  
any logical deficiency on his part.  Kripke acknowledges that, while  it  is  possible  to  describe Pierre's situation 
coherently, it is not possible to answer satisfactorily the question: “Does Pierre believe that London is pretty?”
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 2.3.2 Internalist and Externalist Semantics
In their analyses of language, most analytic philosophers view natural language as an object 
to be investigated without reference to the mental processes of language users.  Just as 
Chomsky  (1986)  differentiated  between  E-Language (natural  language  viewed  as  an 
external  artifact  with  properties  that  are  part  of  the  external  world)  and  I-Language 
(language viewed as a body of knowledge within the minds or brains of speakers), theories 
of  meaning  can  be  divided  into  externalist  and  internalist  theories.  Externalist  and 
internalist theories can both be further divided into those concerned with the meaning of 
natural  language (NL) lexical  items and those concerned with the meaning of  concepts 
which  may be expressible  by NL lexical  items. Treating meaning as a relation between 
lexical  items  (or  lexical  concepts)  and  “mind-independent”  entities  in  the  world  is,  I 
contend, mistaken. 
 2.3.3 Externalist Theories of Meaning
Using,  in  part,  the  theory  of  rigid  designation  advanced  by  Saul  Kripke  (1972/1980), 
Putnam  claimed  that  the  intension of  a linguistic  expression is determined,  mostly,  by 
external factors. Both his and Kripke's externalist position on how the meaning of terms is 
fixed  had  considerable  influence  on  the  philosophy  of  language  and  on  other  areas  of 
cognitive  science.  In  this  section  I  analyze,  compare,  and  criticize  two  examples  of 
externalist  theories  of  meaning,  namely  Putnam's  linguistic  theory,  concerned  with  the 
meaning of lexical items, and Fodor's psychological theory, concerned with the meaning of 
lexical concepts. These two theories both accept a form of the Kripkean causal theory of 
reference. They hence both propose an externalist semantics.
 2.3.4 A linguistic theory of meaning
Putnam rejected the traditional view that the meaning of terms with different extensions 
requires different narrow psychological  states. That is  to say, he rejected the view that 
intension  determines  extension.  The  conclusion  of  his  famous  “Twin  Earth”  thought 
experiment  is  that  “[E]xtension  is  not  determined  by  psychological  state”  (Putnam, 
1975:222). His thought experiment is intended to show that it is possible for two “English” 
speakers (Oscar
1
 on Earth and Oscar
2
 on “Twin” Earth) to be in the same psychological state 
with respect to a term 'T' even though the term refers to distinct extensions in each of the 
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two Earths: in 1750, prior to the development of modern chemistry in either of the two 
Earths, Oscar
1
 and his “Twin” Earth counterpart Oscar
2
 have identical experiences of and 
beliefs about water – they are in the same narrow psychological state – even though the 
extension of ‘water’ in each of the Earths is different. Hence, “the extension of the term 
‘water’ . . . is not a function of the psychological state of the speaker by itself.” Putnam's 
point is that it is possible to know the meaning of a term without being able to fix the 
extension of the term. Determining the extension of many terms must, Putnam proposes, 
be left up to experts; for such terms, there is a linguistic “division of labor” whereby their 
meaning is a function of a social interaction between average language users and experts 
(such as physicists and chemists).
The K-P theory is based on an extension of the theory of proper names but there are 
many cases when the original “baptismal” event occurred in the absence of the referent or 
even when the referent did not exist. An example of the latter is 'Atlantis'. This is not a  
“meaningless” term and is used as a proper name, but there is no referent; hence its mean­
ing cannot be the referent. An example of “premature” baptism is that of “the North-West 
Passage”: explorers searched for “the North-West Passage” before they knew if there was 
just one or if there were many. They were not searching for a north-west passage but for 
the North-West Passage. Scientists often postulate the existence of entities before being 
able to prove if these entities actually exist. Yet their use of the names of these entities are 
still meaningful whether or not the referents actually exist: the term “phlogiston” did not 
cease to be meaningful as soon as it was proved to have no referent. If the meaning is the 
referent, then it is questionable as to where the meaning lies for these or any terms refer­
ring to mythical or fictional entities.
For Putnam and Kripke, meaning is construed linguistically. Concerning individuation 
of the same term with different senses (e.g, 'bank'),  Putnam refers to the “standard” view 
that  a  term  is  actually  an  ordered  pair  consisting  of  the  extension  and  the  sense 
(1975:216).  While Putnam accepted that extension is a principal component of the mean­
ing of natural-kind terms, he rejected that sense is a part of meaning, and proposed that 
the linguistic meaning of every term in the language could be specified by a finite sequence 
of elements (a vector), where, for natural kind terms, at least, the extension is a component 
of its meaning vector (Putnam 1975:246). This meaning vector has several other compon­
ents including: semantic indicators (that place the referent in particular general categories), 
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syntactic indicators (that govern the term's formal relationships in phrases or sentences), 
and a stereotype (a set of typical descriptions of the term). 
A change in the reference of the term but not in its stereotype is, Putnam claims, the 
only legitimate way that the meaning of an expression can change, but this claim may be 
hard to substantiate in the case of many artifacts: for instance, the stereotype of a quill 
feather changes significantly when it is used as a pen – the meaning has changed but not 
the reference. When someone utters the statement “Bush is no Einstein”, where the context 
tells us that 'Bush' refers to George W. Bush who served as the 43 rd President of the U.S.A., 
what are the meanings of the terms 'Bush' and 'Einstein'? If we accept the K-P theory of 
proper names, then the meaning of 'Bush' just is the referent, the person also known as 
George W. Bush, but, in this example, the term-world relation does not work for the term 
'Einstein'. The speaker has in mind something other than the human DNA, with a specific ni­
trogen base arrangement, tagged 'Einstein'; the speaker-meaning just is the stereotype. 
Nevertheless, in a specific case there may be no way of definitively determining whether it 
is its stereotype or its reference that has changed and hence the usage of other expressions 
of the language have also to be considered (Putnam 1975:269-270). Putnam's theory of 
meaning is, thus, a form of semantic holism.
Underlying Putnam's analysis are two assumptions: 1) that the meaning of a term is 
its reference (extension); and, more significantly, 2) that terms themselves have meaning. 
The latter assumption further assumes an externalist perspective that (natural) language is 
an artifact (what Chomsky calls 'E-Language') that can be analyzed independently of lan­
guage users in much the same way that we analyze the mathematical notation of a theorem 
without regard to the psychological states of the mathematicians who developed or use it – 
this is in contrast to the way we treat musical scores for which the composer's intention (the 
composer-meaning rather than the notation-meaning) is paramount. I contend that treating 
(natural) language as an external artifact gives rise to linguistic paradoxes such as Frege's 
Puzzle,  Mates' Cases, and even Putnam's Twin case8.
 2.3.5 A psychological theory of meaning
Like Putnam, Fodor supports the view that meaning is denotation: “there is nothing to the 
meaning of a name except its bearer and nothing to the meaning of a predicate except the 
8 Linguistic puzzles such as these arise from making two assumptions: 1) The meaning of a term is given by its  
reference; and 2) The meaning of a sentence is given by its parts. The puzzles are discussed further in the section  
 2.3.9 “Externalist Semantics and Linguistic Puzzles“.
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property that it expresses” (Fodor 1990:161). Also like Putnam, Fodor proposes a causal 
theory of meaning but, rather than a theory of linguistic meaning, he supports a causal 
theory of representation, an informational theory of content using the notion of information 
to explain naturalistically how intentional states come to have content. On this account, the 
contents of mental representations are determined by their causes: for example, the mental 
representation (MR) CAT is about cats (has 'cat' as its content) because cats cause it. That 
is,  an  MR  receives  its  content  only  through  the  mind's  causal  connections  with  the 
environment.  Tokenings  of  propositional  attitudes  (such  as  believing,  fearing,  hoping) 
involves tokening an MR which, for Fodor, is a symbol in the language of thought (LOT). The 
syntax of a symbol  is  generally a determiner of  its  causal role:  symbol tokens interact 
causally in virtue of their syntactic structures. Two symbols can be transformed one to the 
other if and only if they stand in semantic relations to each other (the semantic relations 
that, for instance, premises have to their conclusions in a valid argument). A symbol's truth 
condition is the state of affairs in the world which, it it obtains, would make the symbol true.
Unlike those who support a linguistic theory of meaning, supporters of theories of 
meaning with psychological components are likely to consider artifacts to be mind-depend­
ent: 
What with one thing and another, I've been pushing pretty hard the notion that 
properties like being a doorknob are mind-dependent. ... the Standard Argument 
shows that only non-primitive concepts can be learned inductively. And it's been 
the  main  burden  of  this  whole  book  that  all  the  evidence—philosophical, 
psychological,  and  linguistic—suggests  that  DOORKNOB  is  primitive 
(unstructured); and, for that matter, that so too is practically everything else. 
(Fodor 1998a:147)
Fodor's position needs, however, some way of distinguishing between a mind-independent 
property of being a P and a mind-dependent property of being a P. “Suppose, in particular, 
that being a doorknob is just having the property that minds like ours reliably lock to in 
consequence of experience with typical doorknobs” (Fodor 1998a:148). But, if being a dog, 
for  instance,  is  a mind-independent property and  being a doorknob is  not,  what is  the 
difference in the two locking mechanisms?  Fodor (1998a:88n) states that  he uses both 
'stereotype' and 'prototype' to refer to mental representations of certain kinds of properties. 
On this view, 'the dog stereotype' and 'the dog prototype' both designate a concept (e.g., 
“BEING A DOMESTIC ANIMAL WHICH BARKS, HAS A TAIL WHICH IT WAGS WHEN IT IS 
PLEASED,... etc.”) A stereotype for Fodor is a type of referent and can be either a particular 
entity (often termed an exemplar) or a set of properties (often termed a prototype). Studies 
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indicate that pre-verbal children can distinguish the use of the definite (the particular) from 
the indefinite (one-of-a-set article) with word shaping occurring almost always at the “Base 
Level” (Markman 1989). This would indicate that pre-verbal children can lock to the mind-
independent property of  being a dog without any scientific-cum-metaphysical theory but 
rather that being a dog “is just having the property that minds like ours reliably lock to in 
consequence of experience with typical” dogs.
The K-P theory provides no discussion of how we understand word meanings other 
than a brief mention that when it comes to individual competence in making the term/ex­
tension link, “concepts have a lot to do with meaning” (Putnam 1975: 246-7). While Fodor 
supports a form of semantic externalism, for him meaning is construed psychologically; he 
is concerned with psychological explanations rather than a theory of meaning for natural 
language. Linguistic expressions of a natural language are conventionally used to express 
intentional mental states and many philosophers (Fodor 1978, Searle 1983, and others), in 
contrast to Putnam for instance, claim that their semantic properties are inherited from 
those mental states. Fodor's theory of meaning is concerned with underived meaning, and is 
a theory in which the meanings of thoughts are prior to the meanings of any symbols used 
for communication or for expressing thoughts – the meaning of symbols is derived from the 
meaning of the thoughts being expressed (Fodor, 1987). 
 2.3.6 Determination of Extension
One of  the first  problems of  meaning is  that  of  how extension is  determined (Putnam 
1975:246). Putnam defines extension as the set of all things that the term is true of: for 
instance “'rabbit' ... is true of all and only rabbits”. What the mechanism for determining an 
extension is  depends,  in  part,  on whether  the  extension is  mind-independent  or  mind-
dependent.  The Kripke-Putnam account is  concerned with mind-independent  extensions, 
with  those  extensions  which  are  determined  by  the  world.  On  this  view,  “[T]he  world 
consists  of  some fixed totality  of  mind-independent objects”  (Putnam 1981:49) and,  to 
paraphrase Plato (Phaedrus 265d-266a), the world is “carved by nature at its joints”. There 
are clearly some metaphysical and epistemological assumptions underlying this view.
Underlying the K-P theory of reference is the idea of a world consisting of a fixed to­
tality of mind-independent objects and properties; of a world that is, hence, independent of 
any discourse about it. Along with this assumption of metaphysical realism are also assump­
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tions of a correspondence theory of truth and that there can be one true, complete descrip­
tion of reality:
There is exactly one true and complete description of ‘the way the world is.’ Truth 
involves some sort of correspondence relation between words or thought signs 
and external things and sets of things (Putnam 1981:49)
A  further  assumption  is  that  science  will  be  able  to  resolve,  at  least  in  principle,  all  
philosophical problems. It should be noted, however, that this does not reflect Putnam's 
later position in which he abandoned metaphysical realism along with its commitment to the 
existence  of  mind-independent  entities.  In  his  later  writings,  he  advocates  a  type  of 
pragmatic realism ("internal realism") motivated in part by the failure of scientific realism to 
provide  an  account  of  intentionality.  He  supports  an  ontology  relativized  to  conceptual 
schemes:
‘Objects’ do not exist independently of conceptual schemes. We cut up the world 
into objects when we introduce one or another scheme of description (1981: 52). 
If, as I maintain, ‘objects’ themselves are as much made as discovered, as much 
products of our conceptual  invention as of the ‘objective’ factor in experience, 
the factor  independent of  our will,  then of course objects  intrinsically  belong 
under certain labels because those labels are just the tools we use to construct a 
version of the world with such objects in the first place. (Putnam 1981:54 italics 
in original)
Fodor too assumes metaphysical realism: “the centrality of perceptual mechanisms in medi­
ating the meaning-making laws is also just a fact about the world, and not a fact about the 
metaphysics of content” (Fodor 1998a:79). On Fodor's view, having a natural-kind concept 
requires locking to the natural kind and having a natural-kind qua natural-kind concept9 re­
quires  locking  to the  natural kind  via  a  scientific-cum-metaphysical  theory  (Fodor 
1998a:157). Fodor argues for a folk psychology within a physicalist framework and for an 
account of concepts which is solely an exercise in metaphysics – epistemology is not relev­
ant (Fodor 1998a:5ff). 
 2.3.7 Determination of Reference
There is  a  distinction between how the meaning of a word is  determined and how the 
reference of the word is determined.  The Kripke-Putnam account of reference has been 
criticized recently  for  giving rise  to  what  has  been  called  the  “qua problem”  (Devitt  & 
Sterelny, 1978).  According to the Kripke-Putnam view, 'gold' involves the act of ostension, 
9 It is not clear how Putnam would distinguish between a natural-kind term and a natural-kind  qua natural-kind 
term; between, that is, the theoretic term and the non-theoretic (non-theory-mediated) natural-kind simpliciter.
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of pointing to samples of the substance gold which is the element with the atomic number 
79 (Kripke 1972/1980:116). As Locke noted, however, natural kind terms can group objects 
in different categories depending on the properties under consideration:
The same Convenience that made Men express several parcels of yellow Matter 
coming from Guiny and Peru, under one name, sets them also upon making of 
one name, that may comprehend both Gold, and Silver . . . under the name 
Metal (Locke, 1690/1959, III vi, 32).
Thus, when a sample of gold is pointed to, it is not clear which natural kind the sample 
instantiates. There is still the problem of fixing the reference of ‘gold’ to gold rather than to 
metals or elements; of gold  qua  gold, or  qua  metal, or  qua  element (Stanford & Kitcher 
2000). To resolve this problem, Dewitt and Sterelny add a descriptive component to the 
causal theory of reference:
Something  about  the  mental  state  of  the  grounder  must  determine  which 
putative nature of the sample is the one relevant to the grounding, and should it 
have no such nature the grounding will fail. It is very difficult to say exactly what 
determines the relevant nature.
People group samples together into natural kinds on the basis of the samples’ 
observed characteristics. They observe what the samples look like, feel like, and 
so on. They observe how they behave and infer that they have certain causal 
powers.  At  some  level,  then,  people  “think  of”  the  samples  under  certain 
descriptions and as a result apply the natural kind term to them. It is this mental 
activity that determines which underlying nature of the samples is the relevant 
one to a grounding. The relevant nature is the one that is, as a matter of fact, 
responsible for the properties picked out by the descriptions associated with the 
term in the grounding. If the sample does not have these properties – if, for 
example, the alleged witch does not have the power to cast spells – then there 
will  be  no  relevant  nature  and  the  groundings  will  fail  (Dewitt  &  Sterelny 
1987:73–74)
As Stanford and Kitcher emphasize, the descriptive component “must include all and only 
those features that are causally relevant to the production of the observable qualities in 
question.” 
One problem is to identify which scientific theory is of consideration when determin­
ing reference. A physicist and a chemist may have different interests in, and are thus con­
cerned with, different underlying properties of the same substance. As stated previously, a 
physicist may be concerned with electron configuration and the chemist with chemical com­
position. Kripke claims that water is necessarily H2O but if what is important about water is 
not that its molecules are composed of hydrogen and oxygen, but rather that its molecules 
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have a particular electron configuration, then it would be possible that Putnam’s Twin Earth 
XYZ water could be theoretically identical to the water on Earth as long as it has the same 
electron configuration.
While determination of reference for (natural-kind) terms may be a matter of the 
knowledge of the linguistic community as a whole, as Kripke and Putnam maintain, how the 
term is used may differ from speaker to speaker. There is a distinction between semantic 
reference and speaker reference:
In a given idiolect, the semantic referent of a designator (without indexicals) is 
given by a general intention of the speaker to refer to a certain object whenever 
the designator is used. The speaker's referent is given by a specific intention, on 
a given occasion, to refer to a certain object. (Kripke 1977)
Kripke (1977) differentiates between the "simple" case in which a speaker has the specific 
intention of referring to the semantic referent (that is to say, his specific intention is simply 
his  general semantic intention) and the "complex" case in which a speaker has a  specific 
intention  which  he  believes,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  determines  the  same  object  as  that 
determined by his general intention.  While, in the "simple" case, the speaker's referent and 
the semantic referent coincide, they only do so in the "complex" case when the speaker's 
belief is correct.
 2.3.8 Meaning of Natural-kind terms
For Putnam and Kripke, 'meaning'10 is to be defined as the reference of an expression (its 
denotation11) as opposed to something that one wishes to convey, especially by language, or 
the sense of an expression (its connotation). Both Putnam and Kripke based many of their 
arguments  on the idea that  that  proper  names are  rigid designators and extended the 
theory to apply to natural kind terms: “terms for natural kinds are much closer to proper 
names than is ordinarily supposed” (Kripke 1972/1980:127). Putnam states that, in order 
for most people to know the meaning of a natural-kind term like 'gold' or 'tiger', they have 
to defer to experts who are able to determine the micro-structure of the natural kind to 
which the term refers. In other words, without deference to experts, we would not know the 
real meaning of such terms. This, I find highly questionable. There is a difference between 
10 Putnam (1975:223-4)  states  that  for  his  theory  of  meaning:  the  verb  'means'  sometimes  means  'has  an  
extension' but “the nominalization 'meaning' never means 'extension'”.
11 Kripke (1972/1980:25n3) “Perhaps it would have been less misleading to use a technical term, such as 'denote' 
rather than 'refer'.  My use of 'refer' is  such as to satisfy the schema, 'The referent of "X" is X',  where 'X' is  
replaceable by any name or description.”
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applying a natural-kind term incorrectly and not knowing the meaning of a term. The term 
'gold' was used long before anyone knew the atomic composition of gold. It seems strange 
to claim, as Putnam does, that the meaning of a natural-kind term does not change but that 
users, prior to the discovery of the chemical composition of the term's referent, users of the 
term were unaware of its meaning. They were obviously not aware of the modern scientific 
usage of the term but were, nevertheless, able to use the term to express their thoughts. 
How the term is used depends on the interests of the user: a physicist may use 'gold' as 
another name for Au or for atomic number 79, while a lay person is more likely to use 'gold' 
to refer to a valuable, yellow12 metal that will never rust or tarnish and that is often used in 
ornamentation or as a currency or standard for global currencies. In other words, the usage 
of the term is interest-relative. Even for the scientist using a natural-kind term, usage is 
determined by the scientific theories “in his head”. When we defer to an expert, we are not 
usually in the position of the expert's giving us an ostensive definition – pointing to an 
electron, or a quark is likely to be problematic. Instead, the expert usually has to try to 
convey the relevant and current theory.
Even if we accept that a relevant scientific community maintains the  meaning of a 
scientific term, the reference of the term is likely to change over time. According to Kripke, 
when a biologist discovered that 'whales are mammals, not fish', his denial that whales are 
fish does not show that his 'concept of fishhood' is different from that of the layman; “he 
simply corrects the layman” (Kripke 1972/1980:138). Nevertheless, in the Bible (Ezekiel 
38:20), reference is made to “the fishes of the sea”. The reference for the initial 'baptism', 
the initial tagging of 'the fishes of the sea', is not what we now-a-days would call 'fish' since 
the original  extension of  'the fishes of  the sea'  would have included mammals such as 
whales and dolphins. Revisions in the reference of 'fish' were made for scientific reasons but 
not because of any empirical  discovery that some creatures originally classified as 'fish' 
were mammals and that the writers of the Bible were in need of correction. By 'fishes', the 
writers of the Bible (and laymen at the time) meant all creatures that live in the sea – for 
them, the creatures of the world were delineated into “the fishes of the sea”, “the fowls of 
the heaven”, “the beasts of the field”, and “all creeping things that creep upon the earth”. 
The relation between 'fish' and its referents has undergone, and continues to undergo, revi­
sion – in this case, the reference of 'fish' is now fixed by what is most useful to the biolo­
12The English term 'gold' comes from the Old English word for yellow, 'geolu'.
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gists and, since 'fish' currently refers to a paraphyletic group13, the reference is likely to un­
dergo many more revisions. 
A pertinent example of a change of reference is that of 'water': when Lavoisier dis­
covered that the chemical composition of water is two-parts hydrogen and one-part oxygen, 
the term 'water' was co-opted by chemists as a name for the category of all substances 
composed of H2O molecules (they could also have used 'ice' or 'steam'); the discovery of 
deuterium oxide (H218O), however, led to the creation of a new term, namely 'heavy water' 
which, despite having the same chemical composition as water, has very different physical 
properties from those of ordinary water14. It should be noted that even “chemically pure" 
water is a mixture of isotopic species. In fact, many discussions of water and H2O fail to dis­
tinguish between the two: both water and heavy water have the same chemical composition 
(two-parts hydrogen and one-part oxygen) but have different micro-structures (H2O and 
H218O respectively). 
 2.3.9 Externalist Semantics and Linguistic Puzzles
Kripke  claims  that  notions  concerning  the  belief  and  content  of  a  proposition  are 
insufficiently  clear  “to  draw  any  conclusion,  positive  or  negative,  about  substitutivity” 
(Kripke 1979:269). This is a rather unsatisfactory conclusion. The problem that Kripke has 
in “drawing any conclusion” about why this should be the case arises, I contend, because 
his  theory is  non-cognitive; his  theory relates solely  to  the “meaning”  of names where 
“meaning”  just  is  reference  and  hence  names  have  no  semantic  properties.  If,  as 
'conventional judgement' holds, 'Londres' and 'London' are referentially opaque for Pierre15, 
then Pierre must hold contradictory beliefs, but if they are referentially  transparent, then 
they identify the same referent for Kripke (and his readers) but not necessarily for Pierre. 
The puzzle arises only if we choose an opaque reading. Even though there is nothing in the 
expressions themselves that indicate which reading is correct in such situations, there is no 
puzzle  in  such cases if  we reject  the  'conventional  judgement'  that  belief  contexts  are 
'referentially opaque'. 
A theory of concepts requires an account of a mechanism to explain the correlation 
of external entities and internal (mental) physical states so that mental states mean (are 
13 Paraphyletic groups, unlike monophyletic groups, do not include all descendants of a single common ancestor – 
certain subsets of descendants are artificially ignored for practical reasons.
14 For instance, heavy water melts at nearly 4°C higher than does ordinary water at ordinary atmospheric pressure.
15 See footnote 7 on page 14 for a description of Kripke's “Pierre” thought experiment.
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about) the external entities. If we accept CTM and hence that psychological processes are 
computational, then we have to be able to reconcile broad intentional content with  “mech­
anisms that (contingently) insure that linguistic paradoxes Twin cases and Frege cases don't 
occur (very often)” (Fodor 1994:27). That is, we have to be able to explain how psycholo­
gical laws can be intentional. Fodor (1994:57) presents the following constraint on concept 
identity:
C: Concepts that carry the same information are always coextensive
Where, by 'information', he means  intentional content (the way the world is represented) 
whereby “if meaning is information, then coreferential representations must be synonyms” 
(Fodor  1998a:12).  This  constraint  works  for  the  MORNING  STAR  and  EVENING  STAR 
concepts  and  also,  he  claims,  for  the  WATER  and  H2O concepts  because  each  pair  of 
concepts  is  informationally  equivalent  and  informationally  equivalent  concepts  are 
semantically equivalent and “semantically equivalent expressions must apply to the same 
things”  (according  to  Informational  Atomism).  If,  however,  there  are  examples  where 
Condition C fails, then his claim that “informationally equivalent concepts are semantically 
equivalent” may be in trouble. There are, Fodor states, only two options for an externalist 
semantics to distinguish between expressions referring to locally instantiated properties: (1) 
if  they  are  not  co-extensive,  then  an  externalist  semantics  resorts  to  the  use  of 
counterfactuals; and (2) if symbols that are necessarily co-extensive and are co-instantiated 
as a matter of conceptual or metaphysical necessity, then an externalist semantics has to 
distinguish them by their syntax.
Fodor proposes that psychological laws are broad but questions whether broad con­
tent is the only kind of content required by psychological explanations. He considers Frege's 
example of Oedipus and Jocasta: if content is construed broadly then to know that Jocasta 
= Jocasta is also to know that Jocasta = Mother, but Oedipus believed the first but not the 
second identity.  To explain this, Fodor proposes that propositional attitudes are three-place 
relations: relations between the creature, a proposition, and a mode of presentation, where 
modes of presentation are sentences (of Mentalese). Propositional attitudes, like sentences 
can thus be individuated by their syntax as well as their propositional content. Fodor himself 
does not seem to be satisfied with this solution, however, given that Oedipus' marrying his 
mother is a counter-example to the psychological generalization that people generally wish 
to avoid marrying their mothers. His answer seems to be that perception and cognition en­
sure that examples such as these do not proliferate (Fodor 1994:49)!
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Frege and Mate's cases arise when the linguistic expressions are analysed strictly in 
accordance with a pure semantic theory of meaning combined with the rules of logic. There 
is no such difficulty if the expressions are analysed using a pragmatic theory of meaning. 
Oedipus may use the referent of 'Jocasta' as its meaning (in accordance with the K-P the­
ory). However, while “Oedipus' mother” is a  contingent property of Jocasta according to 
Kripke, it  is  necessary if  taken as the  transparent description of a referent by Oedipus. 
Jocasta was “tagged” as 'Oedipus' mother' when she gave birth to Oedipus and thus a new 
(albeit related) causal-historical chain was initiated. Rather than taking 'Oedipus' mother' as 
an opaque description, if we take it as a transparent description, we have a similar situation 
to Kripke's “Pierre” problem which is a problem of epistemology: Oedipus was unaware that 
'Oedipus' mother' and 'Jocasta' had the same referent, just as Pierre was unaware the 'Lon­
dres' and 'London' have the same referent. These are not puzzles of logic but tell us some­
thing about the nature of beliefs; they are more a concern for psychology than for linguist­
ics. Fodor's fifth thesis in his version of RTM is: “Whatever distinguishes coextensive con­
cepts is ipso facto 'in the head'” (Fodor 1998a:15), but, in order to solve co-extension/co-
reference problems while still maintaining an externalist semantics, Fodor needs to postu­
late a “something else”, namely “Modes of Presentation”, for individuating co-extensive but 
distinct concepts. Theories of concepts, such as Fodor's Informational Atomism that postu­
late an externalist theory of meaning, that is, theories of concepts that postulate that con­
tents have a broad content, have difficulty explaining how:
• Distinct concepts in a single mind/brain can have the same referent (have the same 
broad or intentional content) — Frege's Puzzle and Mates' Cases;
• An identical concept (identical psychological state; identical narrow content) in two 
different minds/brains can have different referents (one concept could have different 
broad or intentional contents)— Putnam's “Twin Earth” problem; or
• One concept in a single mind/brain can have more than one referent (have the same 
broad or intentional content) —  “Jade” problem.
Fodor's  solution  is  to  postulate  an  internal  “something”,  namely  modes  of  presentation 
(MOPs), as a solution to Frege's Puzzle and Mates' Cases. A solution to the other two would 
require different  causal-cum-nomological relations between a single concept and different 
referents. 
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In particular reference to Frege's Puzzle, he contends that beliefs about the Morning 
Star and beliefs about the Evening Star have the same conditions of semantic evaluation, 
but they are different beliefs with different causal powers; they involve the tokening of dif­
ferent syntactic objects (Fodor 1990a:39). This allows synonymy to be defined at the level 
of mental representations: two expressions are synonymous just in case they are represen­
ted by the same mental representation16. His MOP solution cannot be used for the second 
and third problems however, because neither  being nephrite and  being jadeite nor  being 
H2O and being XYZ are synonymous. Fodor's solution to these two problems is somewhat 
problematic. Since conceptual (broad) content is constituted by a type of nomic, mind-world 
relation (Fodor 1998a:121), it is unclear how two distinct referents could token the same 
concept unless the they had identical properties. Jadeite and nephrite, for instance, would 
both have to exhibit the same property of being jade. He would be constrained to claim that 
locking to being jadeite or being nephrite through a chemical-cum-metaphysical theory that 
specifies their essences using a different mechanism of semantic access from the theory in 
place  prior  to  finding  out  that  jade  has  two  different  chemical  compositions  (mutatis 
mutandis for  being H2O and  being  XYZ). While this solution might be acceptable, it does 
seem to imply that reference is not the only determiner of broad content. Being jade is be­
ing jadeite or nephrite, and being water for Putnam's Twins is  being H2O or XYZ. Indeed, 
Putnam claims in his Twin Earth thought experiment that it is possible for two concepts to 
differ in their extensions but ascribe the same properties. This leads to the position that 
conceptual content is determined by both reference and property ascription which does not 
seem compatible with an atomic theory of concepts.
Many examples of co-extensive concepts (and co-referring terms) include context 
and/or additional information which results  in their  being non-substitutable in doxastic17 
contexts. A causal theory of reference, as presented by Kripke and Putnam, has no mechan­
ism for including such additional information. Further, we need to separate discussions of 
entities (both objects and events) in the world from the names or terms we use to refer to 
them. As Bas van Fraassen has pointed out, scientific theoretical terms are introduced or 
16 How a connectionist model of concepts handles synonomy and linguistic puzzles is discussed in section  5.2.4 
“Concepts and Categorization”.
17 'Doxastic' relates to beliefs and similar attitudes such as 'think', 'hope', desire', want'. It is possible for a rational 
person to believe (think/hope, etc.) that Cicero is a good man and that Tully is not even though Tully and Cicero 
are the same person.
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modified as required for theory construction (van Fraassen 1980:23-25), but this position 
can be extended beyond the requirements of scientific theories to all  theories or beliefs 
about mind-independent entities. 
 2.3.10 An Internalist Theory of Meaning
The theories of meaning discussed in the previous sections take a literal view of meaning; 
they relate linguistic expressions to entities in the world (the K-P theory of meaning) or they 
relate denotation to the bearer of the name or the meaning of a predicate to the property it 
expresses (Fodor's informational theory of meaning). An internalist theory of meaning is, I 
contend,  not  only  more  psychological  plausible,  but  also  avoids  the  paradoxes  of  co-
reference and co-extension which plague referential theories of meaning, can explain how 
metaphors can have meaning, and so on.
 2.3.11 Reference and Interpretation
Kripke's development of his theory of reference applied to proper  names. The question is 
whether the theory can be extended to other entities. Illustration 3 and Illustration 4 show 
two famous examples of ambiguous figures. Each of them 
has a “proper name”, “Jastrow's Duck-Rabbit” and “Necker 
Cube” respectively, each of them can be “seen as” in more 
than one way. Ambiguous  figures such as these highlight 
the  problem  of  holding  that  sensory  stimuli  alone  can 
determine perception: the same stimuli can result in more 
than  one  interpretation.  Processes  of  interpretation  are 
required  for  sensory  stimulations  to  have  meaning.  Both 
illustrations  are  merely  two-dimensional  drawings.  The 
reference of the DUCK  concept and the reference of the RABBIT 
are  both  the  two-dimensional  drawing  of  Illustration  3.  Both 
concepts have the same reference but, in this case, there is no 
duck nor  rabbit in  the  external  world.  What  appears  to  be 
happening is that the ambiguous image is linked to more than 
one  concept  but,  since  consciousness  is  sequential,  only  one 
meaningful image can enter consciousness at a time. This type of process is discussed in 
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Illustration 3: Jastrow's Duck-Rabbit
Illustration 4: Necker Cube
more detail  later  in  the dissertation,  but,  very  briefly,  the process  appears to  be  that, 
unconsciously, input becomes meaningful by being linked to a concept if a relevant one is 
available, or even to more than one, as, for example, in the case of ambiguous figures; this 
process takes place in a massively-parallel system; the meaningful images become input to 
the conscious mind which, being a sequential system, can only process one image at a time.
Perception of the world hence appears to depend, at least in part, on how the per­
cipient conceptualizes the world. We construct visual representations of the perceived world. 
This is clearly the case when it comes to works of art such as that shown in Illustration 5: 
the reference may be an oil-painted canvas but how each viewer views it depends on his or 
her own “theory” of aesthetics. As Magritte himself commented:
The famous pipe. How people reproached me for it! 
And  yet,  could  you  stuff  my  pipe?  No,  it’s  just  a 
representation, is  it  not? So if  I  had written on my 
picture ‘This is a pipe,’ I’d have been lying! (cited in 
Harry Torczyner, Magritte: Ideas and Images, p. 71.)
Other common examples of interpretation are the phonemic 
restoration effect18 and completion of fragmented pictures. 
Both of these examples demonstrate the use of background 
knowledge, of prior beliefs, and of expectations.
When it comes to language interpretation, Daniel Dennett claims that even the most 
obvious text is interpretable only with the aid of rather obvious assumptions. For instance, a 
non-English speaker will interpret  Illustration 6 below as having the same symbol in the 
middle of each group, whereas an English speaker will find it effortless — to the point of not 
noticing  — to see “the cat” as the probable interpretation of this symbol string (Dennett 
1990). Again, we are left with the question of what the actual reference might be.
18 Richard M. Warren (1970) conducted experiments in which one phoneme of a word was replaced with a cough-
like sound. His subjects had no difficulty in “restoring” the missing speech sound perceptually. Interestingly, they 
were not able to identify accurately which phoneme had been replaced.
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Illustration 5: René Magritte's “The 
Treachery of Images”, 1928-29
An  extreme  view  of  this  interpretationalist  position  (see,  e.g.,  Kuhn  1962;  Goodman 
1968/1976) holds that two different people experiencing the same phenomenon would “see” 
radically different entities; what they “see” would depend on what background theories they 
have about the world, on their “web” of beliefs. Such a radical view would, however, require 
that, to share a concept, it would be necessary to share the same background theories. 
There  is,  however,  considerable  empirical  evidence  to  support  the  universality  of  many 
concepts. B. Berlin and P. Kay (1969) proposed a theory of meanings for basic colour terms 
based on their observation of semantic universals and evolutionary regularity in the naming 
of colours across languages, despite the differences in cultures and background theories, 
and also the ability to identify colour differences even in the absence of colour terms. This 
suggests that many concepts (at least sensory concepts) may be innate and thus require no 
background theories for their acquisition – this is discussed further in Chapter 3.
The phenomenon known as “blindsight” provides evidence that conscious awareness 
is not necessary for reacting appropriately to visual stimuli. People with blindsight may re­
port losing part or all of their visual field. These patients do however perceive visual stimuli 
even though they have no conscious awareness of 
them.  The  patient  suffering  from  blindsight  may 
have damage to visual pathway V1 or visual path­
way V2 which are shown in Illustration 7. In Type 1 
blindsight, subjects have no awareness of any visual 
stimuli whatsoever, but are nonetheless able to pre­
dict,  at  levels  that  are  significantly  greater  than 
chance, visual aspects such as location, or type of 
movement. In Type 2 blindsight, subjects have some 
awareness of visual aspects such as movement with­
in the blind area, but have no visual percept. David 
Armstrong (1968) suggested that “In perception the 
brain scans the environment.  In awareness of the 
perception another  process in  the brain scans the 
scanning.” It is possible to react appropriately to the stimuli without any conscious aware­
ness. The lack of the need for conscious awareness to process perceptual input is discussed 
in more detail later in this dissertation.
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Illustration 7: Visual Recognition and Action (© 
McGill University)
 2.3.12 Metaphors and Figurative Language
In developing his causal theory of reference, Kripke used the theory of proper names, but 
proper names can be used in many ways. A proper name may be used when referring to a 
person (an act of referring), to call  the person, to question the person, and so on. The 
different usages are indicated by differences in  intonation but the name-reference link is 
clearly  insufficient  to  distinguish  between the usages.  In  “Homer was a  talented man”, 
'Homer'  could  be  referring  to  the  person  “baptized”  Homer  or,  as  is  more  likely,  to 
whosoever wrote the “Odyssey” and the “Iliad”.  'Homer' in this case might be used in the 
same manner as 'anonymous' is used – the name is an abbreviated description. It is unclear 
how  externalist theories of meaning can distinguish between a proper name  qua  proper 
name and a proper name that is an abbreviated description other than to deny that proper 
names are ever abbreviated descriptions. Externalist theories of meaning also have difficulty 
with metaphors, and like figurative language: it is unclear what the reference or denotation 
of 'sun', or the property expressed by the predicate “is the sun”, in a metaphor such as the 
following might be:
(1) Juliet is the sun (Romeo and Juliet, Act. II, sc. 2) 
The sentence (1) is, presumably, not a statement of identity. Even if we treat “the sun” as a 
simile (“Juliet is like the sun”), it is not clear what property is being expressed, and yet any 
speaker of English is able to understand the sentence and what is being expressed without 
difficulty even if he cannot express it explicitly. That we cannot express explicitly what is 
being communicated by many metaphors, seems to preclude, in such cases, that reference 
is a “social phenomenon" as Putnam contends (even though, 'sun' is a natural-kind term.) 
Audience members in Shakespeare's time were able to understand the large number of his 
newly-minted metaphors without any social interaction, without any causal history following 
the original “baptismal event”. It is doubtful that audience members in Shakespeare's time 
would have attached the same meaning to 'the sun' as today's audience members would – 
most people in Shakespeare's time would have believed in a geocentric universe. It is also 
doubtful that many individual audience members in any age would attach exactly the same 
meaning to the phrase, but that  is  not crucial  to  understanding what Shakespeare was 
trying to convey – the individual “meanings” only had to be close enough.
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According to connectionist theories of concepts19, when networks of different struc­
tures are trained on the same task, they develop activation patterns which are strongly sim­
ilar, thereby suggesting that it might be possible to produce empirically well-defined meas­
ures of similarity of concepts and thoughts between different individuals as is required for 
concepts to be shared. On this view, semantic identity is not based on causal connections to 
the  external  world,  but  is  based  on  an  internalist account  of  sameness  and  similarity 
(Churchland 2007:134).  Rather than having a semantic and syntactic structure similar to 
that of a natural language, as some other theories of concepts posit, internal representa­
tions are sub-patterns that include the micro-features that are specific to the context. This 
would help explain variations between and within groups of language users.  For instance, 
one person's internal representation of DOG might include the micro-feature +DANGEROUS and 
yet would be able to use the term 'dog' with other people whose internal representations of 
DOG do not include +DANGEROUS. All that would be required is that the sub-patterns of their 
DOG representations be similar enough for the same term to be applied without confusion.
 2.3.13 Concepts, Categories, and Meaning
Relevant  cognitive  processes  retrieve  the  same  body  of  knowledge,  the  same  mental 
representation of an entity, from long-term memory whether we categorize the entity, draw 
an inductive inference about the extension it belongs to, draw an analogy between it and 
some other entity or entities, or even understand a linguistic expression in which a term 
referring to the entity appears. In other words, a concept is copied (unconsciously) from a 
class of concepts stored in semantic memory to short-term memory, perhaps along with 
other non-conceptual knowledge of the item in question, for use in a cognitive process (e.g., 
deduction,  induction,  categorization).  The  concepts  form  semantic  networks  and,  in 
conjunction  with  the  “relevant  cognitive  processes”  are,  I  claim,  what  makes  a  mental 
representation meaningful.
A semantic theory has to be able to account for a person's implicit knowledge, that 
is, for the knowledge which the subject may not be able to articulate but which, neverthe­
less, is an authentic propositional attitude. This implicit knowledge is different from tacit 
knowledge where the information-bearing state to which tacit knowledge refers is not an 
authentic propositional attitude. Language users are not always able to articulate what a 
word means for them: they may be able to provide an ostensive definition for many objects 
19Support for connectionist theories of concepts is presented in Chapters 3 and 5.
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but Quine's (1960) indeterminacy of translation problem arises for ostensive definitions. As 
discussed in Chapters 3 and 5, only the connectionist model has an account of  implicit 
knowledge (non-conceptual content), that is, of the knowledge which the subject may not 
be able to articulate but which, nevertheless, is an authentic propositional attitude. Expert 
judgement, at least, is not naturally modelled as the sequential interpretation of a linguistic­
ally formalized procedure, posited by the Computational Theory of Mind, which takes place 
at the conceptual level. Intuition, for example, must be formalized at the sub-conceptual 
level (Smolensky 1988:§6). 
 2.3.14 The Term-Reference Link
Much is made in reference theories of meaning of an introducing event of a name that 
involves ostension. The reference of a term is determined by society (through division of 
linguistic labour). By his claim that “reference is a social phenomenon”, Putnam means that 
individual  users  of  a  term do  not  have  to  know how to  distinguish  reliably  the  token 
referents of the term; they do not have to know how to distinguish elms from beeches, or 
how to distinguish aluminium, for example, because they can always rely on experts to do it 
for them. But how is this accomplished? If an expert chemist points to a nugget of gold and 
say “gold” or even “Au”, how is the non-expert to understand to what 'gold' or 'Au' refers? 
As  stated  earlier,   Locke  noted  that  natural  kind  terms  can  group  objects  in  different 
categories depending on the properties under consideration. Thus, when a sample of gold is 
pointed to,  it  is  not  clear  which natural  kind the sample  instantiates.  There is  still  the 
problem of fixing the reference of ‘gold’ to gold rather than to metals or elements, or even 
to nugget or yellow or shiny. 
In the case of proper names, if someone points to a person and says “John” to a 
young child, how is the child to understand the referent? The child could take the the refer­
ence to be to a person, or adult, or man, or even “undetached-human-parts” (to paraphrase 
Quine). As Quine (1960) pointed out in his discussion of the indeterminacy of reference, no 
unique interpretation of a word is possible, because the meaning of a word varies with con­
text. Further, I contend that it is not possible to learn the unique reference of a term merely 
through ostension unless the hearer already has the concept which the term is used to ex­
press. When a child points to a dog and asks what it is, (that is, asks for the term that is  
used to refer to that entity), the child already has a DOG concept no matter how incom­
plete. When a child learns the term 'dog' through an ostensive definition in the presence of 
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one token of dog, how is the child then able to apply the term correctly to other dog-tokens 
given the vast difference in the phenomenological properties of different breeds of dogs? 
Merely providing the child with a term-reference link will not provide a child with the mean­
ing of 'dog'. If the dog-token that was used to introduce the child to the 'dog' term was a 
poodle, it is hard to explain how the child would then be able to apply the term correctly to 
a Great Dane – there is a “poverty of the stimulus”. The explanation has to include a psy­
chological component. The idea that children have an essentialist disposition is question­
able. Evidence suggests that children tend to acquire base concepts like DOG before con­
cepts at higher or lower levels (e.g., ANIMAL or POODLE) but this is not a justification for 
the “essentialist” position that a reference theory of meaning would require; it can be ac­
counted for using Fodor's theory of concept acquisition, namely that concepts are acquired 
(“locked to”) in virtue of experiences of typical instances of stereotypes. This “locking to” 
normally occurs prior to learning the term which expresses the concept. In other words, the 
term-reference link occurs after the concept is acquired. Such a process also requires some 
innate mechanisms: there is,  for  instance,  neurological  evidence that  there are  distinct 
neural mechanisms dedicated to the processing of different word categories such as animal, 
vegetable, and even furniture, as well as grammatical distinctions between nouns, verbs, 
and adjectives. Studies like these provide a basis for biologically-motivated theories of lan­
guage processing; for supporting the view that there are neural structures or processes for 
the  categorical  organization  of  lexical  knowledge  (Caramazza,  Hillis,  Leek,  &  Miozzo  in 
Hirschfeld & Gelman 1994:68-84).  Studies of patients exhibiting category-specific impair­
ment provide evidence that, no matter how many times the link between a lexical term and 
a referent is pointed out to these patients, they will not grasp the meaning if the referent is 
a token of the impaired category. The mechanism for processing the word categories has to 
be “in the head”; the meaning of the term is not mind-independent even if the term-refer­
ent link is.
 2.4 PART III: CONCLUSIONS
As  argued  in  more  detail  later  in  this  dissertation,  certain  thought  processes  may  be 
encoded in a “broadcast” form – that is, “broadcast” to the conscious mind. This process is 
consistent with Fodor's claim that, for any utterance within its domain, the language system 
module  would  provide  a  type-individuated  representation  specifying  the  linguistic  and 
(possibly) the logical form of the utterance as input to the central, general purpose cognitive 
system (Fodor 1983:90-91).  If  the long-term memory contains relevant lexical concepts 
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and, depending on the thought or input, relevant sentential concepts, along with, perhaps, 
relevant encyclodaedic knowledge, the thoughts are encoded as a semantic representation 
and combined with a linguistic (usually phonetic) representation to produce a linguistically-
encoded icon20 in the conscious mind that is “tagged” as meaningful (see Jackendoff 2012 
for  a  similar  position.)  If  there  are  no  lexical  concepts  but  there  are  other  relevant 
perceptual concepts in long-term memory to link to visual image input, the image that is 
“broadcast”  to  the  conscious  mind  is  a  meaningful but  non-verbal  icon.  Icons in  our 
conscious mind may appear as  meaningful, even in the absence of lexical and sentential 
concepts.  All  icons that  appear in  the conscious minds of non-human animals  and pre-
linguistic  children  can  still  be  meaningful  but  are  not  linguistically  encoded.  This 
“broadcasting” of images to our conscious mind is an internal process. Visual or aural input 
itself has no “meaningful” tag. The link between the “meaningless” input and the meaningful 
conscious image is  created “in the head”.  That is,  the unconscious mind creates a link 
between the input or thought with semantic information stored in long-term memory to 
render the input or thought meaningful. Meaning does not arrive attached to a sequence of 
phonemes or to a viewed printed text. Without the relevant conceptual knowledge, the input 
is meaningless regardless of whether there is a socially-maintained link between a term and 
a reference.
I contend that an externalist theory of meaning, whether linguistic or psychological, 
can explain, at best, how technical, theoretical terms/concepts can fix and maintain refer­
ence. When children point to an item and ask for its name, they obviously have the concept. 
The word itself is merely an epistemic artifact, to use an expression of Clark (2003); it is a 
tool, like a pencil or a computer, but, like those other artifacts, has no meaning in itself, just 
as the pixels on a television screen have no meaning in themselves until they are inter­
preted by the viewer. While a linguistic community (or an expert subset of the linguistic 
community) may, as Putnam (1997) argues, maintain the link between a linguistic item and 
a referent or extension, it is the  link between the referent and the name which is being 
maintained, not the meaning. The linguistic item is used as  a tool to express the mental 
representation; to link the mental representation of the speaker with the appropriate (or 
close enough) mental representation of the hearer/reader.
The attempt to base a theory of meaning on the causal theory of reference may have 
some success for singular terms and for natural kind terms treated as singular terms, but is 
20 The use of the term “icon” here is owed to Hoffman's analogy of icons in the interface of a PC (Hoffman 2009) in  
that icons hide the underlying complexity.
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less  successful when applied to general and abstract terms, particularly when applied to 
members of sets  that have no common, mind-independent, essential  nature. It  is  even 
questionable that any objects of our experience, even natural-kind entities, are truly mind-
independent. As Putnam now maintains, objects in the world are “as much made as dis­
covered, as much products of our conceptual invention as of the “objective” factor in experi­
ence” (1981:54 italics in original).
Such being the case, then, a theory of meaning has to reflect conceptual schemes. 
What we mean when we use the term 'water' is not what we mean when we use the term 
'H2O' even if the two terms do have the same reference. What we mean in each case is in­
terest-relative and depends on the concepts that are linked to the thought before we use 
the terms to express that thought. Different people's hearing (or seeing) the two terms will 
each result in different conscious  linguistically-encoded icons simply because the concepts 
(and encyclopaedic knowledge) that are used in creating the semantic representation of 
each  of  them will  be  different.  My  water-thoughts  may not  be  identical  with  your  wa­
ter-thoughts and, in fact, are unlikely to be so. All that the two sets of thoughts have to be 
is “close enough” so that when I express my water-thoughts by saying “water”, the semant­
ic representation produced in your (unconscious) mind is close enough to mine that our res­
ulting behaviour appears appropriate to each of us. On this view, the only way that co-ex­
tensive concepts can be individuated is “in the head”. We are able to “share” our thoughts 
and the related concepts, by expressing them linguistically, but the language we use cannot 
be analyzed using the rules of logic as though it were a mind-independent object. 
Natural language, whether spoken, signed or written, comprises symbols to which 
meanings are associated These symbols may be combined syntactically and can be used as 
a form of communication both with oneself and with others. Meanings are associated with 
symbols through social interaction of a linguistic community, just as Putnam told us, but this 
activity requires intentionality and the recognition of intentionality in others. In other words, 
the use of a natural language to communicate with others requires that we take an inten­
tional stance (Dennett, 1971); that we assume that, when a con-specific produces a partic­
ular signal, he associates the same, or a similar-enough meaning to the signal as we do. 
When I encountered a dog for the first time, the resulting DOG concept could have referred 
to the category of dogs, or mammals, or animals, or pets, etc. So, when I uttered the term 
'dog'  its  extension was not  necessarily  that  of  my mother's  DOG concept.  When I  say 
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'water', am I referring to the theoretic or Natural-Kind qua Natural Kind, and the non-theor­
etic (non-theory-mediated) Natural-Kind simpliciter?
Just as there is no sound in the external world — sound being the result of pressure 
waves impacting an auditory system — there is no meaning external to a cognitive system. 





A fundamental assumption of cognitive science is that certain behavioural regularities can 
be  attributed  to  different  mental  representations  and to  symbol-manipulation  processes 
operating over these representations. Connectionists counter this assumption by proposing 
that  these  behavioural  regularities  can  be  attributed  to  simple  processing  units  and 
connections between them. In this section I examine these alternate cognitive architectures 
and their  fitness in explaining many of the crucial  aspects of  cognition especially  those 
related to  modularity of mind, propositional attitudes, the Language of Thought hypothesis, 
natural  language  processing,  learning,  abductive  reasoning,  and  the  problems  of  co-
extension, co-reference and synonymy. Arguments are offered in support of connectionist 
cognitive architecture models as offering better explanations of such aspects of cognition.
Chapter 3 is divided into three parts:
• Part I provides an analysis of various views concerning metal representations and an 
overview of the Representational Theory of Mind which is accepted by supporters of 
several competing models of cognitive architecture;
• Part II presents the  two main competing models of cognitive architecture, namely 
the Computational Theory of Mind and Connectionism;
• Part III compares how these models claim to handle crucial aspects of cognition;
• Part IV presents conclusions and support for the view that connectionism provides 
the best model of cognitive architecture.
 3.2 PART I: REPRESENTATIONALISM
If the hypothesis that the brain is a computer is to make a definite claim, then the word 
'computer' must have a precise meaning. The traditional position is that a computer is a 
universal symbol system; it is a a device that processes representations consisting of strings 
of symbols; it processes representations consisting of compositional, recursively-structured, 
quasi-linguistic strings. The mind can construct symbols and manipulate them in various 
cognitive processes. The mind can relate the symbols to something in the world, as when 
verifying a description; or to something not in the world, such as an image of a hypothetical  
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state of affairs. Perception leads to the construction of mental symbols representing the 
world. On this view, there is a causal link from the world to an internal representation. 
Representation evolved as a result of natural selection: it is required for safe navigation 
around the world; it provides the processes governing actions with information about what 
is  where;  and  it  is  recovered  over  several  stages  of  visual  processing  –  it  is  not,  for 
instance, explicit in the patterns of light falling on the retina (Johnson-Laird 1988:34-35). 
A concept is usually taken to be a type of mental representation that aids in organiz­
ing experience. Without a capacity to organize, experience would otherwise be what William 
James called the baby's impression of the world, namely  “one great blooming, buzzing con­
fusion”  (James 1890:462). Much of the perceptual in­
formation we receive is ambiguous and so, without an 
ability to categorize, experiences would comprise an in­
finite  number  of  unrelated  objects,  properties,  sensa­
tions, and events. An example such as that given in Il­
lustration 8 can demonstrate the power of the mind to 
organize perceptions based on an existing concept. The 
illustration can be viewed as a collection of random dots 
or can be organized into a picture of a Dalmatian dog in 
an uneven landscape. Once the pattern of dots has been 
so organized, it is difficult, if not impossible, not to “see” 
a dog in the picture.
The results of research into cognitive development show that conceptual categories 
are formed by children from earliest infancy and that these categories are very similar to 
those of adults (Gelman 1999; see Gelman 1996 for review). Even though there is wide­
spread agreement among cognitive scientists that concepts pick out categories, that con­
cepts refer to categories, there is not such an agreement on just what concepts might be. 
Psychologists (for example, Solomon, Medin, and Lynch 1999; Markman 1999; Carey 2009) 
and many philosophers of mind (Fodor 1987; Dretske 1988; and others), take concepts to 
be a subset of mental representations which are used in various cognitive processes such as 
inference  and  induction,  as  well  as  categorization.  The  term  mental  representation is 
defined slightly differently when used in philosophy, psychology, and cognitive science. In 
philosophy, mental representations are viewed as mental objects with semantic properties 
such as content, reference, and truth-conditions. They are “mentalia” (thoughts, concepts, 
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Illustration 8: Example of "seeing as"
percepts, ideas, notions, schemas, images, et cetera.) In cognitive science, mental repres­
entations are often viewed as information-bearing structures, and cognitive states are con­
stituted by the occurrence, transformation, and storage of these structures. Susan Carey, 
along with most psychologists, assumes that “representations are states of the nervous sys­
tem that have content, that refer to concrete or abstract entities (or even fictional entities), 
properties, and events” (Carey 2009:5).
 3.2.1 Mental Representations
Any claim that mental states have content leads to a metaphysical commitment to mental 
representations. Among those who support the existence of mental representations, there is 
by and large agreement with David Marr's (1982) definition of mental representations as "a 
formal system for making explicit certain entities or types of information, together with a 
specification of how the system does this." Such mental representations are viewed as a 
formal system combining hypothetical internal cognitive symbols (such as thoughts) and the 
mental processes (such as inferences) that use such symbols.
Some thinkers have presented cognitive theories that assume no commitment to 
mental representations. B. F. Skinner (1938, 1950, 1990) and other radical behaviourists 
held that inferred, or unobservable entities had no place in a scientific psychology, and there 
are many who deny that there are mental representations of any kind (e.g., Dennett 1987; 
Gibson 1966, 1979, Stich 1983).  These “eliminativists” about mental representations con­
tend that psychological theorizing should be couched in neurological or behavioural terms 
rather than in terms related to representational mental states. As C. R. Gallistel (2001) has 
pointed out, mental representations are not neurobiologically transparent; that is to say, 
neurobiology, in its current state, is unable to describe how the hypothetical internal cognit­
ive symbols and the mental processes that use such symbols might be realized neurobiolo­
gically. It is not surprising, therefore that those who attempt to eliminate mental represent­
ations from psychological theorizing (for example, Edelman and Tononi 2000, Hull, 1930, 
1952, Rumelhart and McClelland 1986) ground their psychological theories in neurobiology 
(Gallistel 2001:9691). This leads some eliminativists to claim that many “folk psychology” 
concepts, such as belief or desire, are not well-defined, that common-sense understanding 
of the mind (folk psychology) is false, and that, in consequence, they have no coherent 
neurobiological basis — it will never be possible to explain such concepts in terms of lower-
level neurobiological processes. This argument in rejection of folk psychological concepts 
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seems to be self-refuting given that folk psychology as a theory has had considerable suc­
cess in enabling an everyday communication with few words and that such efficiency is not 
achievable using a complex, neuroscientific terminology (Fodor 1987, 1999).
Grounding their psychological theories in neurobiology does present some difficulties 
for Eliminativists in describing what a cognitive architecture might consist in, what would 
make a particular phenomenon cognitive. For representationalists, a cognitive level is one in 
which mental states encode features of the world, and a cognitive architecture is thus an ar­
chitecture of representational states and processes. While some supporters of a connection­
ist  cognitive architecture, e.g.,  Paul and Patricia Churchland, argue that  folk psychology 
should be eliminated in favour of a more scientific theory based on neuroscience, they nev­
ertheless are still representationalists. Both the Classical and Connectionist cognitive archi­
tectures (such as that supported by the Churchlands) are based on the reality of represent­
ational states, although there are extreme eliminativist versions of both types of architec­
tures (see, for instance, Ramsey, Stich, and Garon, 1990).
A main impetus for postulating the existence of mental representations is finding an 
explanation of common-sense, dispositional psychological states (such as thoughts, beliefs, 
desires, and perceptions) and processes (such as inference, categorization), and of how 
such states are transformed and stored in the mind/brain.  According to Representational 
Theories of Mind (RTM), these psychological states have intentionality—they are about  or 
refer to entities—and their intentionality can be explained in terms of the semantic proper­
ties of mental representations. Cognitive mental processes (thinking, reasoning, and such 
like) are hence taken to be sequences of intentional mental states. While there may not be 
unanimity among those involved in cognitive science on the actual types of structures and 
processes of intentional mental states, there is wide agreement that they are nevertheless 
explainable in terms of mental representations.
Mental representations (thoughts) express the propositions that are the objects of 
propositional attitudes; and propositional attitudes are both productive and systematic. As 
constituents of thoughts, and of each other, concepts play a particular role in explaining this 
productivity and systematicity, and it is the compositionality of concepts and thoughts that 
provides the explanation (Fodor 1998a:34-36). Compositionality is  therefore essential  to 
any theory of concepts, where compositionality is defined as the property that a system of 
representation has when:
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a) it  contains  both primitive  symbols  and symbols  that  are  syntactically  and 
semantically complex; and
b) the latter inherit their syntactic/semantic properties from the former.
Fodor’s “non-negotiable” condition number 3 states that “concepts are the constituents of 
thoughts and, in indefinitely many cases, of one another. Mental Representations inherit 
their contents from the contents of their constituents” (Fodor 1998a:34). Some concepts 
are  complex and the syntax and the content of  the constituents  of  a  complex concept 
determines  its  syntax  and  content  (Fodor  1998a:104).  That  is,  complex  concepts  are 
composed of primitive concepts. The argument that concepts compose is primarily that they 
are productive and systematic, which allows Fodor to stipulate that:
“the  claim that  concepts  compose  is  true  only  if  the  syntax  and  content  of 
complex concepts is derived from the syntax and content of their constituents in 
a way that explains their productivity and systematicity” (italics in original, Fodor 
1998a:104).
Fodor and Lepore enlarge on this in “The Red Herring and the Pet Fish” (Fodor & Lepore 
2002) in which they present the following argument:
P1. Concepts  are  productive  because  there  are  infinitely  many  mental 
representations;
P2. There are infinitely many mental representations because new, relatively 
complex  mental  representations  can  be  constructed  by  using  old,  relatively 
primitive ones as their constituents;
P3. That mental representations have constituent structure is thus essential 
to explaining the compositionality of concepts;
Conclusion:  Compositionality  serves to  specify  the constituency relations  that 
mental representations enter into.
Here,  compositionality  is  a  function  that  “maps  a  finite  basis  of  simple  mental 
representations  onto  an  infinity  of  complex  mental  representations  together  with  their 
structural  descriptions”  along with  an interpretive  function  which  maps arbitrary  mental 
representations, simple or complex, into their semantic interpretations (whatever they may 
be).  Their  interpretive  function  specifies  a relation  between mental  representations  and 
things in the world (for example, between representations and their extensions). 
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 3.2.2 Empirical Evidence for Mental Representations
There is empirical evidence from studies of both human and animal behaviour that provide 
support for underlying mental representations some of which are likely innate. Studies by 
Andre  Meltzoff  and  colleagues,  for  example, 
demonstrate that infants (even neonates) who 
are given pacifiers of specific shape and texture 
are  able  to  recognize  the  correspondence 
between the tactile and visual presentations of 
those  shapes  and textures  (Meltzoff  &  Borton 
1979),  and  that  neonates  will  imitate  facial 
expressions  (Meltzoff  &  Moore  1977,  1997). 
Results  of  the  latter  studies  are  sufficient  to 
demonstrate that there are innate supramodal 
representations of the correspondence between 
what  one's  face  feels  like  and  what  another 
looks like. Illustration 9 provides the conceptual 
schematic  of  the  'active  intermodal  mapping' 
hypothesis  that  Meltzoff  and  Moore  (1997) 
propose as the basis of early facial imitation.
Experiments conducted by Richard Herrnstein and colleagues show that at least one 
non-human species, pigeons in this case, are selectively sensitive to stimuli. In these exper­
iments, pigeons were presented with several photographs some of which depicted trees and 
others depicted similar-looking objects such as the tops of celery stalks. Despite the fact 
that  the  photographs  were  taken  from a  variety  of  different  perspectives,  the  pigeons 
proved to be very skilled in sorting the photographs that depicted trees from those that did 
not. Furthermore, the pigeons proved to be as skilled when presented with several other 
categories such as  flower,  fish,  human, and even  automobile (Herrnstein 1979, 1984). It 
would appear that pigeons are causally responsive to groupings of objects that have similar 
extensions to those of certain categories of human cognition (to use a modularity of mind 
thesis,  both  humans  and  pigeons  have  visual  modules  that  process  pattern-recognition 
routines) and, since automobile was included in the Herrnstein studies, it also appears that 
the pattern recognition by pigeons are not limited to naturally-occurring objects. This is not 
to say that pigeons have the same concepts as humans, but it does seem to imply that they 
43
Illustration 9: A conceptual schematic of the active 
intermodal mapping hypothesis (Meltzoff & Moore 1997: 
Figure 1)
might have proto-concepts that can be employed in categorization. David Premack (1988) 
has demonstrated that chimpanzees without language training are able to categorize by 
matching to sample, and to recognize similarities of proportions. There is also empirical 
evidence for the existence of cognitive maps (allocentric representations of physical space) 
in dogs, cats, and chimpanzees (Bressard 1988).
Studies indicate that pre-verbal children can distinguish the use of the definite (the 
particular) from the indefinite (one-of-a-set article) with word shaping occurring almost al­
ways at the “Base Level” (Markman 1989). The following table shows the levels of “word-
shaping” studied:
Levels of Word-shaping by Children
Based on Diagram in Categorisation and Naming in Children by E. Markman 
(1989)
Word Shaping Level Description Examples








Subordinate Narrower still Siamese/Terrier
Volvo/Tipper
Not only do categories embody knowledge, they are also a means of extending it, and, since 
categories capture information, such as inferring that tigers are carnivorous animals from 
their  jaws and claws, categorization functions to support  inductive inferences (Markman 
1989:10). While categorization at the superordinate level is established by verbal consensus 
according to Markman, categorization at the base level requires no linguistic knowledge or 
capacity as demonstrated by Herrnstein's pigeon studies. What does seem to be required at 
the superordinate  level is  some form of  compositionality:  either  union of  extensions by 
consensus, or definitions, or some mechanism for creating complex categories from more 
uniform ones. Presumably, Markman limits “verbal consensus” to consensus among users of 
a  natural  language.  Many  non-linguistic  species  appear  (by  behaviour  and  vocalization 
repertoires) to group several  other species into what would conform to a superordinate 
human category of, for instance, prey, or, more specifically, air-borne-threat, ground-based-
threat,  and so on. What would determine membership in  such categories is,  of  course, 
species-specific. PREY, PREDATOR, and such-like species-specific concepts could be innate 
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as some ethological  studies  suggest  (categorization  by  non-human species  is  discussed 
further below).
 3.2.3 What are Mental Representations?
Mental  states  are  deemed,  by  philosophers  of  mind,  to  be  either  representational  or 
qualitative. Only the first is of interest when discussing concepts. Theories of meaning tend 
to  follow  the  two  main  theories  used  to  explain  the  nature  of  concepts,  namely:  the 
Representational Theory of Mind, according to which concepts are mental representations, 
and the semantic theory of concepts, according to which concepts are abstract objects — an 
abstract idea or a mental symbol sometimes defined as a "unit of knowledge," built from 
other  units  which  act  as  a  concept's  characteristics.  Not  all  mental  representations  are 
concepts:  mental  representations  are  often  viewed  as  a  continuum  from  the 
sensory/perceptual  at  one  end  and  the  conceptual  at  the  other,  where  sensory 
representations are of the phenomenal aspects of the world (what external objects look, 
smell,  feel,  sound  like,  and  so  on);  whereas  conceptual  representations  are  either 
constructed from sensory perceptions and are  about or  refer to external entities, or are 
about abstract entities for which no sensory evidence exists. A mental representation can 
therefore be defined as any internal state that mediates or plays a mediating role between a 
system’s inputs and outputs by virtue of that state’s semantic content; where  semantic 
content may be defined in terms of information that is causally efficacious and in terms of 
whatever  it  is  that  that  information  is  used  for.  In  summary,  mental  representations 
mediate between environmental stimuli and the behavioural output by being causal at the 
appropriate level of analysis (see Hofstadter 1979, Marr 1982, Pylyshyn 1984, et al).
The term  mental representation is defined slightly differently when used in philo­
sophy and in cognitive science. In philosophy, mental representations are viewed as mental 
objects with semantic properties such as content, reference, and truth-conditions. They are 
“mentalia” (that is, thoughts, concepts, percepts, ideas, notions, schemas, images, et cet­
era.) In cognitive science, mental representations are often viewed as information-bearing 
structures; cognitive states are constituted by the occurrence, transformation, and storage 




A fundamental assumption of cognitive science is that certain behavioural regularities can 
be attributed to different representations and symbol-manipulation processes operating over 
these representations (Pylyshyn, 1999). A Representational Theory of Mind (RTM) holds that 
thinking occurs within an internal system of representation. It is the thesis that intentional 
states  (such  as  beliefs  and  desires)  are  relations  between  a  thinker  and  symbolic 
representations  of  the  content  of  those  states.  RTM  holds  that  mental  states  have 
intentionality  (are  about  the  world)  in  virtue  of  a  representational  relationship  holding 
between the mental state and the object or property in the world. 
A mental representation is taken to be either a hypothetical internal cognitive symbol 
that represents external reality, or a mental process using such a symbol. As previously 
noted, Marr defines a representation as "a formal system for making explicit certain entities 
or types of information, together with a specification of how the system does this” (Marr, 
1982:20). A "mental representation" is a basic concept of the theory that cognitive states 
and processes are constituted by the occurrence in the mind or brain of information-bearing 
structures or representations. A representation is something that can stand for concrete ob­
jects, sets, properties, events, and states of affairs in this world, in possible worlds, and in 
fictional worlds; as well as abstract objects such as universals and numbers. It can repres­
ent both an object (in and of itself) and an aspect of that object (or both extension and in­
tension), and can represent both correctly and incorrectly (von Eckardt 1993:527).
RTM postulates the actual existence of mental representations that mediate between 
the observer and external entities (objects, events, and so on) – mental representations 
represent to the mind objects or events in the external world. Hence, for most supporters of 
RTM, it is a form of indirect realism. The proviso “most” is needed because some supporters 
of RTM also support some form of direct realism according to which mental representations 
are not required for perception (see Gibson 1966, Reid 1983). Dretske, for  one, distin­
guishes  between  perception  of  facts and  perception of  objects claiming  that,  while  the 
former requires “conceptual skills needed to classify and sort perceptual objects” (Dretske 
1995:332), the latter may be considered as direct and non-mediated because:
One doesn’t have to know, let alone know for certain …, that there are physical 
objects in order to see (sense perception) physical objects. Such knowledge is 
only required for the perception of the fact that there are such objects … it may 
turn out that we see ordinary physical objects … every moment of our waking life 
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without ever being able to know (if the sceptic is right) that this is what we are 
seeing. (Dretske 1995:338)
The distinction that Dretske proposes would require two different perceptual systems in the 
brain:  perception  of  facts  would  require  a  system  for  conceptual  categorization,  and 
perception of objects would require a system designed solely for objects. The problem, for 
Dretske,  arises  in  determining  the  nature  of  sensory  representations;  in  determining 
whether  they  are  “what  philosophers  and  psychologists  used  to  call  sensations  (raw, 
uninterpreted, sensory givens)” or more what are now called percepts, that is “cognitively 
enriched (more fully interpreted) experiences of the object” (Dretske 1995:345). It is not 
clear why Dretske limits perceptual processing to only two systems. It is also not clear how 
a  dedicated  system  for  direct  perception  of  objects  could  handle  problems  of  object 
constancy; that is, how an object could be recognized (perceived as an object) in varying 
viewing  conditions  such  as  differences  in  lighting  or  orientation,  and  object  variability 
including size, colour, and so on. An example of 
interpretation  by  the  human  visual  system  is 
shown in  Illustration 10: in general,  the human 
visual system interprets lighting as coming from 
above, and so the spheres  whose upper part is 
brighter  are  interpreted  as  emerging  from  the 
image,  while  the  spheres  whose  upper  part  is 
darker are interpreted as receding. To account for 
variations  in  viewing  conditions  the  object 
perception system would have to be able to find 
what  is  common  to  the  object  description  from  varying  viewpoints  and  in  the  retinal 
descriptions (Humphreys & Quinlan 1987). It is not plausible that an object could be picked 
out “directly” in a visual field such as that presented in  Illustration 8 on page  39 without 
some  more  complex  form of  object  recognition  process  such  as  the  use  of  structural 
information as proposed by viewpoint-invariant theorists (Peterson & Rhodes 2003); or the 
matching of 3-D model representations of the visual object with 3-D model representations 
stored  in  memory  (Marr  and  Nishihara  1978).  Visual  illusions,  such  as  the  Müller-Lyer 
illusion  discussed  previously,  are  evidence  that  direct  realism,  even  Dretske's  that  is 
restricted to objects, is not possible. In contrast to direct realists such as Reid, Gibson, and 
Dretske, Fodor contends that direct perception of distal objects is impossible and that what 
is required is a necessarily-mediated and indirect, inferential theory of perception. At the 
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Illustration 10: Example of Interpretation by Visual 
System
base  of  the  inferential  processes,  he  claims,  is  a  computational  mechanism  using 
representations encoded by the transducers (Fodor, 1983:42).
For those committed to a their existence, mental representations are assumed to be 
semantically-evaluable  objects  (having  content,  reference,  truth-conditions,  and  so  on); 
they may be construed as mental objects with semantic properties. Consequently, mentalia 
(thoughts, concepts, ideas, percepts, ideas, etc.) exist as semantically-evaluable objects. 
According to this view, propositional attitudes (beliefs and desires, for instance) are token 
mental representations with semantic properties. To support RTM is to be functionalist about 
mental states, where mental states are classified (or typed) by their function; and to be 
realist about propositional attitudes, where propositional attitudes are real mental entities 
that enter into causal explanations of behaviour. Mental states in general represent reality 
and have information-providing functions which, along with their structural differences, are 
used by representationalists to account for the intuitive differences between conceptual rep­
resentations  (thoughts,  judgements,  beliefs)  and  sensory  representations  (experiences, 
sensations, feelings); they are used to distinguish “seeing and hearing from believing and 
knowing” (Dretske 1995:9). The distinction between experiences and thoughts is based on 
the origin and nature of their functions: sensory representations are states with systemic, 
phylogenetic, indicator functions, whereas conceptual representations are states with  ac­
quired indicator functions (Dretske 1995:19). Dretske (in common with Fodor, Millikan, Krip­
ke, et al.) proposes an externalist account of linguistic meaning and of the content of be­
lief21 (Dretske 1995).
To summarise,  RTM is the theory that thinking occurs within an internal system of 
representation and propositional attitudes are token mental representations. In accordance 
with the terminology used by Fodor (1998a:25) 'thoughts' are the mental representations 
which express propositions and are analogous to closed sentences; 'concepts' are the con­
stituents of thoughts and are analogous to the corresponding open sentences; and 'proposi­
tions' are the objects of propositional attitudes. Propositional attitudes are taken to be rela­
tions between an agent and a mental representation (Fodor 1987). For representationalists, 
the immediate object of knowledge is a mental particular rather than the external object 
which caused the perception. 
21 Dretske extends his externalist account to non-propositional and non-conceptual mental content. He supports  
this strong externalism by claiming that being an externalist with regard to propositional content, should lead one 
to be an externalist also with regard to sensations and qualia.
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If we accept RTM, then we have a means for distinguishing  content identity from 
concept identity. This is because RTM “says that to each tokening of a mental state with the 
content so-and-so there corresponds a tokening of a mental representation with the content 
so-and-so” (Fodor 1998a:41). Hence, it might be possible to have different mental repres­
entations that correspond to the same content: for example, it would be possible to enter­
tain the mental representation MORNING STAR without entertaining the mental representa­
tion VENUS, and, even though the Morning Star and the Evening Star refer to the same ob­
ject, RTM allows that MORNING STAR and EVENING STAR may be different concepts. While 
beliefs about the Morning Star and Evening Star have the same conditions of semantic eval­
uation, they do not involve tokens of the same syntactic objects; they are different beliefs 
and hence have different causal powers (Fodor 1998a:39). 
 3.3 PART II: RIVAL COGNITIVE ARCHITECTURE MODELS
In attempts to understand cognitive processes, whether human or non-human (machines 
included)  researchers  in  cognitive  science  have  sought  means  of  implementing  these 
processes  in  some  kind  of  working  system.  There  is  no  unanimity,  however,  on  the 
architecture of such systems. Proposed models generally fall into one of two categories of 
cognitive architecture: symbolic  computational  systems and connectionist  systems. Even 
within each of these two basic models, there are many different proposals for how different 
aspects  of  cognition  may  be  implemented.  In  this  section,  the  two  principle  rival 
architecture categories, Computational Theory of Mind and Connectionism, are described. 
Their relative strengths and weaknesses are analyzed on Part III.
 3.3.1 The Computational Theory of Mind
The Associationists (such as David Hume), held that mental particulars have both semantic 
and causal properties, and mental processes operate by the association of one state with its 
successor states. In 1936, Alan Turing formalized the idea of computation, and, in 1950, he 
published “Computing Machinery and Intelligence”, which proposed that: mental particulars 
are  symbols  which  are  syntactically  structured;  and the  causal  relations  among mental 
particulars are computational rather than associative. The  Computational Theory of Mind 
(CTM) combines an account of reasoning with the Representational Theory of Mind (RTM). 
CTM  is  the  thesis  that  the  mind  functions  as  a  computer  or,  more  specifically,  as  a 
representation-oriented symbol manipulator in which basic syntactic structures possess a 
transparent compositional semantics. In other words, the mind has a structure similar to 
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that of a digital computer where thoughts are viewed as higher level brain states with a 
syntactic structure; this syntactic structure is isomorphic to the semantic interpretation; and 
thought  processes  are  computational  operations  defined  over  such  structures. 
Computational  operations  are  sensitive  only  to  the  formal,  syntactic  properties  of  the 
structures.  A  modern  digital  computer  can  carry  out  any  finitely  specifiable  task  and 
operates on the basis of internal representations, thereby providing a fundamental analogy 
for systems of internal representation. Zenon Pylyshyn, a leading supporter of the strong 
symbol system hypothesis (the conjecture that only universal symbol systems are capable 
of  thought)  contends that  “The idea that  mental  processing is  computation is  indeed a 
serious empirical hypothesis” (Pylyshyn 1984:55), that the mind is “continually engaged in 
rapid,  largely  unconscious  searching,  remembering,  and  reasoning,  and  generally  in 
manipulating knowledge” (ibid:193), and that  this knowledge is “encoded by properties of 
the brain in the same general way the semantic contents of the computer's representation 
are encoded — by physically instantiated symbol structures” (ibid:258).
Fodor (1998b) finds remarkable the fact that it is possible to tell “just by looking at it”  
that any sentence of the syntactic form 'P and Q' (such as 'John swims and Mary drinks', for 
instance) is true only if both P and Q are true, where “to tell just by looking” means to see 
that the entailments hold even without knowing the meaning of either P or Q, or, for that 
matter, without knowing anything about the non-linguistic world at all. For Fodor, this really 
is remarkable since the combination of what P or Q means plus the state of the non-linguist­
ic world is what decides whether 'P and Q' is true. Fodor states that this line of thought is 
often summarized as follows: “some inferences are rational in virtue of the syntax of the 
sentences that enter into them; metaphorically, some inferences are rational in virtue of the 
‘shapes’ of these sentences.” (Fodor 1998b)
Turing noted that a machine can be made to execute any inference that is formalized in 
this sense because machines can be constructed to detect and respond to syntactic relations 
between sentences. If a computer is presented with an argument which depends solely on 
the syntax of its sentences, then it will accept the argument if and only if it is valid. Such a 
machine could be said to be rational. Similarly, to a certain extent, what makes minds ra­
tional is the ability to perform computations on thoughts, if we assume that thoughts are 
syntactically structured like sentences and that “computations” means Turing-type formal 
operations. This, Fodor states, is the theory that forms the basis of Steven Pinker's claim 
that “thinking is a kind of computation” (Fodor 1998b; Pinker 1999) and, Fodor continues, 
50
It  has  proved  to  be  a  simply  terrific  idea.  Like  Truth,  Beauty  and  Virtue, 
rationality is a normative notion; the computational theory of mind is the first 
time in all of intellectual history that a science has been made out of one of 
those. (Fodor 1998b)
Nevertheless, Fodor (1998b) points out that Turing's account of computation is  local in at 
least a couple of respects: it does not look beyond a sentence's syntax to its semantics; and 
it assumes that the internal syntactic structure of a thought is the sole determinant of its 
role in a mental process. Yet not all rational processes are likely to be local in either respect, 
and Turing-type computational rationality is of little use in providing explanations of the 
semantic  and global  features of  mental  processes.  Rational  beliefs are often formed by 
abductive  inference,  by  ‘inferences  to  the best  explanation’.  If  we  are  given only  what 
perception presents to us as currently the fact and what beliefs are currently available to us 
in memory, we have the cognitive problem of finding and adopting new beliefs that are best 
confirmed on balance which Fodor takes to mean something such as “the strongest and 
simplest  relevant  beliefs  that  are  consistent  with  as  many  of  one's  prior  epistemic 
commitments  as  possible”  (Fodor  1998b).  Nevertheless,  such  properties  as  relevance, 
strength, simplicity, and centrality apply, not to single sentences, but to belief systems as a 
whole, and, as Fodor states, we have no reason for supposing that such global properties of 
belief systems are syntactic.
A further question arises as to whether all cognitive processes can be said to be 
computable at all. One definition of a  computable function is given by the Church-Turing 
thesis which states that every effective (or mechanical) computation can be carried out by a 
Turing machine given unlimited amounts of time and storage space. The Stanford Encyclo­
pedia of Philosophy provides the following statement of the thesis:
A method, or procedure, M, for achieving some desired result is called ‘effective’ 
or ‘mechanical’ just in case 
1. M is set out in terms of a finite number of exact instructions (each instruction 
being expressed by means of a finite number of symbols);
2.  M  will,  if  carried  out  without  error,  produce  the  desired result  in  a  finite 
number of steps;
3. M can (in practice or in principle) be carried out by a human being unaided by 
any machinery save paper and pencil;
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4. M demands no insight or ingenuity on the part of the human being carrying it 
out.
According to this thesis, any function for which a self-terminating algorithm can be provided 
is  computable,  algorithm being understood as a sequence of steps that  a  person could 
perform given sufficient time, stamina, pencils and paper. There is, however, no universally-
accepted definition of “algorithm”. Marvin Minsky asserted that “algorithm” is synonymous 
with "effective procedure" (Minsky 1967:311), an effective procedure being "...a set of rules 
which tell us, from moment to moment, precisely how to behave", although, as he points 
out, this definition may be subject to "... the criticism that the interpretation of the rules is 
left to depend on some person or agent" (Minsky 1967:106). In order to avoid having to 
provide, for each statement of the rules, mechanisms for interpreting them, he sought to 
identify a "reasonably uniform family of rule-obeying mechanisms" formulated thus:
“(1) a language in which sets of behavioral rules are to be expressed, and
“(2) a single machine which can interpret statements in the language and thus 
carry  out  the  steps  of  each  specified  process."  (italics  in  original,  Minsky 
1967:107)
He noted that "there remains a subjective aspect to the matter. Different people may not 
agree on whether a certain procedure should be called effective" (Minsky 1967: 107), but, 
nevertheless,  introduced his  "Turing's  Analysis  of  Computation  Process":  “[A]ny process 
which could naturally be called an effective procedure can be realized by a Turing machine" 
(Minsky 1967:108).
Michael  Sipser  provided  three  levels  of  description  of  Turing  machine  algorithms 
(Sipser 2006:157):
High-level  description:  "wherein  we  use  ...  prose  to  describe  an  algorithm, 
ignoring the implementation details. At this level we do not need to mention how 
the machine manages its tape or head."
Implementation description: "in which we use ... prose to describe the way that 
the Turing machine moves its head and the way that it stores data on its tape. At 
this level we do not give details of states or transition function."
Formal  description:  "...  the  lowest,  most  detailed,  level  of  description...  that 
spells out in full the Turing machine's states, transition function, and so on."
Daniel Dennett provides a less formal description of an algorithm: “[T]he standard textbook 
analogy  notes  that  algorithms  are  recipes  of  sorts,  designed  to  be  followed  by  novice 
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cooks", which, if executed correctly, always produces the same results – "[A]n algorithm is a 
foolproof recipe."(Dennett 1995:51).
It is nonetheless questionable what proportion of mental processes are algorithmic; 
what proportion are effective procedures in the same manner as a Turing computation pro­
cess is said to be. As Paul Smolensky argued:
it is sound to formalize knowledge in linguistically expressed laws and rules for 
the purpose of science (or any other public knowledge), but it does not follow 
that  knowledge  in  an  individual’s  mind  is  best  formalized  by  such  rules. 
(Smolensky 1988:§10)
Smolensky notes, nonetheless, that novices “consciously and sequentially follow rules”, and 
thus  it  is  natural  to  model  the  cognitive  processing  of  novices  “as  the  sequential 
interpretation  of  a  linguistically  formalized  procedure”  (Smolensky  1988:§2.1).  This  is 
discussed further in paragraph 3.4.5 below.
Steven Pinker wrote that the key idea of the Computational Theory of Mind (CTM) 
can be expressed in one sentence:
The mind is a system of organs of computation, designed by natural selection to 
solve the kinds of problems our ancestors faced in their foraging way of life; in 
particular,  [the  problems  of]  understanding  and  outmaneuvering  objects, 
animals, plants and other people. (Pinker 1997: )
While Fodor claims that CTM is “the only game in town” for giving an account of the natural 
mechanisms underlying thought and cognition,  it  is  only part  of  the of  the truth about 
cognition (1975).
Fodor has pointed out that Turing-type computational rationality cannot help to ex­
plain the semantic and global features of mental processes and that there is no reason to 
suppose that  global properties of belief systems (such properties as relevance, strength, 
simplicity, and centrality) are syntactic (Fodor 1998b). Thus the computational theory of 
mind can provide explanations for only a subset of mental processes. On the other hand, 
while the version of RTM that Fodor proposes endorses an account of thinking that is com­
putational, it endorses an account of the semantics of mental representations that is non-
computational. The metaphysical view that computational relations determine the semantic 
properties of their constituent mental representations is thereby rejected along with the 
idea “that the notion of a computation is prior to the notion of a symbol” (italics in original, 
Fodor 1998a:20). While Fodor accepts Turing's idea that thought is a kind of computation, 
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he does not accept that all causal processes are computational. For Fodor, a mental repres­
entation has its content in virtue of its causal-cum-nomological relations to the entities to 
which it refers; “for example, what bestows upon a mental representation the content dog is 
something about its tokenings being caused by dogs” (italics in original, Fodor 1998a:21). 
In other words, he combines a computational theory of mind with a causal account of men­
tal content. This leads to Fodor's informational semantics for which:
A representation  R expresses the property  P in virtue of its being a law that  
things  that  are  P cause  tokenings  of  R (in,  say,  some  still-to-be-specified 
circumstances C). (italics in original, Fodor 1998a:21)
Which is to say that a mental representation  R means  X as long as tokenings of  R are 
reliably  caused by  Xs: as long as the tokenings of the concept COW, for  example,  are 
reliably caused by cows and tokenings of WATER by H2O. Given, however, Fodor's claim that 
conceptual content is information, he cannot then agree that the content of the concept H2O 
is different from the content of the concept WATER, especially as he accepts that they are 
different  concepts.  Hence,  content  individuation  is  insufficient  for  concept  individuation 
(Fodor 1998a:24). What is  required for concept individuation is an adequate account of 
content  that  includes  a  “narrow”,  psychological  component  (encoded  in  syntax)  and  a 
“broad” component (which determines reference).  This line of reasoning clearly leads to 
Fodor's position that most concepts are atomic.
The  basis  of  cognitive  science  is  that  cognitive  mental  processes  are  operations 
defined on syntactically structured mental representations which are similar to sentences; 
that is, that mental representations are language-like. The idea is to explain the productive 
and systematic nature of cognitive states and the mostly truth-preserving nature of cognit­
ive processes. As Fodor (1995:15, 1998a:35, and elsewhere) has pointed out, the system­
aticity and productivity features of natural languages can be used to illustrate the system­
aticity and productivity of thought. A natural language is said to be  productive because 
there is no upper bound to the number of well-formed sentences or expressions it can con­
tain.  A  natural  language  is  said  to  be  systematic in  that  the  ability  to 
produce/understand/think some sentences implies the ability to produce/understand/think 
others of related content: a mind that can grasp the proposition that John loves Mary can 
“in point of empirical fact” also understand the proposition that Mary loves John. That is to 
say that the systematicity and  productivity of thought arise from the compositionality of 
mental representations, which in turn depends on their constituent syntactic structure. The 
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tendency of mental processes to be truth-preserving is explained by the hypothesis that 
they are computations which are, by stipulation, causal processes that are syntactically driv­
en. The form of a belief is thus independent of its content. 
Pinker (1999) defended the theory that the human mind is a naturally-selected sys­
tem of computational modules. For Pinker, the computational theory of mind is a key ele­
ment of cognitive science but Fodor (2000:24-25) argues that there are serious problems 
with viewing cognition as computational:
Premise 1: Because mental processes are computational, they are sensitive only to 
the syntax of mental representations;
Premise 2: Because the syntactic  properties  of  any representation  are  essential, 
syntactic properties of mental representations are essential;
Conclusion: Mental processes are insensitive to the context-dependent properties of 
mental representations.
This  conclusion  seems  to  be  false  to  Fodor  and  he  offers  some  counter-examples  to 
demonstrate this falsity:
Simplicity:  The  complexity  of  a  thought  is  not  an  intrinsic  property—it  is  context-
dependent—but the syntax of a representation is one of its essential properties and 
hence does not change when the representation is transported from one context to 
another. Nevertheless, the computational theory of mind requires that the simplicity of 
a thought supervene on its syntax.
Abductive reasoning22: Abductive inferences can only be computational at the price of 
a “ruinous holism”; that is, only if the units of thought were much larger than in fact 
they could possibly be.  The problem is “how to  reconcile  a local  notion of mental 
computation with ... the fact that information that is relevant to the optimal solution of 
an abductive problem can, in principle, come from anywhere in the network of one’s 
prior epistemic commitments” (Fodor 2000:42).
Conservatism: Estimates of which beliefs count as significantly relevant and which do 
not when determining the conservatism of a change of theory are context sensitive, 
but (pursuant to Premises 1 and 2 above) the syntactic properties of representations 
are not theory sensitive and cannot change with context.
22 Abductive reasoning is a form of reasoning which relies on the formation and evaluation of hypotheses given the 
best available information. It is performed through local approximations of global processes. Each problem has to 
be solved case-by-case. 
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Referring to the “persistent failure” to produce artificially intelligent machines, Fodor asserts 
that “[t]he failure of our AI is, in effect, the failure of the Classical Computational Theory of 
Mind to perform well in practice” (Fodor, 2000:38). Fodor claims that the pre-theoretical, 
‘folk’  taxonomy of  mental  states  conflates intrinsically  intentional  natural  kinds  (beliefs, 
desires, and the like) with the intrinsically conscious ones (sensations, feelings and the like). 
He also claims that a main result of the attempt to fit the facts of human cognition to the 
Classical Turing account of computation is that a comparably fundamental dichotomy among 
mental processes is also needed; that is, a dichotomy is needed between local and non-local 
mental representations. Further, there is a characteristic cluster of properties that typical 
examples of local mental processes reliably share with one another but do not share with 
typical  instances  of  global  ones.  The  features  which  Fodor  finds  most  pertinent  for  his 
purpose are: 
• that local mental processes appear to fit Turing’s theory that thinking is computation;
• that they appear to be largely modular; and
• that much of their architecture, and their knowledge about their proprietary domains 
of application, appear to be innately specified.
As  defined  by  the  Classical  Turing  account  of  cognition,  mental  processes  are  causally 
sensitive to, and only to, the syntax of the mental representations that they are defined 
over;  in  particular,  mental  processes  are  not  sensitive  to  the  meaning of  mental 
representations. Also, mental processes are sensitive only to the local syntactic properties of 
mental representations; in particular, to the identity and arrangement of their constituents. 
The constituent structure of a mental representation, and whatever can be defined in terms 
of its constituent structure, is all that is “visible” to a Classical computational “machine” 
when it views an object in its computational domain. But, Fodor claims, not all the syntactic 
properties of a symbol are local in that sense; many types of relational syntactic properties 
are not: in particular, properties such as being the simplest of the available solutions to a 
computational problem are “global” not local (Fodor, 2005:26).
Fodor thinks that the appeal to the compositionality of mental representations to ex­
plain the productivity and systematicity of mental states has been, by and large, highly suc­
cessful but that the attempt to reduce thought to computation has been much less so. In his 
later work, he took this scepticism further stating that,  while computational nativism is 
“clearly the best theory of the cognitive mind that anyone has thought of so far (vastly bet­
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ter than, for example, the associationistic empiricism that is the main alternative)”, it is 
“nonetheless quite plausible that computational nativism is, in large part, not true” (Fodor, 
2005). It should be noted that Fodor was not trying to convince anyone that computational 
models of cognition do not, or will not work but rather to point out that a (perhaps increas­
ingly substantial) portion of the cognitive science community is already worried that “some­
thing has gone badly wrong with computational cognitive psychology and wonders what it 
might be and how it might be fixed.” He contends that he was offering a diagnosis of a pat­
tern of failures and to suggest “some ways in which intrinsic features of the ‘Classical’ com­
putational model of mind might fail to capture crucial aspects of cognition even though Tur­
ing’s account of computation underlies it, and there’s a sense in which ‘Turing machines can 
do anything’” (Fodor, 2005:25). 
One of the major failures of computational cognitive psychology that Fodor identifies 
is its inability to provide a convincing account of abduction23 which he suggests is more ana­
logous to the (non-computational) cumulative accomplishments of the scientific community 
over millennia. A possible solution to the “globality-cum-complex-sensitivity” requirements 
of abduction and other similar cognitive processes might lie in the choice of cognitive archi­
tecture, but Fodor concludes that:
The substantive problem is to understand, even to a first approximation,  what 
sort of architecture cognitive science ought to switch to insofar as the goal is to 
accommodate abduction. As far as I know, however, nobody has the slightest 
idea. (Fodor 2000:47)
Whether or not abductive reasoning is amenable to algorithmic processing has yet to be 
definitively proved one way or the other. Being global and context-sensitive is a claim made 
for parallel  distributive processing (PDP) architectures, and these “connectionist”  models 
may  be  able  to  provide  non-algorithmic  accounts  of  global,  context-sensitive  cognitive 
processes. 
 3.3.2 Connectionism
The  division  between  CTM  and  connectionist  theories  reflects  the  division  of  cognitive 
science  into  computational  cognitive  science and  neural  cognitive  science  (Rumelhart  & 
McClelland, 1986). As previously discussed, the basis of computational cognitive science is 
23In abductiive reasoning, perceptual input and whatever beliefs are stored in memory are used as data to solve 
the cognitive problem of finding and adopting new beliefs that are consistent with as many of one's prior epistemic  
commitments as possible (see Fodor 1998 for a discussion).
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that cognitive mental processes are operations defined on syntactically-structured mental 
representations which are similar  to sentences; that  is,  that mental  representations are 
language-like. According to this view, the brain is a biological symbol-manipulator.  Neural 
cognitive  science,  in  contrast,  rejects  the mind/computer  analogy which  is  the basis  of 
computational cognitive  science,  holding instead that  behaviour  and cognitive  capacities 
should be interpreted through the use of theoretical models. These models, which use the 
physical  structure and processes of the nervous system as their  inspiration, are “neural 
networks”  composed  of  large  sets  of  neuron-like  units  which  interact  locally  through 
“synaptic-like” connections imitating the interactions found in the human brain. Each of the 
approximately 10 billion neurons in the human brain has approximately 10,000 connections 
(synapses) to other neurons. The input signals from these synapses is combined by the 
neuron in a manner that determines if and when to transmit a signal to other neurons. The 
input signals are modulated by the synapses before combination by the neuron, and by 
changes in modulation at each synapse the system “learns”. 
Andy Clark (1993) emphasizes three key features of connectionism: 
1)  Superposition:  the  ability  to  represent  more  than  one  thing  with  the  same 
structure. The same neural network can be “trained” to recognize many different 
items by changing the weights of its connections;
2)  Context  sensitivity: because  weights  can  encode  multiple  items,  the 
"representation" of an item is automatically context-sensitive; and
3)  Representational change: the ability both to create new representations and to 
acquire new representational capacities. 
The symbols of the classical, symbol-system hypothesis do not change with the context in 
which  they  are  located;  context  is,  instead,  expressed  through  relationships  between 
symbols. For neural networks, on the other hand, representational context is embodied – 
context is internally expressed. While the models of the classical, symbol-system hypothesis 
have the ability to create new representations by combining symbolic expressions to create 
new  symbolic  expressions,  this  is  performed  through  the  combination  of  pre-existing, 
internal expressions, in contrast to a connectionist model which “learns” through training by 
an external environment.
58
For connectionism, the mind is neither a symbol manipulator nor a computational 
system and can be modelled as an artificial neural network consisting solely of quantitative 
processes. Through the use of complex networks of neurons (together with weights that 
measure/modulate the strength of connections between them), connectionism can manage 
without symbolic computation. That is to say, connectionism views the brain as a parallel 
distributed processing (PDP) device. Information processing in such networks begins with an 
INPUT pattern and ends with an OUTPUT pattern. This type of architecture is  very well 
suited for perception-like tasks requiring object recognition.  It  is  uncontentious that the 
brain is a vast collection of neurons, that humans can think, and that there have been some 
experimental successes24 in modelling skills in such  areas as facial recognition using PDP 
networks. There have also been some successes in other areas such as: a neural network 
trained to produce the past tenses of English verbs (James McLelland and David Rumelhart 
1986); a network, called NETtalk (Sejnowski and Rosenberg 1987), which takes, as inputs, 
vector codings for seven-letter segments representing printed words, and produces vector 
codings for phonemes as outputs which can be then be used directly as input to a sound 
synthesizer thereby producing audible sounds. Another model (based on experiments by 
Gorman & Sejnowski, 1988) has been able to distinguish between sonar echoes returned 
from explosive mines, and the solar echoes returned from rocks of comparable sizes. 
A main difference between the classical, symbol-system hypothesis position and that 
of connectionism is the nature of the internal representations that they each posit. The clas­
sical position is that internal representations have a semantic and syntactic structure ana­
logous to that of a natural language: “classical theories – but not connectionist theories – 
postulate a 'language of thought'” (Fodor and Pylyshyn 1988:316). The classical theories 
posit internal representations that are similar to a sentence of a natural language in so far 
as they are composed of constituents and syntactic rules which, in combination, determine 
the meanings of the strings in which they appear. Further, these constituents are in some 
measure isomorphic to the lexical items of the natural-language sentences in which the 
thoughts are reported. To have the thought that “John loves the girl”, then, is to be in some 
relation to a complex internal token the constituents of which have the context-independent 
meanings of 'John, 'loves', 'the', and 'girl'. Thus, the classical position proposes a conceptu­
al-level compositional semantics: 
24 While  these  results  are  impressive,  humans  also  respond to environmental  features  and taking  these  into 
account has proven difficult. For example, the vowel sound for the letter “a” in the English word “rain”, may not be 
counted or recognized when voiced in isolation; what makes something an /a/ or an /e/ or an /ej/ is in part a  
matter of the entire linguistic surround (Churchland (1989).
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Classical theories ... take mental representations to have a combinatorial syntax 
and semantics, in which (a) there is  a distinction between structurally-atomic 
and  structurally-molecular  representations;  (b)  structurally-molecular 
representations  have  syntactic  constituents  that  are  themselves  either 
structurally-molecular or are structurally-atomic; and (c) the semantic content of 
a  (molecular)  representation  is  a  function  of  the  semantic  contents  of  its 
syntactic  parts,  together  with  its  constituent  structure.  (Fodor  and  Pylyshyn 
1988:316)
It is  because the constituents ('John',  'loves',  'the',  and 'girl')  make the same semantic 
contribution to the sentence “John loves the girl” as they make to the sentence “the girl 
loves John” that understanding the one sentence implies understanding the other. If, on the 
other  hand,  sentences  of  English  were  atomic,  then  there  would  be  no  reason  why 
understanding “John loves the girl” would imply understanding “the girl  loves John” any 
“more  than  understanding  'rabbit'  implies  understanding  'tree'”  (Fodor  and  Pylyshyn 
1988:331). 
Both the classical and most connectionist theories are representationalist25, but they 
differ in cognitive architecture where, for the classicists but not for the connectionists, men­
tal representations are formed by a combinatorial syntax and mental processes that are 
sensitive  to  the  combinatorial  structure  of  mental  representations  (Fodor  and  Pylyshyn 
1988:316). For most connectionist models, on the other hand, representations are distrib­
uted in a cognitive architecture that is implemented in a type of network. Unlike classical 
computers, a connectionist network's behaviour does not result from manipulating symbols 
in accordance with an algorithm. In distributed representations there is nothing analogous 
to the logical operations of taking an element from one complex representation and combin­
ing it with another (Fodor and Pylyshyn 1988) and, although some connectionist techniques 
have been developed which allow for structure-sensitive processing, such logical operations 
result  in  functional compositional  structure  rather  than  the  concatenative compositional 
structure26 of the classical cognitive architecture (van Gelder, 1990).
Some connectionist models appear to reject the representationalist position (e.g., 
Brooks 1991) but, as Clark &  Eliasmith (2002) state, this is not so much a division between 
representational and non-representational models but is rather a division between a view of 
25 As opposed to eliminativists for whom the appropriate level of psychological theorizing is neurological and the 
semantic notion of representation is, therefore, not required.
26 A complex representation is said to have a  concatenative structure if the individual constitutive elements are 
embedded in it, and can be retrieved from it, without alteration; and to have a functional compositional structure if 
unaltered tokens of these elements are not embedded in the complex expression even though they are still usable 
or retrievable (Clark & Eliasmith 2002).
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mental representations as memory-intensive and all-purpose forms of internal representa­
tion (as favoured by the standard computational theories) and that of internal representa­
tions as sparse and action-oriented forms which exploit stimuli from both the body and the 
external world to produce a response from which is built the representation itself. This con­
nectionist position is of “just-in-time representation” (Ballard et al. 1997) based on the no­
tion that “The world is its own best model” (Brooks 1991). Such connectionist models many 
still accept the idea of mental representations as internal content-bearing states but reject 
the view of them as rich and action-neutral forms of internal representation. While the latter 
may enable flexible processing, they, nevertheless, require additional computational effort 
to produce a behavioural response. 
 3.4 PART III: STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES
 3.4.1 Modularity
Chomsky  (1980)  introduced  the  notion  of  domain-specific  cognition  by  proposing  that 
humans are born with domain-specific systems of knowledge. Among candidates for such 
systems are:
Knowledge of language: neonates have the ability to recognize speech sounds at 
birth; to differentiate  sounds of the mother tongue from unrelated languages as 
early as four days after birth (Kuhl, Williams, Lacerda, Stevens, & Lindblom, 1992; 
Werker  &  Tees,  1984);  and  to  learn  languages  amazingly  quickly,  despite   the 
impoverished input;
Knowledge of physical objects: infants, starting at around three months of age, react 
with surprise when two objects appear to occupy the same location; and, starting 
around four months of age, register surprise if one solid appears to pass through 
another; and
 Knowledge of number: Around six months of age, infants are able to discriminate 
between large sets of objects on the basis of numerosity (provided that the sets to 
be discriminated differ by a large enough ratio); and this capacity appears to develop 
prior  to  language  acquisition  and  the  ability  to  count  symbolically  (Xu  &  Spelke 
1999).
Expanding on the notion of domain-specific cognition, Fodor (1983) presented a famous 
argument for modularity of mind. The basic idea is that the mind consists of a number of 
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functionally  specialized  mechanisms  which  evolved  in  response  to  recurring  adaptive 
problems. His theory is not that all mental systems are modular (the “Massively Modular 
Mind Hypothesis”)  but rather that only peripheral  subsystems are modular  — high-level 
perception and cognitive systems are, on his view, non-modular. Fodor presents, therefore, 
a mental architecture that is composed of a number of modules that receive and process 
inputs received from the transducer systems27, and produce outputs as representations that 
are  then  processed  by  a  non-modular  central  system.  In  contrast,  evolutionary 
psychologists,  who have the goal  of  identifying and comprehending the  species-specific 
architecture of the human mind and brain, tend to support the Massively Modular Mind 
Hypothesis (Tooby & Cosmides, 1992, Cosmides & Tooby 1997). Evolutionary psychology is:
informed by the additional knowledge that evolutionary biology has to offer, in 
the expectation that understanding the process that designed the human mind 
will  advance  the  discovery  of  its  architecture  (Cosmides,  Tooby,  &  Barkow, 
1992:3).
Evolutionary psychologists,  such as Cosmides and Tooby, tend to be strongly adaptivist: 
they propose that the modular structure of the mind results from evolutionary pressures; 
and that it is even possible to identify which particular evolutionary pressures resulted in 
which  type  of  module.  Whether  they  accept  the  the  Massively  Modular  Mind  (MMM) 
hypothesis or a more limited version of modularity such as that proposed by Fodor, many 
(computational)  cognitive  scientists,  psychologists,  anthropologists,  psycholinguists,  and 
philosophers are now willing to accept that at least some cognitive abilities are domain-
specific.  Computational  cognitive  science  tends  toward  the  view  that  the  mind  is 
computational;  that it  is  composed of distinct modules each of which specializes in the 
processing of distinct types of information, has specialized functions, and is informationally 
and functionally encapsulated (Chomsky, 1980; Fodor, 1983). In contrast to the cognitivist 
position of evolutionary psychologists and many others who support at least some form of 
the modular mind hypothesis, connectionists tend to be non-cognitivist and anti-innatist, 
holding instead that only a general capacity for learning is genetically inherited and that all  
cognitive capacities are the result of learning and experience.
 Analysis of transducers and of Noam Chomsky’s idea that the “poverty of the stimu­
lus” argument are used to support the existence of an innate language “faculty” led Fodor to 
postulate the existence of perceptual modules. He used the examples of illusions, such as 
27 Transducers are peripheral sensory systems that convert input stimuli to electrochemical signals which output is  
in a computationally usable form and is lawfully dependent on their input stimuli (Fodor 1983:40).
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the Müller-Lyer, to support his hypothesis that certain mental processes are informationally-
encapsulated by which he meant that that they are not cognitively accessible; that they are 
not penetrable by our belief systems.  Even if we are cognitively aware of the illusion we are 
unable  to  change  our  percept  of  it.  He  further  postulated  that  these  modules  are  do­
main-specific, mandatory, and fast. His hypothesis can be supported using adaptionist argu­
ments for, as Immanuel Kant wrote, rational processing would be too slow and unreliable in 
dangerous situations that are very likely to arise in natural environments:
In the natural constitution of an organic being—that is, of one contrived for the 
purpose of life—let us take it as a principle that in it no organ is to be found for 
any end unless it is also the most appropriate to that end and the best fitted for 
it. (Kant 1785/1956:395) 
Kant's position is echoed in Hoffman's principle of perceptual categorization:
Principle of Satisficing Categories: Each perceptual category of an organism,  
to the extent that the category is shaped by natural selection, is a satisficing  
solution to adaptive problems. (Hoffman 2009)
Hoffman  argues  that  this  principle  aids  in  understanding  the  origins  and  purpose  of 
perceptual categories. Satisficing categories are, Hoffman contends, those optimally suited 
to  resolving common problems faced by all organisms, although specific solutions will vary 
since the actual form of the problems vary from niche to niche.
Fodor does not support the idea that the mind itself is modular but only that there 
are some, mostly perceptual, modules in the mind. Modules, on Fodor's account, decompose 
proximal stimuli in a series of stages which are  encapsulated: they are not accessible to 
thought. He accepted Chomsky’s idea of the innate language “faculty” but contended that 
this was an rationalist epistemological position (that is, that certain  knowledge — certain 
sets of representations, or body of information — has to be innate) and as such could not be 
used to justify the postulation of cognitive modules, often termed “Darwinian/Chomsky” 
modules. Fodor describes human decision-making as intentional psychology and points out 
that belief formation and intentional action use are not characteristic of perceptual input 
systems which are domain-specific and do not involve inferential mechanisms. In order to 
compute the best hypothesis about the state of the world, the processing of cognitive sys­
tems is always subject to correction in the light of the organism's body of beliefs and per­
ceptual  input and thus these  belief-fixation mechanisms cannot be domain-specific.  The 
modular solution is suited to informationally-bounded problems, but is not suited to inform­
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ationally-open decision problems. Fodor proposes, therefore, a mental architecture that is a 
hybrid of specialised cognitive modules and a central, domain-general processor.
Fodor’s thesis was adopted by, in particular, evolutionary psychologists, such as Cos­
mides,  Tooby,  and many others,  to  explain  many of  their  empirical  findings.  Cook and 
Mineka (1990), for example, postulated the existence of a module specific to the fear of 
snakes in rhesus monkeys whereby this “module” has all the properties of Fodorian percep­
tual modules, namely innate, fast, domain-specific, mandatory, and relatively information­
ally-encapsulated. Experimental ethologists have reported similar findings in other species 
such as the Tinbergen/Lorentz hypothesis (discussed in more detail in Chapter 5) that ap­
pears to demonstrate that certain species of birds have an innate fear of over-head predat­
ors: young, experimentally-naïve turkeys raised in batteries will panic if a particular shape is 
moved in one direction but show no response when the same shape is moved in the oppos­
ite direction — the shape moving in one direction looked similar to that of a hawk, whereas 
the same shape moved in the opposite direction looked similar to that of a goose. In addi­
tion, species other than humans are susceptible to certain illusions: bees also have been 
shown to react to the illusionary white rectangle appear­
ing  between  appropriately  positioned  “pacmen”,  as 
shown in Illustration 11, suggesting that edge detection 
in both bees and humans may involve similar mechan­
isms that lead to the percept of illusory contours (van 
Hateren, Srinivasan, & Wait 1990). All such results seem 
to support the idea that the mind has considerably more 
modules  than  Fodor  postulates,  but  these  examples 
could still be deemed to be “perceptual’ and peripheral and evidence of modularity at those 
levels cannot be used to justify postulating modularity at higher-levels.
Cosmides and Tooby, as well as other evolutionary psychologists, postulate the exist­
ence of  cognitive modules and base these claims on empirical findings. The flagship ex­
ample used to support their claim is the “Wason Selection Task” which Peter Wason de­
veloped to determine if humans use scientific hypothetico-deductive reasoning. Evolutionary 
psychologists use the task to demonstrate that subjects will perform better (that is, in con­
formance with the rules of the propositional calculus) if the task is worded in the form of a 
social  contract.  They claim that,  if  the task is  so worded,  a “cheater-detection”  module 
(CDM) is triggered and that such a module would have been a beneficial adaptation in the 
64
environment of evolutionary adaptation (EEA)28. Since the situations in which the CDM is be­
ing currently used is significantly different from that of the EEA, the issue of proper and ac­
tual domains has to be taken into account. Dan Sperber (2002), Murray Clarke (2004), and 
Stephen Pinker (1999), among others, claim that, if the gap between the actual and proper 
domains is sufficiently small, such a module will perform reliably. 
Some supporters of the “Massively Modular Mind” hypothesis (MMM) contend that 
most but not all of the mind is composed of  Darwinian/Chomsky modules, and some, like 
Sperber, claim that the mind is completely modular. Fodor, and others such as Kim Sterelny, 
have criticized both versions of MMM. Sterelny claims that MM could not explain the consid­
erable flexibility and creativity of the human mind. Defenders of MMM, on the other hand, 
claim that, if central systems were non-modular, domain-general, and content neutral, then 
computation could become intractable: the possible domain of any reasoning process would 
include all epistemic commitments thereby giving rise to the “frame problem”29. In support 
of MMM, Cosmides and Tooby state that:
If there is an adaptive problem that can be solved either by a domain general or 
a domain specific mechanism, which design is the better engineering solution 
and,  therefore,  the  design  more  likely  to  have  been  naturally  selected  for? 
(Cosmides & Tooby 1994:89)
The idea being that,  functionally specialized mechanisms can be quickly, efficiently, and 
reliably  fine-tuned  for  processing  specific  types  of  information,  but  general-purpose 
mechanisms are amenable to fine-tuning for a single task as long as there is little or no 
impact on its performance of other tasks. The claim is that, if two adaptive problems have 
different or incompatible solutions, then two functionally-specialized mechanisms are likely 
to outperform one general-purpose mechanism, and therefore natural selection will tend to 
favour functionally-specialized mechanisms.
Almost all supporters of MMM accept the Computational Theory of Mind (CTM) — the 
thesis that reasoning is local computation on syntactically-structured symbols. Fodor con­
tends that, because such computation is local, CTM cannot account for global reasoning 
such as abduction (inference to the best explanation). Supporters of MMM claim that the 
modularity thesis can account for abduction since computation within each module is local. 
28 The EEA is usually assumed to be the latter part of Pleistocene when humans were hunter-gatherers.
29 The “frame problem” according to Dennett, concerns how "a cognitive creature … with many beliefs about the 
world" can update those beliefs when performing an action so that the beliefs remain "roughly faithful to the world" 
(Dennett 1978:125). Fodor defines it as 'the problem of putting a "frame" around the set of beliefs that may need  
to be revised in light of specified newly available information' (Fodor 1983:112-3)
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Fodor's argument that MMM cannot account for abduction is based on the combination of 
the claim that the input to an abductive process is the whole of one’s epistemic commitment 
and the claim that modules are informationally-encapsulated. This latter claim is contested 
by supporters of MMM because their theory does not entail that all modules be encapsu­
lated; in fact, their theory is completely consistent with the existence of non-encapsulated 
modular processors (Darwinian modules) as well as Chomsky modules. This position promp­
ted another criticism from Fodor, namely that there would have to be some mechanism 
whereby input to these modules is limited to only relevant information in order to avoid the 
frame problem (Fodor 2001). The same criticism could, however, be levelled at Fodor's posi­
tion: that there would have to be a mechanism available for determining which information 
is relevant to enable domain-general, non-modular, content-neutral systems to process any 
particular global problem without information-overload and without compromising the exist­
ing set of beliefs. Hence both the massively modular hypothesis favoured by evolutionary 
psychologists and the limited modular hypothesis favoured by Fodor, for instance, suffer 
from a frame problem.
 Gigerenzer and Selten (2001)  have offered a possible solution to the frame problem 
that would still be compatible with the computational theory of cognition. They point out 
that human rationality is not optimal and that humans often reason using “fast and frugal” 
heuristics. The main problem with the heuristics solution to the problem of abduction, ac­
cording to Fodor, is that it simply “won’t do.” The reasons that it “won’t do” are that: 1) to  
be reliable, abduction may require information from anywhere in the network of prior epi­
stemic commitments; 2) to be feasible, abduction requires that, in practice, only a small 
subset of even relevant background beliefs be actually considered; and, even more crucially, 
3) abductive inference itself is often involved in choosing which problem-solving heuristic to 
use. Postulation of global cognitive processes is not an option within the Turing framework 
and “bona fide abductive inferences are nonlocal, hence noncomputational by definition” 
(Fodor 2000:44) .
In addition, defenders of MMM may be taking insufficient account of how humans ac­
tually reason. First, the Wason Selection Task can be interpreted in many ways without hav­
ing to postulate the existence of a Cheater Detection Module and, secondly, that inference 
to the best explanation, the way it is conducted by humans (including scientists) may not 
have to entail global processing. In the tests performed by Cosmides and Tooby (1987) the 
predicted selection of “benefit taken” and “cost not paid” corresponds to the truth conditions 
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of conditionals of the propositional calculus leading them to conjecture that by wording the 
Wason Selection Task in the form of a social contract, that is, in a more socially relevant 
format, subjects are more likely to select the logically correct answer of P and NOT-Q.  Gerd 
Gigerenzer and Klaus Hug (1992), on the other hand, claimed that the key to these tests is  
that cheater detection is pragmatic and depends on perspective, whereas logic does not. To 
test their claim, they used a rule in the form of a “switched social contract”. In this case, the 
logically correct answer would be P and NOT-Q, as previously, but detection of a rule viola­
tion would require selecting the NOT-P and Q cards thereby violating the rules of proposi­
tional calculus. The “illogical” choice would detect cheaters, whereas the formally logical 
choice would not. The result appears to be that we do not use logical reasoning when at­
tempting to detect violation of a social contract rule. In addition, certain social contracts, 
such as “if an employee works at the weekend, he takes a day off the following week” has 
two possible answers depending whether the person being asked is an employee or an em­
ployer (Gigerenzer & Hug 1992). Additionally, empirical evidence may contradict Cosmides 
and Tooby’s claim that the purported Cheater Detection Module evolved during the hunter-
gatherer phase of human existence: studies of capuchin monkeys, for example, show that 
emotional reactions to perceived unfairness evolved considerably earlier (Brosnan & de Waal 
2002)30. These reactions support an early evolutionary origin of inequity aversion. During 
the evolution of cooperative behaviour it may have become critical for individuals to com­
pare their own efforts and rewards with those of others. Negative reactions may occur when 
expectations are violated. In fact, the cheater detection effects may only be the result of ac­
tivation of part of the amygdalae during reasoning: that is, that the subject has to have an 
emotional investment even when reasoning counterfactually and a relentlessly logical per­
son would not be able to detect cheaters reliably. 
One of the characteristics of Fodorian modules is that they are realized in dedicated 
neural architecture and there are empirical studies of the effect of focal brain lesions that 
lend some support to the claim that mental faculties are localized. Localization is also sup­
ported by some neuroimaging studies which attempt to identify the areas of the brain that 
are active when subjects perform specific mental tasks. Such studies also show, however, 
that many fundamental mental tasks appear to involve large areas of the cortex suggesting 
the existence of large-scale networks rather than small localized regions. There is, for ex­
30 Brosnan & de Waal (2001) report that monkeys refused to participate if they witnessed a conspecific obtain a 
more attractive reward for equal effort. The reactions was even greater if another monkey received such a reward  
without any effort at all. Many of the “working” monkeys became so enraged that they often threw their rewards at  
the researchers. 
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ample, disagreement about the precise location of even Broca’s area which has been highly 
studied and is purported to be the centre of language production (Poeppel, 1996). Every 
lobe of the brain seems to be involved in some measure in language production (Pulver­
müller, 1999). These latter results lend credence to the connectionist claim that mental pro­
cesses are distributed and massively parallel. In addition, the brain structure includes many 
different types of neurons and there appears to be a correlation between a neuron's type 
and its specific function with differently-shaped neurons predominating in different areas of 
the brain. As J. R. Anderson points out, distributed representations:
assume that a memory record does not reside in any single neural element but 
rather is represented by a pattern of activation over a set of neural elements 
(Anderson 1995:224-5)
That said, there is no reason to suppose that being modular and domain-specific, and being 
distributed and  massively  parallel  are  mutually  exclusive.  It  is  possible  that  a  domain-
specific system could be multi-modal and composed of sub-systems.
 3.4.2 Propositional Attitudes
Failure  of  substitution  of  co-referring  expressions  in  propositional  attitude  statements 
creates a problem for any semantic theory. Just what constitutes a propositional attitude is 
a problem for any cognitive architecture. Folk psychology (or common-sense psychology) 
concerning the prediction and explanation of our own and each other's behaviour is, as 
Fodor  (1987)  noted,  both  successful  and  indispensable.  It  provides  a  common-sense 
conceptual framework for mental phenomena which provides:
a simple and unifying organization to most of the major topics in the philosophy 
of mind, including the explanation and prediction of behavior, the semantics of 
mental predicates, action theory, the other-minds problem, the intentionality of 
mental states, the nature of introspection, and the mind-body problem. Any view 
that  can  pull  this  lot  together  deserves  careful  consideration.  (Churchland 
1981:68)
The content of a person's beliefs, desires, fears, doubts, and other such states, is a reliable 
indicator of what a person is likely to do. In order to make sense of each other's behaviour, 
we  ascribe  these  states  to  them and  generalize  accordingly.  By  so  doing,  we  commit 
ourselves to the basic truth of folk psychology and to an ontology that includes these states. 
Fodor writes,
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It does seem relatively clear what we want from a philosophical account of the 
propositional  attitudes.  At  a  minimum,  we  want  to  explain  how  it  is  that 
propositional attitudes have semantic properties, and we want an explanation of 
the  opacity  of  propositional  attitudes;  all  this  within  a  framework sufficiently 
Realistic to tolerate the ascription of causal roles to beliefs and desires. (Fodor 
1981:18)
Propositional Attitudes (PAs) refer to folk psychological attitudes (e.g., belief, desire, fear) 
taken toward a proposition (e.g., “I believe that the Sun revolves around the Earth”); a PA 
is a mental state that expresses a relationship between an individual (the attitude holder) 
and a proposition; PAs imply that a person can have different mental postures toward the 
same proposition (e.g., believing that P; hoping that P); and PAs are “about” or refer to 
something – they imply intentionality.
For Fodor, and many other intentional realists (e.g., Dretske 1988), propositional at­
titudes can be viewed as computational relations to mental representations; they are se­
mantically interpretable and have a causal role. Intentional states, such as beliefs and de­
sires, are relations between a thinker and symbolic representations of the content of the 
states; to have a thought is to stand in a certain functional relation to a token mental rep­
resentation composed of concepts; and to think is to perform content-respecting computa­
tional operations, à la Turing, over such representations. Propositional attitudes are suscept­
ible of semantic evaluation (of evaluation in such terms as satisfied/unsatisfied, true/false, 
and so on), and they have intentional content through which they influence behaviour, belief 
fixation, and so on. They are also functionally discrete in so far as they can play causal roles 
individually.
As regards the role of propositional attitudes and belief-fixation, there are two main 
theories according to which: 1) Perceptual aspects are privileged and the fixation of beliefs 
is dependent on perception, that is, on the relation with the external world; and 2) The in­
ferential relation between old and new beliefs is privileged, such that the fixation of beliefs 
is substantially an internal process. Fodor (1983) rejects the latter, interpretationalist theory 
citing as evidence the persistence of perceptual illusions (e.g., the Müller-Lyer illusion) that 
clearly demonstrate the impenetrability of perception to background knowledge. Fodor is 
here emphasizing the distinction between observation, which is, for the most part, inde­
pendent of a subject's background beliefs, and the perceptual fixation of beliefs, which in­
volves the holistic relation between the subject's beliefs. 
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Direct perception of distal objects is impossible and hence it is necessary, Fodor con­
tends, to adopt a necessarily mediated and indirect inferential theory of perception. At the 
base of these inferential processes is a computational mechanism using representations en­
coded by the transducers (Fodor, 1983:42). Input systems31 constitute, for Fodor, a natural 
kind, which he defines as “a class of phenomena that have many scientifically interesting 
properties over and above whatever properties define the class” (Fodor, 1983:46), and input 
processing makes non-demonstrative inferences from sensory data to produce hypotheses 
about the objects in the external  world. These hypotheses are transmitted to central sys­
tems for the purpose of the fixation of beliefs (or any other propositional attitude). That be­
lief-fixation is a central system process is something Fodor insists upon:
the operation of the input systems should not be identified with the fixation of  
belief. What we believe depends on the evaluation of how things look, or are said 
to be, in light of background information about (inter alia) how good the seeing 
is or how trustworthy the source. (Fodor 1983:46, italics in original)
and, as discussed in the preceding section on modularity, perceptual modules for Fodor are 
domain-specific, mandatory, and informationally-encapsulated, whereas central systems are 
non-modular, domain-general, and content neutral.
Now, Fodor contends that only peripheral modules are computational. Central sys­
tems are not modular, on his account, but are responsible for belief-fixation. These central 
systems are not modular because, he contends, belief-fixation is  isotropic and  Quinean. 
That is to say, belief-fixation is isotropic in so far as it involves the epistemic interconnected­
ness of beliefs in the same way that in confirming a scientific hypothesis:
everything that the scientist knows is, in principle, relevant to determining what 
else he ought to believe. In principle, our botany constrains our astronomy, if 
only we could think of ways to make them connect” (Fodor, 1983, p. 105).i
By stating that confirmation is also 'Quinean’, Fodor means that:
[T]he degree of confirmation assigned to any given hypothesis is sensitive to 
properties  of  the  entire  belief  system  …  [S]implicity,  plausibility,  and 
conservatism are properties that theories have in virtue of their relation to the 
whole structure of scientific beliefs taken collectively. A measure of conservatism 
or simplicity would be a metric over  global properties of belief systems (Fodor 
1983:107–108).
31 An input system is a computational mechanism that “presents the world to thought” by processing the outputs of 
sensory transducers (Fodor 1983:40).
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The epistemic interconnectedness of beliefs required for belief-fixation and the requirement 
for confirmation to be sensitive to properties of an entire belief system mean that isotropic 
and  Quinean  processes  cannot  be  performed  by  informationally-encapsulated  systems. 
Unfortunately, “[t]he more global (e.g., the more isotropic) a cognitive process is, the less 
anybody  understands  it”  (Fodor  1983:107).  Despite  this,  Fodor  goes  on  to  state  that 
scientific, isotropic confirmation is able to provide a model for the non-modular fixation of 
beliefs; and that Quinean confirmation metrics (simplicity, plausibility, and the like), being 
global  properties  of  belief  systems,  constrain  confirmation  non-arbitrarily32 (Fodor 
1983:111).
 Fodor's view of the brain is that of a combination of a “hard-wired”, stable neural ar­
chitecture  (associated  perception  and  language)  and  a  central  system (associated  with 
thought) composed of Quinean/isotropic systems with connections between them that are 
unstable and  instantaneous (Fodor 1983:118). The distinction between input analysis and 
belief-fixation  is  a  division  between  “relatively  local  and  relatively  global  computations” 
(Fodor 1983:126). What is still needed is to determine the structure of an entire belief sys­
tem such that it enables individual instances of belief fixation and this is problematic given 
that we have “no computational formalisms that show us how to do this, and we have no 
idea how such formalisms might be developed” (Fodor 1983:129). Perhaps neuroscience will 
be able to develop such formalisms. This remains to be seen. That we do not yet have the 
formalisms that Fodor seeks is, of course, not an argument against the view of the mind as 
computational. 
Proponents of the Computational Theory of Mind (CTM) claim that it provides an ac­
count of the semantic and intentional properties of mental states and also a framework for 
psychological explanation such that intentional state ascriptions can figure in such explana­
tions. As Fodor notes:
To a first approximation, symbols and mental states both have representational 
content. And nothing else does that belongs to the causal order: not rocks, or 
worms or trees or spiral nebulae. (Fodor 1987: xi)
and so:
It would, therefore, be no great surprise if the theory of mind and the theory of 
symbols were some day to converge. (ibid)
32 Quinean metrics can be used to support any hypothesis whatsoever if relevance of beliefs is non-isotropic, if the 
subset of beliefs is arbitrarily delimited (Fodor 1983:111).
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Given that mental representations have semantic properties and the semantic prop­
erties of propositional attitudes are inherited from those of mental representations, it would, 
therefore seem, to Fodor at least, that “the semantic properties of the formulae of natural 
languages are inherited from those of the propositional attitudes that they are used to ex­
press” (Fodor 1981:31). Whatever computational formalisms might be involved in individual 
instances of belief fixation, propositional attitudes themselves are  syntactically structured 
like sentences (Fodor 1998b; Pinker 1999) and thinking is done in a Language of Thought 
(Fodor 1975, 2008). The Language of Thought (LOT) hypothesis is discussed in paragraph
3.4.3  below.
Connectionism tends to a view of the mind as non-modular: information in neural 
networks is represented by distributed patterns of activation which are transformed into 
other activation patterns through modifications of the connection weights of the communic­
ation links between the network’s units. Neural network models are not in general divided 
into any type of module other than what is required to distinguish between input units, out­
put units, and layers of hidden (or internal) units. Many connectionists, such as the Church­
lands, have taken a different tack from Fodor on belief-fixation, namely that there is in­
creasing evidence supporting the view that very little human knowledge has to do with pro­
positional attitudes and indeed it is possible to find examples of computational systems in 
which there are many symbol manipulations that have no obvious description at the level of 
propositional attitudes —  for example, we may use inference rules like modus ponens, the 
disjunctive syllogism, and so on, to reason, without necessarily representing the rules expli­
citly (see also examples discussed by Fodor 1987:23–6; Dennett 1998:107). A more ex­
treme view is that of Ramsey, Stich, and Garon (1990) who have argued that:
If connectionist hypotheses of the sort we will sketch turn out to be right, so too 
will  eliminativism  about  propositional  attitudes.  (Ramsey,  Stich,  &  Garon 
1990:500)
What  they  mean  here  is  not  just  that  reference  to  the  propositional  attitudes  will  be 
eliminated from folk, or  common-sense,  psychology, but that  propositional attitudes will 
turn out not to exist at all. In other words, they contend that common-sense psychology 
and  connectionism  are  incompatible.  The  justification  they  provide  is  that,  because 
information is encoded holistically in distributed connectionist models, connectionism cannot 
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encode the necessary functionally-discrete  states33. The connectionist models they studied 
are  cognitive-level,  superpositional34 networks  which  encode  information  in  a  widely 
distributed and sub-symbolic manner. There is nothing in these models, they contend, with 
which  propositional  attitudes  can  plausibly  be  identified35 (Ramsey,  Stich,  &  Garon 
1990:520) and hence, since distributed, superpositional connectionist networks will be the 
future paradigm for cognitive science (or so they appear to believe) propositional attitudes 
do not exist. The arguments that Ramsey, Stich, and Garon present are based on their claim 
that propositional attitudes (of folk psychology) are defined by a cluster of three features 
that  they  name  “propositional  modularity”:  propositional  attitudes,  on  their  view,  are 
semantically interpretable; have a causal role; and are functionally discrete (Ramsey, Stich, 
& Garon 1990:504). Their position on the non-existence of propositional attitudes thus rests 
on three claims: that propositional attitudes are propositionally modular; such propositional 
modularity cannot be implemented in a distributed, superpositional connectionist network; 
and distributed, superpositional connectionist networks are the future of cognitive science. 
Some philosophers (e.g., Bogdan 1993; Clark 1995) have questioned whether pro­
positional attitudes are modular at all and some claim that distributed, superpositional con­
nectionist networks can, in any case, be propositionally modular in the way that Ramsey, 
Stich, and Garon claim they are  (e.g., Clark 1995; Smolensky 1995). Clark, in particular, 
suggests three ways of overcoming  their eliminativist arguments:
We might just deny that the folk care about propositional modularity. . . . Or we 
might try to show that propositional modularity is safe whatever turns up in the 
head. . . . Finally, we might argue that distributed, sub-symbolic, superpositional 
connectionist models are actually more structured than RS&G think, and hence 
visibly  compatible  with  the  requirements  of  propositional  modularity.  (Clark 
1995:345)
Ramsey, Stich, and Garon claim that being functionally discrete is a necessary condition for 
being a propositional attitude. It should be noted, however, that there is more than one type 
of functional discreteness:  dispositional and occurrent are prime examples. A dispositional 
belief  is  one  that  is  about  something  that  is  likely  to  occur  and  endures  (is  stored in 
memory);  an  occurrent  belief  is  one  that  is  about  something  that  is  occurring  and  is 
33 In Classical Turing architectures, local syntax determines the causal powers of a mental representation; and 
representations that are syntactically distinct are hence type-distinct which means that local syntactic properties  
are essential.
34 Superpositionality, the ability to represent two different items using the same structure, is discussed in § 3.3.2 .
35 RS&H claim that these models encode the “intentional object” of a propositional attitude but not the attitude 
itself.  Fodor uses the “dodge” invented by Stephen Schiffer: “for  each episode of believing that  P,  there is  a 
corresponding  episode  of  having  'in  one's  belief  box',  a  mental  representation  which  means  that  P”  (Fodor  
1998a:8). For RS&H then, there is no way for the connectionist models they studied to encode “belief boxes”.
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fleeting.  Both  dispositional  and  occurrent  beliefs  can  be  implemented  by  connectionist 
models including the specific, superpositional types discussed by Ramsey, Stich, and Garon 
(see,  for  instance, Clark 1995; Smolensky 1995).  For any supporter of  the state  space 
semantics  approach (see, for  instance,  Churchland 2007),  occurrent representations are 
points,  regions,  or  trajectories  in  an  activation-vector  space,  and  longer-term 
representations (e.g., dispositional representations) are points in the weight space. 
 3.4.3 Language of Thought
Underlying discussions of propositional attitudes is the claim that propositions can be viewed 
as terms in a formal representational language. Fodor (1975) claims that, because direct 
perception of distal objects is impossible, it is necessary to adopt an inferential theory of 
perception.  The  transducers  provide  the  required  computational  mechanisms  and  these 
mechanisms produce a representation of the distal stimulus on the basis of the properties of 
the  proximal  stimulus.  But,  as  Fodor  states,  “representation  presupposes  a  medium of 
representation, and there is no symbolization without symbols. In particular, there is no 
internal representation without an internal language” (Fodor 1975:55). That the language of 
thought has to be  internal rather  public is because we would otherwise have to deny the 
ability to think to non-verbal animals and pre-linguistic infants and, as Fodor says:
there are homogeneities between the mental capacities of infraverbal organisms 
and  those  of  fluent  human  beings  which,  so  far  as  anyone  knows,  are 
inexplicable except on the assumption that infraverbal psychology is relevantly 
homogeneous with our psychology (Fodor 1975:57)
Fodor notes that both humans and infraverbal organisms typically find disjunctive concepts 
(e.g., 'red or blue') difficult to master (see Fodor, Garrett, & Brill 1975) and says that this 
can be explained on the assumption that both humans and nonverbal organisms employ 
relevantly similar representational systems (Fodor 1975:57).
Pylyshyn used Fodor's LOT hypothesis to extend his claim that knowledge is encoded 
by physically instantiated symbol structures by also claiming that mental activity is basically 
manipulation of sentence-like symbolic expressions and that human thought is the manipu­
lation of “sentence analogues” in an internal mental  language called “mentalese” or the 
“language of thought” (Pylyshyn 1984:194). Some thoughts are intrinsically connected with 
other thoughts. If a normal cognitive agent lacked some thoughts, he would also lack cer­
tain other thoughts. This intrinsic systematicity can be explained by a semantically and syn­
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tactically combinatorial language of thought (Fodor & Pylyshyn, 1988). The classical treat­
ment of mental processes rests on two main ideas:
 1)  It  is  possible  to  construct  languages  such  that  certain  features  of  the 
syntactic  structures  of  formulae  correspond  systematically  to  certain  of  their 
semantic features; and
 2) It  is possible to devise machines whose function is the transformation of 
symbols, and whose operations are sensitive to the syntactical structure of the 
symbols on which they operate
and
Such a machine would be just what's required for a mechanical model of the 
semantic coherence of thought; correspondingly, the idea that the brain is such a 
machine is the foundational hypothesis of classical cognitive science. (Fodor & 
Pylyshyn 1988)
Because semantic symbols and syntactic rules can easily be represented in a classical, von 
Neumann computer  architecture,  Language  of  Thought  (LOT)  is  usually  represented  as 
implemented by “classical AI” (also known as GOFAI: “good, old-fashioned AI”).
Although connectionism does not require symbols, representations can be symbolic. 
Connectionsts (e.g., Churchland 1989, Smolensky 1988) hold that there is a level of repres­
entation which lies beneath that of the sentential or propositional attitudes; and that there 
is a learning dynamic that operates primarily on sub-linguistic  factors. According to this 
view, depicting knowledge as an immense set of individually stored sentences cannot ex­
plain how is it is possible to retrieve from the millions of sentences stored, the small number 
relevant to a current predictive or explanatory problem; nor can it explain how such retriev­
al can be accomplished in fractions of a second. Fodor (2000) himself has pointed out how 
one of the major failures of computational cognitive psychology lies in its inability to provide 
a convincing account of abduction. 
Many connectionists propose a  state-space semantics (SSS) approach which views 
concepts as “functionally salient points, regions, or trajectories in various neuronal activa­
tion spaces” in contrast to the LOT approach which views concepts as “functionally salient 
wordlike elements  in  a  languagelike system  of  internal  representations”  (Churchland 
2007:126). Fodor & Lepore (1992) present a theory of meaning for which the basic LOT 
concepts are unstructured atoms that are mutually independent, and where each atom has 
its  content through a causal-cum-nomological  relation with some aspect  of  the external 
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world. This theory of meaning contrasts starkly with Paul Churchland's SSS for which con­
ceptual content is a portrayal of the world that has no automatic referential connection to 
the external world; even “primitive” concepts have a complex structure; and a creature's 
set of beliefs (“cognitive portrayals” of the world) are constitutive of meaning (Churchland 
2007:135). On this view, a concept “encompasses a substantial range of distinct but closely 
related cases, in that the mature network will have generated, in the course of its learning 
the concept, a proprietary  volume within its activation space” (Churchland 2007:144). A 
framework of concepts constitutes a portrayal of some section or aspect of the external 
world  — this portrayal is a complex physical structure composed of internal relations that 
mirror the family of relations comprising the target external domain36. In other words, ac­
cording to this state space semantics account, “there exists a relation-preserving mapping 
from the  external  domain  to  the  acquired  structure  of  the  relevant  neuronal-activation 
space” (Churchland 2007:159).
 3.4.4 Natural-language and Cognitive Architecture
Chomsky (1957) claimed that humans are born with a strong biological predisposition for 
language  and emphasized that  the language input  that  a  child  receives under-specifies 
his/her  ultimate  knowledge  of  language  (the  “Poverty  of  the  Stimulus  argument”).  He 
further  claimed that  humans have  an innate  “language  faculty”  which  is  configured for 
language acquisition:
An engineer faced with the problem of designing a device for meeting the given 
input-output conditions would naturally conclude that the basic properties of the 
output are a consequence of the design of the device. Nor is there any plausible 
alternative to this assumption as far as I can see. (Chomsky, 1968)
Fodor agrees with Chomsky that there must be something innate to account for humans' 
natural language ability but his analysis of the conditions required for learning a natural 
language lead him to claim a relationship between natural languages and the language of 
thought: “not all the languages one knows are languages one has learned, and that at least 
one of the languages which one knows without learning is as powerful as any language that 
one can ever learn” (Fodor 1975:82). In other words, the ability to learn a natural language 
36 The “target external domain” is whatever gave rise to the peripheral input to the neuronal transducers, the 
output of which is used by the brain to build a model of the world. An example provided by Churchland (2007:203)  
is  that  of  the  mapping  of  the  “peculiar  and  well-defined  three-dimensional  structure  of  the  human 
phenomenological space” (the inner portrayal) with the “objective space of possible electromagnetic reflectance 
profiles displayed by material objects” (the target external domain) – that is, how we experience the colour of an 
object versus the subset of electromagnetic radiation reflected by the external object.
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in the first place is dependent upon having an innate language of thought. Fodor does not 
claim that having an LOT is a sufficient condition for being able to learn a natural language 
but does claim that it is necessary. That some other non-human species might have some 
type of LOT appears reasonable given the similarity of brain structures.
Fodor integrated the Chomskyan idea of the language facility as a cognitive module 
with his own computational theory of mind. According to the Fodor-Chomsky model, the 
language module is complete and inviolate in the brain; one that performs all and only the 
functions of language without external influence. According to Chomsky, it is not possible to 
learn language through a general-purpose mechanism and, although language experience is 
essential for language acquisition, linguistic experience only initializes the “language organ”. 
Much of the knowledge which language requires is innate; moreover, it is encapsulated in so 
far as one's beliefs about the world play no part in the ability to construct grammatical sen­
tences in one’s natural language—innate “Universal Grammar” is not open to introspection.
Fodor holds that language is an “eccentric stimulus domain.”  A stimulus domain is 
considered to be “eccentric” if there is a wide experience/data gap; if it is difficult to develop 
the right concepts to describe the data from experience alone. Language appears to be a 
paradigm example of an eccentric stimulus domain: there is nothing in the spectrograph of 
an utterance that marks out the salient features needed for linguistic interpretation. Indeed, 
how we extract out from all the background noises just those which constitute an utterance 
and how we parse the spectrograph of the utterance into a phonological representation is 
not at all obvious. Language is certainly cognitively demanding and its usage involves com­
plex multi-tasking such as keeping track of what one has said; what others have said; de­
termining other’s attention, understanding, or dissension, and so on.
There have been attempts to apply connectionist principles to the area of language 
acquisition. Models have been designed to test grammatical tasks such as the production of 
English past tense verbs (Rumelhart & McClelland 1986), or recognition of gender of French 
nouns (Sokolik & Smith 1992). Parallel Distributed Processing may be able to provide a 
more  plausible  explanation  than  rule-driven  language  systems  of  why  children  learn  a 
second language more readily than adults when neurological constraints on language learn­
ing and the parallel processing which characterizes brain function are taken into account 
(Sokolik 1990).
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 3.4.5 Levels of Cognitive Architecture
One of  the  difficulties  inherent  in  performing  a  comparison  of  descriptions  of  cognitive 
architectures is that they are not always determined at the same cognitive level. Notably, 
Fodor  & Pylyshyn (1988)  accused connectionists  of  confusing the level  of  psychological 
explanation with the level of implementation. Cognitive architecture, they claim:
consists of the set of basic operations, resources, functions, principles, etc. ... 
whose domain and range are the representational states of the organism. (Fodor 
& Pylyshyn 1988:10)
On this  account,  the operations,  resources,  and so on, consist  of  rule-governed symbol 
manipulation;  of  processes  that  are  sensitive  to  the  structure  of  the  symbols  that  are 
conceptual-level  representations.  The  level  of  cognitive  analysis  adopted  by  the  sub-
symbolic paradigm, favoured by connectionists, on the other hand, is lower than the level 
traditionally adopted by the symbolic paradigm. As Paul Smolensky (1988:§1.3) explains, 
the preferred level of the symbolic paradigm is the conceptual level; and the preferred level 
of the sub-symbolic paradigm is the sub-conceptual level which lies between the neural and 
conceptual levels. Smolensky notes that there are both semantic and syntactic distinctions 
between the symbolic and sub-symbolic paradigms: 
For  the  Symbolic  Paradigm:  entities  are  typically  represented  by  symbols; 
symbols are operated upon by symbol manipulation; and operations consist of a 
single discrete operation; 
whereas
For the  Sub-symbolic Paradigm: entities are represented by a large number of 
sub-symbols;  sub-symbols  participate  in  computation;  and  operations  often 
consist of a large number of finer-grained operations.
Differences between the two levels can be illustrated by comparing how novices and experts 
learn. (This is discussed in more detail in the section on learning below.) Novices are con­
scious of sequentially following linguistically-formalized rules. The intuitive knowledge of a 
novice can thus be easily modelled as a symbol-system manipulator (Smolensky 1988:§2.1) 
given that, for the symbolic paradigm, programs:
• Consist of linguistically formalized rules that are sequentially interpreted;
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• Are composed of elements (symbols) referring to essentially the same concepts as 
the ones used to consciously conceptualize the task domain; and
• Have a syntax and semantics comparable to those running on the conscious rule 
interpreter.
This is not, however, the case for the intuitive knowledge of an expert. A study on expertise 
conducted by a Dutch psychologist, Adriaan de Groot, during the 1940's concluded that the 
advantage that master chess players have over weaker players is that their view of a chess 
game is organized into thousands of chunks, where a chunk is a familiar stimulus grouping 
which is stored in memory as a single unit. The analysis of the game into configurations of 
several chess pieces forms, according to de Groot, the basis for selecting the appropriate 
moves. The conclusion by de Groot came from a series of memory studies that compared 
experts' and novices' ability to recall pieces on a chessboard as it might appear 20 moves 
into a game. Experts were able to replace about 90% of the pieces correctly, compared to 
weaker players' 40%. A later experiment by de Groot showed that, when pieces were placed 
randomly on the board, thereby eliminating familiar groups or chunks, the master players 
scored no better than weaker players in reproducing the layout of the pieces (de Groot 
1965).  This  can  be  explained  by  the  requirement  of  the  rule  interpretation  process  to 
maintain  the  retrieved,  linguistically-encoded  rule  in  memory  during  the  interpretation 
process and that, in consequence, it is essential that the activity pattern which represents 
the rule be stable for a relatively long time. On the other hand, no correspondingly stable 
pattern  need  be  formed once  the  connections  to  perform the  task  directly  have  been 
developed. This provides a natural explanation of the loss of conscious phenomenology with 
expertise. The fact that the rule interpretation process is sequential is not a result of the 
cognitive architecture; but is, rather, the result of our limitation to following only one verbal 
instruction at a time. “Even if the memorized rules are assumed to be linguistically-encoded, 
there is no commitment as to the encoded form (phonological, orthographic, semantic, and 
so  on)”  (Smolensky  1988:§6.1).  This  observation  will  form  an  important  part  of  the 
arguments for a hybrid cognitive architecture in Chapter 5.
Smolensky (1988:§2.2) claims that expert knowledge is not useful for cultural pur­
poses because an expert’s individual knowledge does not posses the properties of cultural 
knowledge.  He states that the method of formulating knowledge and drawing conclusions 
have the properties of:
• Public Access: the knowledge is accessibly to many people;
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• Reliability: different people (or the same person at different times) can reliably check 
whether conclusions have been validly reached; and
• Formality, bootstrapping, universality: the inferential operations require very little 
experience with the domain to which the symbols refer.
But expert knowledge is not publicly accessible or completely reliable, and is completely 
dependent on ample experience. 
 3.4.6 Learning
H. L. Dreyfus and S. E. Dreyfus (1986) produced a five-stage typology of developing expert­
ise and, according to this model, skills progress from the novice stage, with a rigid adher­
ence to rules provided by an instructor; through three more levels of increasing competency 
and proficiency; to the expert stage at  which there is  no longer any reliance on rules, 
guidelines or maxims.  The rate of play for  expert  chess players,  they note,  is  5 to 10 
seconds per move and can be even faster without significantly degrading performance. Giv­
en the speed at which they are performing, expert chess players “must depend almost en­
tirely on intuition and hardly at all on analysis and comparison of alternatives” (Dreyfus & 
Dreyfus 1986); that is, experts do not consciously and sequentially follow rules. This obser­
vation is not new: in the Platonic dialogue  Euthyphro, Socrates attempts to discover the 
rules for recognizing the characteristics of piety by asking an expert on the subject. All the 
expert, Euthyphro, is able to provide, however, are examples of piety. He knows how to 
judge acts as pious or impious; but is unable to state the rules used for generating such 
judgements. Even though many philosophers and knowledge engineers accept the view that 
expertise is based on the application of sophisticated heuristics to a large volume of facts:
[A]n expert's knowledge is often ill-specified or incomplete because the expert 
himself doesn't always know exactly what it is he knows about his domain. (from 
Edward  Feigenbaum's  book  The  Fifth  Generation:  Artificial  Intelligence  and 
Japan's Computer Challenge to the World, as quoted in Dreyfus & Dreyfus 1986)
Expert judgement, at least, is not naturally modelled as the sequential interpretation of a 
linguistically formalized procedure and thus we can safely say that not all mental processes 
are  necessarily  algorithmic,  pace Barbel  Inhelder  and Jean Piaget who maintained that 
“reasoning  is  nothing  more  than  the  propositional  calculus  itself”  (Inhelder  &  Piaget 
1958:305). Propositional calculus is concerned with the truth-value of the propositions, but 
not their  content. In the preceding discussions of algorithms and rule-based procedures 
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(both those in this paragraph and in paragraph 3.3.1 on the Computational Theory of Mind 
above), there is no concern for the content of the propositions — computation is a causal 
relation between symbols that respects symbolic content. Algorithms, effective procedures, 
recipes, and such like, have, as John Searle remarked about computers, “a syntax but no 
semantics” (Searle 1980). 
In the symbolic paradigm, both conscious rule application and intuition (i.e., both 
conscious and unconscious rule interpretation) are described at the conceptual level, but, in 
the sub-symbolic paradigm, conscious rule application can be formalized in the conceptual 
level but intuition must be formalized at the sub-conceptual level (Smolensky 1988:§6). The 
intuitive processor is presumably responsible for all of animal behaviour: perception, prac­
tised motor behaviour, fluent linguistic behaviour, intuition in problem-solving and game-
playing — in short, practically all skilled behaviour. The transference of responsibility from 
the conscious rule interpreter to the intuitive processor during the acquisition of skill has 
been well studied by cognitive scientists (Anderson et al., 1981). In short, adherents of the­
ories based on the  symbolic paradigm and those of theories based on the connectionist, or 
sub-symbolic paradigm may often be talking at cross purposes.
 3.4.7 Comparison of Cognitive Architectures
There are many crucial differences between the classic, symbol-manipulation, computational 
cognitive architecture and that of the connectionist model. There are also some aspects that 
both architectures have in common. The following table shows comparisons of some of the 
main aspects of the classical, symbolic and the connectionist views of cognitive architecture.
Cognitive Architectures — Comparison
Cognitive Phenomena Classical Model Connectionist Model
Level of explanation Symbolic Sub-symbolic
Mental representation Symbol structure with 








word-like in a language-like 
system
Points, regions, or trajectories in 
a neuronal activation-vector 
space — “prototype”
Conceptual content External, real-world entity Internal 
“Fuzzy” and graded concepts Difficult to implement Easily implemented
Meaning Reference or denotation;
Beliefs irrelevant
“Portrayal of the world” with no 
automatic referential connection 
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Cognitive Architectures — Comparison
Cognitive Phenomena Classical Model Connectionist Model
to the external world; beliefs 
constitutive of meaning 
Language of ThoughtA Concepts are symbols in an LOT Individual nodes (symbols) can 




Modularity Mind massively modular (see 
Cosmides & Tooby; Sperber, et 
al); or
Modular perceptual peripheral 
systems with domain-neutral 
central system (see Fodor, 
Pylyshyn, et al)
mental processes distributed and 
massively parallel but  
correlation between a neuron's 
type and its specific function 
with differently-shaped neurons 
predominating in different areas 
of the brain
(Conscious) Behaviour Result of a practical
syllogism through process of 
symbol manipulation
Output of a neural
net in response to a specific set 
of inputs
Categorical framework Referential Theory of how the world is 
structured
Fundamental theories Propositional Non-propositional
Processing Sentential Massively-parallel
Basic mode of operation Rule-governed symbol 
manipulation
Vector transformation
Language learning Pre-existing Universal Grammar 
and/or language of thought
Pre-existing fundamental mode 
of representation and learning 
Perception (as opposed to 
peripheral transduction)
Inferential theory (necessarily 
mediated and indirect)





Combinatorial syntax Vector transformations
Fixation of beliefs Realist: dependent on perception 
and relations to the external 
world;




Frame problem Accessing relevant information 
among vast store of 
linguistically-encoded structures 
problematic
Received information results in 
an almost instantaneous 
activation of a prototype, a 
cognitive system is able to 
access the relevant 
consequences of a change in the 
environment almost 
immediately, thereby avoiding 
the frame problem.B
A Not all supporters of the Classical Model support the Language of Thought Hypothesis.
B AI attempts to model symbol manipulation have often resulted in a version of the Frame Problem because of the 
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difficulty of drawing on the relevant background knowledge.
 3.4.8 Systematicity, Productivity, and Compositionality
The  view  of  the  mind  as  a  symbol-manipulator  (the  “classical  model”)  holds  that  the 
systematicity  (and  productivity)  of  thought  arise  from  the  compositionality  of  mental 
representations, which in turn depends on their constituent syntactic structure. Further, the 
tendency of mental processes to be truth-preserving is explained by the hypothesis that 
they are computations which are syntactically-driven causal processes. This explanation of 
the systematicity of thought is not available to supporters of connectionism, so  Fodor and 
Pylyshyn (1988) claim, and connectionism is not able provide an alternative.
As Fodor (1995, 1998a, and elsewhere) has pointed out, the systematicity and pro­
ductivity features of natural languages can be used to illustrate the systematicity and pro­
ductivity of thought (see the section 3.3.1 “The Computational Theory of Mind” above for a 
detailed discussion).  Fodor and McLaughlin (1990) argue that such an explanation of the 
systematicity of thought is not available to connectionism: it is possible, for instance, for 
connectionist models to be trained to recognize “John loves Mary”, but fail  to recognize 
“‘Mary loves John.”’  Hence,  connectionism cannot not  guarantee systematicity,  and thus 
cannot provide an explanation of the pervasiveness of systematicity in human cognition. Al­
though systematicity may exist serendipitously in connectionist architectures, the classical, 
symbol-system solution can offer  an explanation because, in classical  models, pervasive 
systematicity “comes for free”. Attempts have been made by connectionists to rebut these 
criticisms. For instance, several connectionists have offered counter-examples to Fodor and 
Pylyshyn's  (1988)  “strong  systematicity”  position  (e.g.,  Chalmers  1990;  Pollack  1990, 
Smolensky 1996). Most of their arguments rest on the claim that Fodor and Pylyshyn have 
severely underestimated the power of distributed representations. In addition, Chalmers 
(1990) has pointed out that if Fodor and Pylyshyn were correct, then no neural nets, even 
those that implement a classical architecture, would exhibit systematicity, and, given that 
the brain is a neural net, systematicity would be impossible in human thought. Clearly such 
is not the case and, therefore, it should be possible, at least in principle, for systematicity to 
exist in a neural network (the human brain being a “proof of concept”). 
Fodor and Pylyshyn's (1988) argument goes something like: 
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P1:  If  thought  is  systematic,  then  internal  representations  are 
structured;
P2: Representations in connectionist networks are unstructured;
C: The architecture of thought is not connectionist.
For both the classical and connectionist models, thought is systematic but, as Andy Clark 
(1989:146) points  out,  Fodor  and  Pylyshyn  hold  that  systematicity  of  thought  is  a 
contingent,  empirical fact: “It is an empirical question whether the cognitive capacities of 
infraverbal organisms are often structured that  way37” (Fodor & Pylyshyn 1988:41).  For 
Clark, the fact that the mind is not composed of myriads of unrelated thoughts is not an 
empirical fact but is a conceptual fact because a “radically punctate mind is no mind at all”. 
In addition, behavioural responses result from a network of thoughts; thought ascription is a 
process that is abstract, idealising, and holistic; and what needs empirical explanation is the 
systematicity of  behaviour, not the systematicity of thought (Clark 1989:147). On Clark's 
account, it is the systematicity of behaviour that grounds thought ascription and, given the 
holistic nature of thought ascriptions, there is no reason to suppose that the recurrent and 
recombinable elements of such systematicity need have a conceptual-level semantics (Ibid). 
Hence,  Clark and connectionists in general are holistic and behaviouristic about thought 
ascription, and deny that the way thoughts are described in natural languages can be used 
as the basis for describing the systematicity of “in-the-head” processing; in particular, they 
reject the Language of Thought hypothesis.
Clark (1989) has proposed that compositionality could be an emergent property of a 
network. His main argument is that Fodor & Pylyshyn assume that internal representations 
have a semantic and syntactic structure similar to that of a natural language, but the intern­
al representations in a distributed connectionist network are not similar to parts of concep­
tual-level descriptions — they are, in contrast, sub-patterns that include the micro-features 
that are specific to the context. Internal representations, for Fodor & Pylyshyn, have a se­
mantic and syntactic structure which is similar to that of natural language sentences — the 
basis for their claim that there is a “language of thought” (Fodor & Pylyshyn 1988:12). But 
what this suggests is that the thought that “Mary loves John” is related, in some way, to a 
37 It is an empirical question whether an infraverbal organism who has been taught the meanings of individual  
symbols for “Mary”, “give”, “banana”, and “John”, and responds correctly to the order “Mary give banana John”, 
would also respond correctly to the command “John give banana Mary” without additional training. So far, the 
answer seems to be “no”, but this may indicate only that they cannot use symbolic communication systematically 
rather than that their thought processes are not systematic. 
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complex internal representation which has the meanings of “Mary”, “loves”, and “John” as 
context-independent parts  — the semantics of “Mary loves John” is inherited from the se­
mantics of “John, “loves”, and “Mary”. Connectionists, in contrast, do not posit such context-
independent items that are congruent with the parts of of conceptual-level descriptions. 
Hence  an argument  for  the  conceptual-level  compositionality  of  internal  representations 
cannot be used against connectionism (Clark 1989:148). Using the notion of a cluster of mi­
cro-features rather than semantic and syntactic structures might be better able to explain 
why the thought that “John loves London” does not function in the same way as “John loves 
Mary”. If we use Fodor and Pylyshyn's LOT argument, then the thought that “Pierre loves 
London” is a complex internal representation which has the meanings of “Pierre”, “loves”, 
and “London” as  context-independent parts and the semantics  of  “London loves Pierre” 
would be inherited from the semantics of “Pierre, “loves”, and “London”. For any reasonably 
competent speaker of English, however, “London loves Pierre” is a semantically incorrect 
proposition even though it is syntactically correct. The requirement that the (atomic) con­
stituents be context-independent creates a problem for explaining the intuitive incongruity 
of “London loves Pierre” even though the LOT argument is correct in that we can at least 
think it. It is clearly possible for a natural language sentence to obey the language's rules of 
syntax and be composed of meaningful, context-independent parts, yet still be meaningless, 
as Chomsky's famous example “colorless green ideas sleep furiously” demonstrates.
 3.4.9 The Intentional Stance
In explaining and, especially, predicting the behaviour of an object, Dennett (1987:43-68) 
defines three levels of abstraction:
The physical stance which is the most concrete and is concerned with material 
composition (at the level of physics and chemistry);
The  design  stance is  concerned  with  purpose  and  function  (at  the  level  of 
biology and engineering); and
The  intentional  stance is  the  most  abstract  and  is  concerned  with  belief, 
planning, etc. (at the level of mind and software).
The  intentional  stance is  characteristically  the  attribution  of  beliefs  and  goals  and  is, 
therefore, the concern of cognitive science. Connectionists disagree with supporters of the 
classical model of cognition about the nature of cognitive processes, they nevertheless often 
agree that cognition can be usefully described through the use of theoretical notions like 
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beliefs,  goals,  knowledge  structures,  plans,  and concepts  (e.g.,  Smolensky 1991;  Clark 
1993).
 3.4.10 Co-extension and Co-reference
When it comes to co-extensive concepts, connectionism offers a clear alternative to that of 
the supporters of the classical, symbol-processing model.  For supporters of the classical 
model, such as Fodor and Lepore, Putnam, and many others, meaning is externalist; they 
support  a  view of  meaning as  reference or  denotation.  On the account  of  concepts  as 
presented by Fodor, concepts have a content that is causally linked with an entity in the 
external world. In order to individuate co-extensive but nevertheless distinct concepts, a 
“something else” must be postulated and this “something else” is internal, is psychological. 
In contrast, conceptual content for connectionists like Paul Churchland, is a portrayal of the 
world  that  has  no  automatic  referential  connection  to  the  external  world,  and  what 
constitutes  meaning  is  a  creature's  set  of  beliefs  (“cognitive  portrayals”  of  the  world) 
(Churchland 2007:135). This connectionist theory of meaning is thus internalist. By making 
a creature's set of beliefs constitutive of meaning, connectionists are “meaning holists” and 
are constrained to explain how two creatures could be in the same psychological state; how 
they could  “share”  a  concept.  This  is  discussed further  in  the  section  on connectionist 
theories of concepts in Chapter 5, but briefly, the claim is that it is possible to define and 
use a notion of sameness and similarity of configuration-in-activation-space for concepts in 
the minds of two people where “sameness” of configuration would be taken to mean that 
they are in the same psychological state and “similarity” of configuration would mean that 
they had similar (but not identical) concepts (Churchland 2007:134).
 3.5 PART IV: CONCLUSIONS
A study of the physiology of the eye reveals that no visual image of the world is transmitted 
to the brain; what is transmitted is primarily  information about: colour, contrast and edges, 
and  change  signalling  movement.  Even  this  information  is  incomplete:  while  there  are 
approximately 120 million rods and 6 million cones receiving stimuli, there are only about 
one  million  retinal  ganglion  cells  to  carry  information  to  the  brain.  The  mind  is, 
nevertheless, able to construct images and categorize percepts based on very limited and 
often ambiguous input. The Computational Theory of Mind is loosely based on the digital 
computer analogy, but a more productive and accurate analogy would be that of a system of 
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pattern-recognition  and  pattern-completion.  Such  a  system  is  more  compatible  with 
connectionism. 
Connectionists reject the symbolic paradigm hypothesis concerning formalized know­
ledge because actual artificial intelligence (AI) systems built on the hypothesis seem too 
brittle, too inflexible, to model true human expertise; and, further, the process of articulat­
ing  expert  knowledge  in  rules  seems  impractical  for  many  important  domains  (com­
mon-sense, for instance). Connectionists contend that the symbolic paradigm hypothesis 
has not contributed any insight into how knowledge is represented in the brain. In particu­
lar, only the connectionist model has an account of implicit knowledge (non-conceptual con­
tent), that is, of the knowledge which the subject may not be able to articulate but which, 
nevertheless, is an authentic propositional attitude. Expert judgement, at least, is not natur­
ally modelled as the sequential interpretation of a linguistically formalized procedure posited 
by the Computational Theory of Mind and which takes place at the conceptual level. Intu­
ition, for example, must be formalized at the sub-conceptual level (Smolensky 1988:§6). 
Human knowledge (and possibly that of many other species) consists predominantly, 
according to connectionist theories, of a substantial set of “prototypes”38 which are under­
stood to be the clearest cases which have been learnt and which occupy a specific region (a 
“hot-spot”) inside an activation space, and where a concept encompasses a range of related 
cases:
The picture  I  am trying to  evoke,  of  the cognitive  lives of  simple  creatures, 
ascribes  to  them an organized ‘library’  of  internal  representations  of  various 
prototypical perceptual situations, situations to which prototypical behaviors are 
the computed output of the well trained network. (Churchland, 1989:207).
A relevant example is that of the mine/rock network that  has been able to out-perform 
human operators in distinguishing between sonar echoes returned from explosive mines and 
the solar echoes returned from rocks of comparable sizes. As discussed further in Chapter 5, 
the Prototype Theory of concepts is well suited to implementation in connectionist models 
given that neural nets are capable of “learning”39 the difference between subtle statistical 
patterns  that  would  be very  hard to  implement  in  rule-based classical  models.  Further, 
Churchland  suggests  that  the  model  he  advocates  is  applicable  to  many  types  of 
“prototypes”, including categorical, social, temporal, and motivational) suggesting that it can 
38 This view has much in common with the Prototype Theory of Concepts (see Rosch 1973a, 1973b, 1975, 1978) 
for which some members of a category are more typical than others forming the concept. A pigeon is usually 
viewed as a more typical bird that an ostrich. A  PIGEON prototype would occupy a more central position in the 
“hotspot” of the BIRD activation space. 
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provide  a  unified  account  of  a  large  part  of  explanatory  understanding  (Churchland 
1989:212–8). Explanatory understanding, on this account, consists in the activation of a 
prototype  vector  whereby  the  incoming  activation  pattern  is  “amplified”  because  the 
prototype  results  from  the  previous  complex  processing  of  many  examples  during  its 
learning stage (Churchland 1989:210-2). Hence, because the received information results in 
an almost instantaneous activation of a prototype, a cognitive system is able to access the 
relevant consequences of a change in the environment almost immediately  (Churchland 
1989:178), thereby avoiding the “frame problem” to which the classical, symbol-processing 
model is liable, whether in its Massively Modular or Fodorian domain-general central system 
incarnation. 
Classical  cognitive science uses symbolic representations which closely mirror the 
structure of propositionally-described knowledge: the Computational Theory of Mind is a 
combination of the notion that mental representations are syntactically-structured with the 
idea that mental processes are calculations which act only on the symbolic form of the men­
tal representations. Relationships between a proposition's concepts are represented expli­
citly by symbolic structures in either a hierarchy or through the use of rules. Determining 
the relevance of what information needs to be represented in the hierarchy or input to a rule 
can quickly lead to a “computational explosion”. As Fodor has stated, one of the major fail­
ures of computational cognitive psychology is its inability to provide a convincing account of 
abduction. A possible solution to the “globality-cum-complex-sensitivity” requirements of 
abduction and other similar cognitive processes might lie in the choice of cognitive architec­
ture, but Fodor concludes that:
The substantive problem is to understand, even to a first approximation,  what 
sort of architecture cognitive science ought to switch to insofar as the goal is to 
accommodate abduction. As far as I know, however, nobody has the slightest 
idea. (Fodor 2000:47)
Proponents of the connectionist model claim to have just such an idea. It should be noted, 
however, that, in a connectionist model, there is no real distinction between processes and 
memory stores; in particular, there is no clear distinction between conceptual knowledge 
39 Connectionist models usually start as  tabula rasa and “learn” through connection weight adjustment (where 
weighted  connections  represent  synapses  or  groups  of  synapses).  In  a  “trained”  model,  each  input  pattern 
generates an internal pattern (an abstract underlying representation) over the hidden units. This would be a little  
like a human learning a DOG concept through exposure to different instances of dogs. Clearly the prototypes for an 
Inuk exposed only to instances of huskies would be different from that of the Mexican exposed only to instances of 
chihuahuas. A human would have, according to nativists at least, some innate concepts such as ANIMATE, while a 
connectionist model would learn to categorize objects as ANIMATE or INANIMATE – they are able to generalize beyond 
the input patterns (see, for example, Daugherty and Seidenberg 1992).  
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and background knowledge. The difficulties with connectionism cited by Fodor & Pylyshyn, 
and others, notwithstanding, there has been a lot of recent progress in neurophysiology and 
the understanding of neural networks which has led to models that overcome many of the 
early  problems  with  the  result  that  neuroscientists  tend  to  favour  connectionism.  That 
neuroscientists  tend  to  favour  connectionism40 is  not  that  surprising  given  its  parallel 
distributed processing and the fact that the brain is massively parallel, while, in contrast 
symbol-manipulation  models  have  no  resemblance  whatsoever  to  underlying  brain 
structure.
A review of the relative strengths and weaknesses of the two competing cognitive ar­
chitecture models (outlined in the Comparison table above), suggests that a hybrid architec­
ture that combines the strengths of both, at the appropriate cognitive level,  is  needed. 
There is considerable empirical evidence that supports the view of the brain as a massively-
parallel processor but how this would translate into a massively-parallel mind is question­
able41. The problem is that the thought processes appear as sequential to the conscious 
mind and, as such, are amenable to being explained in symbol-manipulation terms, but 
much of our cognitive processes are not conscious and do not appear to be translatable into 
a language-like medium, as is demonstrated by the phenomenon of expert knowledge. As 
previously stated, there is evidence for a level of representation which lies beneath that of 
the sentential or propositional attitudes; and for a learning dynamic that operates primarily 
on sub-linguistic factors. What appears to be required is a link between the two architec­
tures42. In Chapters 4 and 5, I present a possible direction that might provide a means for 
linking the two architectures using a variation of recent dual-process/dual-system theories.
--------------------
40The best known proponents of connectionism, the neuro-philosophers Patricia and Paul Churchland, are both 
neuroscientists by training.
41 Fodor and Pylyshyn, and other proponents of the Classical model, accept connectionism at the neural '(abstract 
neurological') implementation level and conclude that arguments for Connectionism “are coherent only on this 
interpretation” (Fodor & Pylyshyn 1988:1). They thus reject that the mind/brain architecture is Connectionist at the 
cognitive level even as part of a hybrid model.
42 Clark (1989), for one, has attempted such a unification but, to date, with only limited success.
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4. DUAL-PROCESS THEORIES OF MIND
 4.1 INTRODUCTION
Before offering a cognitive architecture model which differs somewhat from those that have 
been  widely-accepted,  I  examine  in  this  chapter  several  dual-process  and  dual-system 
theories and the attributes that these processes and systems are purported to exhibit. The 
results of this examination will be used in the following chapter.
Chapter 4 is divided into 4 parts:
• Part I is an overview of some of the most popular dual-process and dual-system the­
ories found in current philosophical and psychology literature;
• Part II presents many of the problems and weaknesses of these theories;
• Part III presents a dual cognitive architecture model which compares how the two 
main cognitive architecture models (the classical symbolic, computational model and 
the connectionist model) relate to the attributes of the two system types common in 
many dual-process theories; and
• Part IV provides some conclusions following from the preceding discussions and ob­
servations.
 4.2 PART I: DUAL-PROCESS THEORIES – STANDARD VIEW
A  position  common  among  many  psychologists  today,  especially  social  psychologists43, 
draws on the distinction between automatic and controlled processing. This distinction has 
given rise to various dual-process theories which emphasize contrasts between: heuristic 
processes and those that are systematic or analytic; between those that are intuitive and 
those that are analytic; between those that are associative and those that are rule-based; 
between  those  that  are  implicit  and  those  that  are  explicit;  between  those  that  are 
experiential and those that are  rational; or any combination of these. Two psychologists, 
Keith Stanovich and Richard West  (see Stanovich 1999, Stanovich & West 1999, 2000, 
2007, 2008a. 2008b), proposed that there are two cognitive systems in the mind (System 
1 and  System 2) which underly the two process types. They proposed that  System 1 
operates automatically and rapidly, with minimal, if any effort, and without any sense of 
43 Social psychology is concerned with how individual personality, attitudes, motivations, and behaviour influence 
and are influenced by social groups.
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voluntary control; and that  System 2 allocates attention to demanding mental activities 
that include complex computations. The following table presents attributes associated with 
standard views of the differences between the two systems of a dual-process theory:
 Dual-Process Theory – Differences between System 1 and System 2
 (Evan 2008, Kahneman 2011)
Cluster System 1 System 2
I Unconscious reasoning Conscious reasoning
Implicit Explicit
Automatic Controlled
Judgements based on intuition Judgements based on critical examination
Operates effortlessly and automatically Operates with effort and control
Processes information quickly Processes information slowly
Hypothetical reasoning Logical reasoning
Large capacity Small capacity
Default process, can be overridden by System 2 Inhibitory, used when System 1 fails to form a 
logical/acceptable conclusion
Unintentional thinking Intentional thinking
Holistic, Perceptual Analytic, reflective
II Prominent in animals and humans Prominent only in humans
Prominent since human origins Developed over time
Nonverbal Linked to language
Evolutionary rationality Individual rationality
Modular cognition Fluid intelligence
III Associative; includes recognition, perception, 
orientation, etc
Rule-based; includes comparisons, weighing of 
options, etc.






Influenced by experiences, emotions, and 
memories
Influenced by facts, logic, and evidence
Unrelated to working memory Related to working memory
Independent of general intelligence Linked to general intelligence
For Kahneman (2011), the impressions and feelings that originate in  System 1 provide 
sources for the explicit beliefs and deliberate choices of System 2; and, while the automatic 
operations  of  System 1 may generate  complex  patterns  of  ideas,  logically  progressive 
thought construction can only take place in the slower  System 2.  Not all  dual-process 
theorists (J. Evans, for example) agree that, underlying the two process types, there are 
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two cognitive systems (Stanovich's  “System 1” and “System 2”),  holding instead that 
there are several cognitive systems (especially for unconscious processes) or even just one 
complex  system.  Nevertheless,  what  is  common  to  all  dual-process  and  dual-system 
theories is the demarcation between processes that are unconscious and those that are 
conscious (Cluster I in the previous table): one group of processes (or “System 1”) consists 
of those that are fast, unconscious, and automatic; and the other of processes (or “System 
2”) that are slow, conscious, and controlled. “The highly diverse operations of  System 2 
have one feature in common: they require attention and are disrupted when attention is 
drawn away” (Kahneman 2011). Whether dual-process or dual-system, these theories have 
in common the contrast between fast, automatic, or unconscious processes and  those that 
are slow, effortful, and conscious (Samuels 2006). Following the terminology suggested by 
Evans  (2008),  I  will  use the “Type 1”  and “Type 2”  terminology in order  to  avoid any 
commitment to a two-system view. While I  accept the  basic view of different cognitive 
systems  as  presented  by  Kahneman  and  others,  I  will  diverge  significantly  from their 
positions on the constitution of these systems. 
 4.3 PART II: PROBLEMS WITH THE STANDARD VIEW
In this section, I evaluate some of the features attributed to the standard or commonly 
accepted two process, or two system, accounts. While the list of attributes may vary slightly 
from one account to another, they generally follow those given in the previous table.
 4.3.1 Conscious and Unconscious Processes
Most reasonably competent car drivers have experienced driving, sometimes long distances, 
without  being  conscious  of  doing  so.  Keeping  to  the  speed  limit,  avoiding  obstacles, 
following  the  desired  route,  and  so  on,  can  be  accomplished  without  any  conscious 
processing. There is a major difference between performing an action and being conscious 
of performing the action. There is also a major difference between experiencing an event 
and being aware of  the experience:  there are  many anecdotes  about athletes who are 
unaware that they have sustained serious injury during a sporting event and only become 
aware (experience pain) after the event has ended. Certain neurological disorders provide 
some evidence that the areas of the brain correlated with being conscious of performing at 
least some actions are distinct from those correlated with actually performing them. Visual 
perception involves many different cortical areas contributing to visual perception but visual 
information appears to be processed by two major cortical systems: 1) a ventral  visual 
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pathway  extended  to  the  temporal  lobe  and  associated  with  conscious  perception, 
identification, and recognition of objects using the objects' intrinsic visual properties; and 2) 
a dorsal visual pathway extended to the parietal lobe and associated with the exercise of 
visual-motor control of objects44. Certain types of brain lesions in the ventral visual pathway 
can lead to “blindsight”, a disorder discovered by the psychologist Larry Weiskrantz (1986). 
Patients  suffering from “blindsight”  report  that  they are  unable  to  see objects,  but  are 
nevertheless able to guess at the location or even visual features of the objects with an 
accuracy  significantly  greater  than  chance.  Weiskrantz  hypothesized  that  the  person 
suffering from blindsight perceives a light in their blind area but is unable to report the 
perception because it is not being monitored.
Dissociation of the two visual pathways can help explain the phenomenon of driving 
“unconsciously” and may, in fact, provide advantages when swift action is required. As Im­
manuel Kant argued, for any simple act of self-preservation that man performs, he would be 
far better served by instinct than by reason (GMM, 396). For dual-processing theorists, the 
dissociation of conscious and unconscious processing systems may help explain the differ­
ence between novice and expert performance: novice performance consists predominantly 
of conscious rule-following but expert performance is predominantly independent of  any 
conscious rule-following. Novice versus expert learning and performance is discussed further 
in the “Implicit and Explicit Learning” paragraph below.
Experiments  using  electroencephalography  performed  by  H.  H.  Kornhuber  and 
I. Deeke (1964) demonstrated that, when subjects are asked to raise a finger, brain activity 
builds up as much as one and a half seconds before finger movement commences. Thus, 
anyone observing the brain activity would know that the subject would raise a finger about 
one second before the subject  would have the subjective experience of  freely  initiating 
movement. The neuroscientist, Benjamin Libet, used electroencephalography (EEG) to study 
“freely voluntary” acts:
Freely voluntary acts are preceded by a specific electrical change in the brain 
(the  'readiness  potential',  RP)  that  begins  550  ms  before  the  act.  Human 
subjects become aware of intention to act 350-400 ms after RP starts, but 200 
ms before the motor act. (Libet 1999)
Libet's results led him to claim that the volitional process is initiated unconsciously. Susan J. 
Blackmore wrote that “Many philosophers and scientists have argued that free will is an 
44 The ventral and dorsal pathways are shown in the “Blindsight” illustration “Visual Recognition and Action (©
McGill University)“ on page 30.
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illusion. Unlike all of them, Benjamin Libet found a way to test it” (Blackmore 2007). Libet 
did,  however,  also  claim that  the  conscious  function  could  still  control  the  outcome by 
inhibiting (or “vetoing”) the action, but the results of experiments, such as those conducted 
by Kornhuber, et al., and, later, by Libet himself, suggest that unconscious processes in the 
brain  are  the  true  initiators  of  voluntary  acts  thereby  suggesting  a  form  of 
neurophysiological determinism which, if true, means that decisions are the outcome of pre-
existing causal factors (beliefs, needs, preferences, etc.) Incompatibilists claim that this is 
true and its truth is incompatible with the existence of free-will. Compatibilists, in contrast, 
claim that the truth of neurophysiological determinism is compatible with choices based on 
one's own beliefs, desires and inclinations. The question is what role consciousness plays in 
these choices.
Daniel Wegner (2002, 2003) hypothesized that there is no difference between the 
experience of having personally caused an action and the experience of cause and effect in 
general. He conducted several studies to test this hypothesis and reported that subjects be­
lieve that something causes something else if and only if what the subjects thought to be 
the causal event:
• occurs just before the putative effect (the priority principle);
• is consistent with the putative effect (the consistency principle); and 
• is the only apparent cause of the putative effect (the exclusivity principle).
Wegner provides considerable evidence to support his view that we are largely ignorant of 
when and how we act and the ignorance is of two types:
• we are acting without realizing that we are so doing; and
• we are not acting, but think that we are.
He cites, as examples of the former type, the ouija board; facilitated communication; water 
divination; and hypnotism. An example of the second type of “ignorance” is provided by his 
‘I-Spy’ study in which subjects incorrectly believe that they have selected a figure on a 
computer screen through “priming” – they were previously encouraged to think about the 
figure.  In  addition  to  these  types  of  “ignorance”,  are  the  common  problems  of 
overestimating the effect that we have on objects and people around us, and of forgetting 
or  even confabulating earlier  actions in order that  the actions appear in  a better  light. 
Michael Gazzinga (1988) has suggested that the brain has a monitoring system that often 
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“constructs hypotheses” and will often make guesses that are not always correct. Gazzinga 
gives the example of split-brain patients who often fabricate a false hypothesis to explain 
incorrect selections during experiments in which they are shown two different images – one 
visible only to left eye (controlled by the right hemisphere) and the other only to the right 
eye (controlled by the left hemisphere) – and are then asked to use both hands to pick two 
items that they most associate with what they have seen. In most patients the language 
centre is in the left hemisphere and, because the corpus collosum has been severed, they 
cannot report information available only to the right hemisphere. The patients will fabricate 
an explanation for the selection made by the left hand. Gazzinga suggest that it is not just 
in damaged brains that a monitor will fabricate or guess when needed, but that fabrication 
and  guesswork  is  a  normal  part  of  its  functioning.  This  fabrication  and  guesswork  is 
performed unconsciously.
Wegner (2003) reports that in many cases of clinical anomalies, such as 'alien hand 
syndrome' and schizophrenia, the experience of free will is “fabricated”.  While we experi­
ence the conscious willing of an action, Wegner maintains that acts of will cannot be taken 
to be the uncaused causes of such action 
and that  the  experience of  conscious will 
arises  from  inferring  a  causal  path  from 
thought to action (shown as a purple arrow 
in  Illustration 12) while the actual  causal 
paths (shown as a green arrow in Illustra­
tion  12)  are  not  consciously  present. 
Wegner (2003) concludes that “[T]he ex­
perience  of  conscious  will  is  a  marvelous 
trick of the mind, one that yields useful in­
tuitions about our authorship – but it is not 
the foundation for  an explanatory system 
that stands outside the paths of deterministic causation.” As Voltaire put it: “When I can do 
what I want to do, there is my liberty for me ... but I cannot help what I do want.” This is  
not to say that, given sufficient information about an agent's beliefs, desires, and inclina­
tions, his behaviour can, at least in principle, always be correctly predicted. Chaos Theory, 
the study of nonlinear dynamics, demonstrates that, for any system, there will always be 
differences smaller than the smallest measurable difference (see Gleick 1988).
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Illustration 12: Experiencing Conscious Free Will (from Wegner 
2003  - modified from Wegner & Wheatley 1999)
The findings of the studies by Kornhuber et al., Libet, Wegner, and others lend sup­
port to the view that there are two cognitive processes but differ with most dual-process 
theorists on their causal effect. The findings suggest that:
• in one process, certain unconscious mental events cause a thought while other un­
conscious mental events cause actions; and
• in another process, the apparent (but not real) link between cause and action is ex­
perienced consciously. 
Libet's studies indicated that awareness is a unique phenomenon in itself, distinguished from 
the contents of awareness:
The content of an unconscious mental process . . . may be the same as the 
content with awareness of the signal. But to become aware of that same content 
required that stimulus duration be increased by about 400 msec. (Libet 1999)
Libet's results have been replicated by others (e.g., Soon et al., 2008) using using more 
accurate fMRI techniques, and these later studies report that the behavioural output of a 
decision can be encoded in brain activity in regions of the frontal and parietal cortex as 
much as ten seconds before the subject  becomes aware of the decision.  For Libet,  the 
awareness  of  the  decision  to  veto  could  be  thought  to  require  preceding  unconscious 
processes, but the content of that awareness (the actual decision to inhibit action) is a 
separate feature that need not have the same requirement. The role of conscious free will, 
on this account, would not be to initiate a voluntary act, but rather to control whether or not 
the act takes place. There is a weakness, however, in Libet’s interpretation: if, as his results 
indicate, unconscious brain activity always precedes a conscious decision, then it is difficult 
to argue that the conscious veto is not also preceded by unconscious brain activity; thereby 
suggesting that the experience that “veto” is exercised consciously is also illusory. 
The results of brain potential recordings of Parkinson patients suggest that the sup­
plementary motor area, which is not available to introspection, has a priming role in the 
preparation and initiation of voluntary movement (Kornhuber & Deecke 1964). Studies of 
mirror neurons, the cells in the brain that fire when a particular action is performed and also 
when someone else is observed performing the same action, has led to the suggestion that 
this "mirroring" is the neural mechanism by which we automatically (unconsciously) under­
stand the actions, intentions and emotions of other people45. Galen Strawson took the posi­
45 University  of  California  -  Los  Angeles.  "First  direct  recording  made  of  mirror  neurons  in  human  brain."  
ScienceDaily, 13 Apr. 2010. Web. 21 Sep. 2013.
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tion that some thoughts have qualia; some thoughts have introspectively accessible, phe­
nomenal features. He claimed that there are experiences of something (such as understand­
ing a sentence or suddenly thinking of something) but that these experiences are not redu­
cible to the associated sensory experiences: “Each sensory modality is an experiential mod­
ality, and thought experience (in which understanding-experience may be included) is an 
experiential modality to be reckoned alongside the other experiential modalities” (Strawson 
1994:196). If we take the neuroscientific or cognitive approach, however, then we may be 
able to avoid what Gilbert Ryle (1949) tagged as a “category mistake”. There is a consider­
able difference between discussing what we experience consciously and what causes the ex­
perience. Contrary to what we “feel” is happening, all the studies cited in this section sug­
gest that conscious experiences are causally inert. This claim is contrary to almost all du­
al-process and dual system theories, especially those that are prevalent among social psy­
chologists (see Wilson et al. 1991, 2000, Epstein 1994, Chaiken 1999, Bargh 2011) which 
stress  the  distinction  between  controlled  (conscious)  processing  and  automatic  (uncon­
scious) processing and hold that there are causal interactions between conscious thoughts, 
feelings, and perceptions, and behaviour. It should be noted that the “inhibitory” function 
attributed to Type 2 could be explained as merely the monitoring and verbalization of a sub­
conscious “conflict” resolution resulting from much the same mechanism as an alarm call 
would in other species.
 4.3.2 Language and Reasoning
There are two basic assumptions behind most dual-process or dual-system theories such as 
that  proposed  by  Kahneman,  namely  that  logical  reasoning  is  conscious,  that  rational 
judgement, in general, takes place consciously, and that such reasoning is associated with 
language. If this is correct, then it would appear that other non-linguistic species, or even 
pre-linguistic infants, cannot reason logically nor make rational judgements. It would appear 
that,  for  such theories,  natural  language competence is  required for  Type 2 to  operate 
successfully.  I  will  agree that  consciousness uses some form of imagery,  usually  verbal 
imagery (pronunciation, in the case of spoken languages; visual or even haptic in the case 
of sign languages), but I do not agree with these divisions between intuition and reasoning 
and between hypothetical and logical reasoning and will argue that all these processes are 
conducted  at  the  non-conscious (Type  1)  level.  I  claim  that  differences  between  the 
reasoning capacities of linguistic and pre-linguistic humans and non-linguistic species are 
questions of degree but that development of language capacities enables some reasoning to 
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be  consciously  experienced  and  reported. Several  studies  have  demonstrated  that 
preschoolers  demonstrate  deductive  reasoning  skills  (see  Dias  &  Harris,  1988,  1990; 
Hawkins, Pea, Glick, & Scribner, 1984; Richards & Sanderson, 1999). On the Piaget account 
of sensori-motor development, symbolic problem solving is manifest in infants from 18 to 
24 months of age. Recent fMRI experiments46, suggest that logical reasoning does not rely 
on  the  grammar  of  natural  language  and,  along  with  other  neuroimaging  and 
neuropsychology  evidence,  appear  to  show that  high-level  cognitive  functions,  such  as 
arithmetic,  problem-solving,  and theory  of  mind,  are  remarkably  language-independent. 
Anyone who has watched a crow solving problems that require several  steps (including 
creation of tools) is likely to accept that it too is using logical reasoning, albeit without being 
consciously (refectively) aware of its thought processes. 
 4.3.3 Implicit and Explicit Learning
The standard dual-process or dual-system position is that the conscious process (or System 
2) includes rule-following. Certainly when learning a new skill, such as how to drive a car, to 
play a musical instrument, or to play chess, a novice will be conscious of following rules. 
Experts, in contrast, are usually unaware of following any rules and, as Socrates discovered 
when trying to find how Eurythro, a supposed expert in the field, could recognize piety and 
justice (see the Platonic dialogue  Euthyphro), experts are often unaware of how they are 
able to perform the skills. Given the speed at which expert chess players perform, they may 
depend almost entirely on intuition rather than relying, if at all, on analysis and comparison 
of  alternatives  (Dreyfus  &  Dreyfus  1986);  experts  do  not  follow  rules  consciously  and 
sequentially. Pattern recognition is an integral part of an expert chess player's competence 
and that would appear to be included in Type 1. I would suggest that we are conscious of 
rule-following (attributed to  Type 2) when learning a new skill, when examining rules, or 
when identifying errors in reasoning and making normative judgements, but rule-following 
is included in Type 1 although not necessarily amenable to introspection.
There is a distinction between implicit and explicit learning, between implicit and ex­
plicit memory, and these are usually attributed to Type 1 and Type 2 respectively.  There is 
increasing evidence that it is possible to acquire implicit knowledge without ever being able 
to state any related explicit rule (see Reber 1993, Sun et al. 2005). Implicit learning theor­
ists, such as Reber, contend that implicit processing proceeds by chance without accompa­
46As reported by Martin M. Monti at the  Interdisciplinary Workshop on the Notion of Thought, Ruhr-Universität 
Bochum, 5th - 7th June 2008
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nying awareness, and that explicit processing proceeds deliberately and is always accom­
panied by awareness (Reber 1993). “Conscious rule-following” can, however, be described 
(in my opinion more accurately)  as “being conscious of following rules”:  difficulties en­
countered at the unconscious level by novices result in activation of the monitoring and 
verbal (usually phonic) encoding systems and hence in the awareness of rule-following. The 
same type of difficulties do not arise in the unconscious of experts and thus their monitoring 
systems are rarely activated.
Procedural or motor learning (as opposed to declarative learning) has been defined 
as “…a set of [internal] processes associated with practice or experience leading to relatively 
permanent  changes  in  the  capability  for  responding”  (Schmidt,  1988:346;  Schmidt, 
1991:51). The division of memory into two systems can help explain infantile amnesia: 
skills learnt in infancy may be retained but not explicitly; and adults are unable to retrieve 
episodic memories formed before the age of 2–4 years. This is likely because the ability to 
encode memories in some linguistic form is required for storing explicit memories – the hip­
pocampus, which is necessary for storing explicit memories, does not mature prior to 3 or 4 
years of age. There is anecdotal evidence from deaf individuals who did not acquire a (sign) 
language until relatively late (e.g., Helen Keller and the Nicaraguan deaf children who de­
veloped their own sign language47) that they previously did not “think”. It is probably more 
accurate to say that, although they could think, they were not conscious of thinking before 
acquiring a language.
 The use of short-term memory (attributed to Type 2) is involved in links between in­
put stimuli (of whatever modality) and the relevant concepts and encyclopaedic knowledge 
stored in semantic memory (a subset of long-term memory)48. The existence of the relevant 
semantic memory items is what renders the stimuli  meaningful. Even an incomplete se­
mantic web of concepts and encyclopaedic knowledge can render a term like 'electron', for 
example, meaningful: we can “sort of know what it means” without having acquired all the 
scientific concepts necessary for accurate reference fixation. We do not need to keep defer­
ring to experts whenever we use scientific or technical terms because, as long as our idio­
syncratic definitions of the terms are “close enough”, we will still be able to understand each 
other which is all that is required for day-to-day communication. When we have insufficient 
knowledge or understanding for a complete grasp of the meaning of the term, we may re­
47 See Kegl (1994)
48 See Illustration 16 “Psychological View of Memory and Cognitive Processing“ on page 124 for a diagram of the 
relationship between short-term memory, concepts, and encyclopaedic knowledge.
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sort to statements such as “you know what I mean” and most of the time that is sufficient 
for communication purposes. The meaning of “meaning” is discussed further in the next 
chapter.
The association of conscious thought with short-term (working memory) can help ex­
plain some of the attributes associated by dual-process theorists with Type 2: slow process 
of information, small capacity, and its links to general intelligence, but, as Evans (2008) 
states, “skeptics may see this as the only firm foundation on which the various dual-process 
theories stand: There is one conscious working memory system and everything else.” I will 
argue in  section 5.5  that  this  is  the  case:  there  is  a  very limited conscious  mind and 
everything else.
 4.3.4 Evolutionarily Old versus Evolutionarily Recent
Another contrasting attribute between  Type 1 and  Type 2 is that  Type 1 is evolutionarily 
relatively old (is prominent in both humans and many other species) and that  Type 2 is 
evolutionarily more recent (is prominent only in humans). The claim is that the two Types 
fulfil different functional roles. The claim is that certain attributes of  Type 2 (the link to 
language, the attributes of conscious, logical, and hypothetical reasoning, and the like) are 
uniquely human. The experiential Type 1 operates rapidly and unconsciously, while Type 2 
operates slowly and consciously using the medium of language. Many of the proposed Type 
1 processes utilize, however, regions of the brain (the neo-cortex) that evolved relatively 
recently.  There  are,  in  addition,  many  ethological  studies  that  undermine  the  clear 
distinction between the two process types. The increase in the size of the neo-cortex of 
primates has been attributed to the growing complexity of their social interactions given 
that  the  ability  to  predict  the  behaviour  of  conspecifics  appears  to  confer  a  large 
evolutionary advantage (Dunbar 2001)49. The parts of the cortex responsible for social skills, 
which  includes  language  functions  and  theory  of  mind,  have  increased  in  size  and 
complexity because they improved social skills. Sensory and motor regions are located in 
the neo-cortex the surface of which is greater in predatory mammals than in herbivorous 
mammals  probably  because  the  ability  to  hunt  successfully  relies  on  a  highly  evolved 
sensori-motor system.
49 What is being suggested here is that there is a “positive feedback loop”: individuals with a more developed 
prefrontal cortex would exhibit greater associative capacities which would enable them to make their behavioural 
responses more unpredictable; selective pressure would then result in other members of the species developing a  
more complex prefrontal cortex which would enable them to predict these responses, leading to the generation of  
even more unpredictable behaviours, and so on.
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 4.3.5 Modularity and Dual-Process Theories
Modularity of mind theories are discussed in some detail in Chapter 3 but, briefly, Chomsky 
(1980) introduced the notion of domain-specific cognition by proposing that that humans 
are born with domain-specific systems of knowledge and Fodor (1983) presented a famous 
argument  for  modularity  of  mind  that  the  mind  consists  of  a  number  of  functionally-
specialized mechanisms which evolved in response to recurring adaptive problems. Fodor's 
position  is  not  that  all  mental  systems  are  modular  but  rather  that  only  peripheral 
subsystems are modular. Consistent with Fodor's position,  Evans (2012) stresses that the 
evidence of subject's performance on dual-processing tasks points clearly to there being 
more than two cognitive systems and hence there has been a shift to theorizing that there 
are two “minds” with different evolutionary histories and each of which are composed of 
multiple  sub-systems.  Other  researchers  (Moshman 2000,  Osman 2004)  claim that  the 
variety  of  processes  accomplished  could  not  be  accommodated  by  just  two  systems. 
Moshman actually proposes four possible types of processing: implicit heuristic processing, 
implicit  rule-based  processing,  explicit  heuristic  processing,  and  explicit  rule-based 
processing.
Fodor (1983, 2000) also proposed a form of dual-process theory but his contrasted a 
combination  of  input  transducers  and  mandatory,  informationally-encapsulated  cognitive 
modules (such as language and vision) with central, non-modular general-purpose systems. 
On this model, the domain-specific input cognitive modules compute representations which 
become input to the central, general purpose cognitive systems (Fodor 1983:90-91); the in­
put modules “present the world to thought” (Fodor 1983:101). The input representations 
and computational processes of these modules are relatively impenetrable to consciousness. 
Thus, this model also describes two systems: one that includes unconscious computational 
processing and the other that includes conscious reasoning. The representations computed 
by the input modules may need to be corrected (given that perceptual information is often 
incomplete) using background knowledge and, perhaps, output representations from other 
modules – Fodor calls such a process “the fixation of perceptual belief” (Fodor 1983:102). 
Fodor's “System 2” is more encompassing than the standard view as given in the “Dual-Pro­
cess” Table above but his systems are subject to some of the same criticisms as the stand­
ard view.
Dual-process theories, such as Fodor's and several others, appear to endow Type 2 
processes with significant ability to control behaviour but, as discussed previously, many 
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neuro-imaging studies indicate that volitional processes are initiated unconsciously.  Activity 
in specific regions of the human brain can be used to predict the outcome of a motor de­
cision that the subject was not yet conscious of having made. These findings would seem to 
indicate that decisions are first made at a subconscious level and only after are translated 
into what appears to be a “conscious decision”. Retrospection leads the subject to believe 
that an action resulted from an exercise of freewill.
Most tasks are performed automatically but, even for common tasks such as facial 
recognition, brushing teeth, or  speaking, highly complex neural  networks are employed. 
Many of these neural  networks are highly specialized (acting as cognitive modules) and 
function unconsciously. An expert pianist, for instance, knows how to play the piano but 
would have difficulty in telling how they know what finger they use to press a particular key 
– in fact, when asked how they know what fingers to use, some pianists have reported ex­
periencing a temporary inability to play. Visual perception also uses specialized neural cir­
cuits which, as Fodor (1983) has argued, are informationally-encapsulated and hence, are 
inaccessible to introspection and are the basis of many optical illusions.
 4.3.6 Cognitive Correlates of Consciousness
If we examine the table “ Dual-Process Theory – Differences between System 1 and System
2“ on page 91, the features listed in Cluster 1 for System 2 (Type 2)  represent cognitive 
correlates of consciousness for most standard dual-process views (see Evans 2008). It is 
possible, however, to be conscious without any of these correlates. This is especially the 
case when we are relaxed and, perhaps, listening to music or the sound of waves or looking 
at a sunset, or even engaged in yoga or transcendental meditation. In such situations, we 
are not conscious of reasoning; nor of explicit or controlled thought; we are not making 
judgements based on critical examination; we are not aware of any operations requiring 
effort and control; nor of reasoning logically. Yet we cannot be said to be “unconscious” in 
these situations. Hence, these features cannot be cognitive correlates of consciousness. In 
the next chapter, I suggest a different set of cognitive correlates of consciousness,
PART III: DUAL COGNITIVE ARCHITECTURAL MODELS
One of the accepted attributes (in Cluster III of the previous table) of System 1 is that it is 
“parallel” whereas the related attribute of  System 2 is that it is “sequential”. If such is 
indeed the case, then the parallel nature of System 1 could be modelled by a connectionist 
cognitive architecture while the sequential  nature of  System 2 could be modelled by a 
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symbolic cognitive architecture. Some of the relevant attributes of the two models are given 
in the following table (using the “Cognitive Architecture – Comparison” table in Chapter 2:
Dual-Process Theories and Cognitive Architectures — Comparison
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Received information results in an almost 
instantaneous activation of a prototype, 
a cognitive system is able to access the 
relevant consequences of a change in the 
environment almost immediately.
Connectionist models are more biologically plausible; they are more “brain-like” than other 
non-connectionist architectures like the classical, symbolic model. While the connectionist 
model is massively parallel, it can, however, be used to model slower, sequential processing. 
There have been studies (Shedden & Schneider 1991) that demonstrate that, even though a 
connectionist system module transmits in parallel to higher levels, comparison processes 
within  the  module  need  to  be  serialized  in  order  that  acceptable  accuracy  levels  be 
maintained. This serialization corresponds to the apparently serial processing by the human 
brain of different types of memory mapping and visual searches. John von Neumann pointed 
out in 1956 that the structure of the brain is such that serial processing in general would be 
very slow and inaccurate, but, he claimed :...large and efficient natural automata are likely 
to be highly parallel, while large and efficient artificial automata will tend to be less so, and 
rather to be  serial” (italics in  original)  but  that the brain is  able to compensate for  its 
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inability for fast and accurate logical “depth” through the use of logical “breadth”  – it tends 
“to pick up as many logical (or informational) items as possible simultaneously, and process 
them simultaneously (von Neumann 1956/2000:51). Rumelhart explains:
Given that the processes we seek to characterize are often quite complex and 
may  involve  consideration  of  large  numbers  of  simultaneous  constraints,  our 
algorithms  must involve considerable parallelism....Although the brain has  slow 
components, it has very many of them....Rather than organize computation with 
many, many serial steps, as we do with systems whose steps are very fast, the 
brain must deploy many, many processing elements cooperatively and in parallel 
to carry out its activities. (Rumelhart 1989:135)
A  review  of  the  relative  strengths  and  weaknesses  of  the  two  competing  cognitive 
architecture  models  (outlined  in  the  Comparison  table  in  Chapter  2),  suggests  that 
accounting for  all  the proposed attributes of the different processes and systems might 
require  a  hybrid  architecture  that  combines  the  strengths  of  both,  at  the  appropriate 
cognitive level. There is considerable empirical evidence that supports the view of the brain 
as a massively-parallel processor but how this would translate into a massively-parallel mind 
is debatable although the fact that connectionist models can be  simulated on a symbol-
manipulation computer50 is a good starting point. The problem is that thoughts that can be 
“broadcast” to the conscious mind51 are sequential and are amenable to being explained in 
symbol-manipulation terms, but  many, perhaps most of  our  cognitive  processes do not 
appear  to  be  translatable  into  a  language-like  medium,  as  is  demonstrated  by  the 
phenomenon of expert knowledge. There is evidence for a level of representation which lies 
beneath that of the sentential or propositional attitudes; and for a learning dynamic that 
operates  primarily  on  sub-linguistic  factors.  The  classical  symbol  system  cognitive 
architecture  can  be  used  to  model  very  well  all  processes  that  can  be  converted  to 
linguistically-encoded icons in  the  conscious  mind,  to  which  all  processes appear  to  be 
serial.  Nevertheless,  the  apparent  serialization  does  not  prove  that  the  applicable 
unconscious processing is also sequential, and, in fact, results of brain scanning studies 
would suggest that unconscious processes are massively parallel.
PART IV: CONCLUSIONS
Almost  everyone  has  experienced,  at  one  time  or  another,  going  to  sleep  after  being 
troubled by a seemingly intractable problem only to awake later with the solution. Many 
50 Digital computer simulations of a connection model treat units as virtual objects in a similar manner to the way 
the pieces in a computer chess game are treated.
51 “Broadcasting” to the conscious mind is described in the next section.
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computer programmers report this type of experience. It seems that our unconscious mind 
is very capable of finding solutions to complex problems without the involvement of our 
conscious mind. Many of the proposals for dual processing in higher cognition suggest an 
underlying neo-Cartesian dualism given their division between the automatic, instinctual, 
“shared with animals” attributes of the unconscious mind and the controlled, analytic, fluid 
intelligence, “uniquely human” attributes of the conscious mind. The claim by most dual-
process and dual-system theorists that the conscious mind is  causally efficacious is  not 
supported by empirical evidence (c/f. Kornhuber & Deeke 1964; Weiskrantz 1986; Gazzinga 
1988; Libet 1999, Wegner 2002, 2003; Soon et al. 2008; and many others). I contend that 
this  claim  is  a  result  of  confusing  the  internal  “broadcasting”  of  some  of  our  thought 
processes  to  the  conscious  mind  with  the  initiation  or  control  of  those  processes;  of 
confusing being conscious of thoughts with thinking consciously. While I am proposing that 
all thinking  is  an  unconscious  activity,  I  am  not  proposing  that  consciousness  is 
epiphenomenal. Conscious icons are linked to thoughts; the conscious mind can be taken as 
one stage of a cognitive “loop” rather than as a byproduct; the conscious mind is certainly 
not an illusion although some of the features attributed to it may very well be.
When certain thought processes are encoded in a “broadcast” form, they have been 
encoded as a semantic representation and combined with a verbal (usually phonic) repres­
entation to produce a linguistically-encoded icon that is “tagged” as meaningful. Most of the 
icons in our conscious mind appear as meaningful. It should be noticed that this “broadcast­
ing” of meaningful linguistically-encoded icons to our conscious mind is an internal process 
and is thus of importance to an internalist theory of meaning. The “dual” system that I am 
proposing – a non-conscious system coupled with a causally-inert conscious system – forms 




5. PROPOSAL FOR A HYBRID COGNITIVE ARCHITECTURE
 5.1 INTRODUCTION
As stated in the previous chapter, one reason why the  Type 1 system proposed by most 
dual-process  theorists  operates  more  rapidly  than  the  Type  2 system  is  because  the 
information processing of the former is performed in a massively parallel type of cognitive 
architecture  whereas  processes  that  are  attributed  to  the  latter  by  most  dual-process 
theorists are necessarily sequential owing to the sequential nature of natural language and 
linguistically-encoded icons. This is not to say that the neural correlates of these processes 
are sequential but that the processes themselves seem to be sequential in so far as how 
they appear to the conscious mind. Given that, as I argue, the most biologically-plausible 
cognitive  architecture  is  connectionist,  the  apparently  sequential  nature  of  thought 
processes is deceptive and is a result of the encoding of thought processes in a form that is 
suitable for communicating with oneself (“inner voice” or “inner language”) as well as with 
conspecifics. This chapter offers a proposal for a cognitive architecture which uses, in part, 
Chomsky's theory of a Universal Grammar (Chomsky 2006:124) to describe the encoding of 
thought processes and has much in common with the theories of the role of consciousness 
proposed by Ray Jackendoff (1990, 2011). 
Chapter 5 is divided into 4 parts:
• Part I presents a proposal for a hybrid cognitive architecture model which is broadly 
connectionist  with  a  symbolic,  computational  component,  starting  with a  brief 
overview of the proposed cognitive architecture before discussing it in more detail;
• Part II  offers examples of how this hybrid model can accommodate the cognitive 
processes and attributes that are commonly discussed by dual-process theorists;
• Part  III  presents  and  rejects  several  objections  that  may  be  raised  against  the 
proposed model and against connectionist architectures in general; and
• Part IV provides conclusions and possible directions for future research.
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 5.2 Part I: Proposal for a Cognitive Architecture Model
 5.2.1 Introduction
In attempting to design a cognitive architecture, it is necessary to emphasize the distinction 
between modelling cognition itself and modelling an implementation of cognition. Regardless 
of  whether  cognitive  scientists  support  the  classical,  symbol-manipulation  model  or  a 
connectionist model of cognition, they can agree that connectionism,  which  is the name 
given to the computer modelling approach based on an understanding of how information 
processing occurs  in  neural  networks, may  provide  a  useful  model  at  the  neurological, 
implementation  level.  Disagreements  arise  as  to  which  provides  a  better  model  at  the 
cognitive level.  I  will  argue  that  connectionism provides  the  better  model  at  both  the 
cognitive and implementation level.
Classical, symbolic-processing systems are, I contend, too slow to correctly model 
reflexive and direct reasoning processes. In addition, even vociferous advocates of such 
systems (e.g.,  Fodor,  Pylyshyn,  Pinker,  and  many  others)  will  admit  that  such systems 
cannot account for the contextual, parallel processing required for non-local reasoning. As 
previously discussed in section 3.3.1  “The Computational Theory of Mind”,  Fodor (1998b) 
points out that, on the Classical account, the internal syntactic structure of a thought is the 
sole determinant of its role in a mental process and is, hence, of little use in providing 
explanations of the semantic and global features of mental processes. Rational beliefs are 
often formed by abductive inference, by ‘inferences to the best explanation’. If we are given 
only what perception presents to us as currently the fact and what beliefs are currently 
available to us in memory, we have the cognitive problem of finding and adopting new 
beliefs that are  best confirmed on balance.  Properties like relevance, strength, simplicity, 
and centrality apply, not to single sentences, but to belief systems as a whole, and, as Fodor 
states, we have no reason for supposing that such global properties of belief systems are 
syntactic. That belief systems have syntactic properties is required if the Classical, symbol-
manipulation model is to be explanatorily adequate.
One  reason  why  System  1 processes  as  advocated  by  most  dual-process/dual-
system theorists52 operate more rapidly than those of System 2 is because the information 
processing of the former is performed in a massively parallel type of cognitive architecture 
whereas  processes  that  are  attributed  to  the  latter  by  most  dual-process  theorists  are 
52See the table entitiled “ Dual-Process Theory – Differences between System 1 and System 2“ on page 91.
107
necessarily sequential owing to the sequential nature of conscious imagery. This is not to 
say that  the neural  correlates of these processes are sequential  but  that the processes 
themselves seem to be sequential in so far as how they appear to the conscious mind. The 
encoding of thoughts to produce linguistic (as opposed to other non-linguistic) icons in the 
conscious mind is, because it is linked to language, evolutionarily recent, but, in contrast to 
most dual-process theories, is, on my view, a non-conscious process. Also in contrast to 
other  dual-process  and dual-system theories,  all  other  features commonly  attributed to 
System 2 are, according to the position I am taking, attributes of System 1; they are all 
attributes of the non-conscious cognitive system which is actually composed of multiple sub-
systems. There is,  on my view, consciousness and “everything else”. The position I  am 
advocating is  that  all  causal  processes in  the  mind take place  non-consciously,  just  as 
results  of  many brain-imaging studies demonstrate.  I  therefore  reject  the position that 
volition and many other proposed cognitive processes advocated by dual-process theorists 
are correlates of consciousness. Some of these causal processes are encoded in a form that 
can become available to consciousness – we often become aware of difficulties and conflicts 
during rule-based learning, for instance – but this does not prove that causal processes, 
such as following rules, are conscious (System 2) activities. Awareness of following rules 
could be explained as merely the encoding of a subconscious “conflict” resolution resulting 
from much the same mechanism as an alarm call would in many species. Activation of an 
“alarm”  system  may  be  the  result  of  a  physiological  reaction  such  as  an  increase  in 
epinephrine which is part of the hormonal component of an emotional response occurring in 
response  to  stress  whether  environmental  or  psychological.  The  processes  involved  in 
encoding thoughts in a form required for input to the conscious mind is discussed in more 
detail below. 
 5.2.2 Overview
The  cognitive  architecture  that  I  am  proposing  is  predominantly  connectionist.  In  this 
model, all cognitive processing is performed at the non-conscious level; the perceptual input 
system is modular; the output of some cognitive processes is encoded in a suitable form to 
become input to further thought processes; and consciousness is merely one stage in a 
feed-back  loop  –  consciousness  itself   is  causally  inert.  A  simplified  view  is  given  in 
Illustration 13 on the next page. On this view, consciousness is not epiphenomenal, but can 
be taken to be a “spandrel”, a term originally coined by Gould and Lewontin (1979), and 
now used by evolutionary biologists for any phenotypic characteristic that, rather than being 
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a  direct  product  of  adaptive  selection,  is 
merely  a  byproduct  resulting  from  the 
evolution  of  some  other  characteristic.  I 
contend that consciousness is a byproduct of 
the evolution of the alarm-call and “learning 
from experience”  systems  and  is  shared  by 
many species. The “learning from experience” 
system will be discussed in more detail below 
in  reference  to  the  dual-process  theorists 
distinction  between  implicit  and  explicit 
learning.
 5.2.3 The Image Encoding-Decoding 
Systems
The cognitive architecture model I support is 
connectionist.  It  is,  however,  necessary  to 
account for our intuitions that the mind is a 
symbol-manipulation system, that cognition is 
predominantly the manipulation of propositional attitudes, and that thought and thinking 
take  place  in  a  language  of  thought  consisting  of  a  physically-instantiated  system  of 
representations with syntactic properties to which operations on these representations are 
causally sensitive (see, for example, Fodor 1975, 1978, Putnam 1988). For the cognitive 
architecture  I  am  proposing,  there  is  a  Language  of  Consciousness  (language  of 
consciously-experienced icons) rather than a Language of Thought.
In the proposed cognitive architecture model, cognitive processes are not “computa­
tion over symbols”. Symbols are, in this model, produced in the Encoding-Decoding Systems 
module which converts structured mental representations to symbolic form much the way 
digital computers convert internal representations to interface icons in the same way that 
the icons on a computer screen represent but do not resemble the complex processes of the 
computer (Hoffman 2009). The part of  Illustration 13 labelled “Image Encoding-Decoding 
Systems” represents several  functional systems, which may be widely distributed in the 
brain, and which may share functions with other processes. The input to the Encoding-De­
coding Systems includes the output of perceptual processing systems such as the visual 
109
Illustration 13: Proposed Hybrid Architecture - Simplified View
(extensively studied by, for example, Marr, 1982; Marr & Nishihara 1978; Humphreys & 
Quinlan, 1987; Peterson & Rhodes, 2003), and of cognitive systems. The output from the 
perceptual system is “tagged” by peripheral recognition systems such as speech recognition, 
face recognition, and so on, and the “tags” determine which encoding-decoding systems are 
activated. Not all output from the Encoding-Decoding Systems is transferred to the con­
scious mind; on the contrary, I would contend that only a fraction of the encoded output is 
available to consciousness although it is often used in re-enforcing learning processes. I also 
contend that the syntactic structure of the encoded output is a reflection of the micro-fea­
tures and structure of the input representations. 
The output of the Encoding-Decoding Systems becomes input to other cognitive pro­
cesses thereby re-enforcing learning – acting in the same manner as perceptual input to in­
crease connection weights in the neural pathways. The linguistically-encoded icons are of 
particular importance in this regard as they constitute the “inner voice” which is of signific­
ant importance in abstract thinking and other higher mental functions such as memory and 
self-awareness. Recent research conducted by the Deafness Cognition and Language (DCAL) 
Research Centre,  based at  University  College  London,  appears  to  demonstrate  that  the 
brains of completely deaf people never develop the “inner voice” and the theory is that, in 
the absence of a language, dealing with abstract concepts is highly problematic (Lyness et 
al., 2014). While natural language can be spoken, written, or haptic (in the case of sign lan­
guage), spoken language is most crucial in developing the “inner voice” especially given the 
relatively  small  vocabulary  of  sign  languages  compared  to  that  of  spoken  languages53. 
Ruben Conrad, studied the reading abilities of deaf students and reported that their reduced 
ability compared to hearing students was a result of their not being able to “hear” them­
selves  reading  internally  (Conrad  1962,  1970,  1972).  Conrad  observed  that  short-term 
memory 'thrives on a speechlike input' (Conrad, 1972:231) but a later study tends support 
the view that Conrad's observation should be amended to “'language-like input', so that the 
characterization is not restricted to the speech mode” (Bellugi et al., 1975). These results 
suggest that the Linguistic Encoding-Decoding System has to be activated through exposure 
to a natural language for proper functioning (see Chomsky 1957, 1960, 1980, 2006).  
53 Sign languages typically augment hand orientations and shapes, with facial expressions and body posture, which 
are combined simultaneously to produce a sign, which corresponds to a spoke language's single word or group of 
words. There are currently projects to develop of computer assisted sign language recognition systems. Part of the 
projects involves the creation of databases, two examples of which are the Australian Sign Language database  
containing 7415 words, and the British Sign Language database containing 6330 signs (Melnyk et al., 2014). 
110
Certain  neurological  disorders,  such as  blindsight,  can provide evidence that,  al­
though the encoded icons are available to cognition, they may not always be available to the 
conscious mind. As discussed earlier54, damage to one of the two main visual pathways can 
lead to subjects having absolutely no awareness of any visual stimuli but still being able to 
predict visual aspects such as location, or type of movement; while damage to the other 
pathway can lead to subjects having some awareness of visual aspects such as movement 
within the blind  area but without  having a visual  percept  (Armstrong 1968, Weiskrantz 
1986). In regard to activation of the Linguistic Encoding-Decoding Systems, the example 
that can be used is that of Albert Einstein who, when describing his own thought process, 
said that he used images to solve his problems and only found the words later (Pais, 1982), 
and, even more strongly, that “I have no doubt that our thinking goes on for the most part 
without the use of symbols, and, furthermore, largely unconsciously” (Schilpp, pp. 8-9). 
Studies by Sandra Witelson et al. (1999) suggest that that the regions in Einstein's brain 
that are associated with speech and language are smaller, whereas the regions involved 
with numerical and spatial processing are larger than normal. These examples do not, of 
course, constitute a proof of the model I am proposing but they hint at the possibility that 
the mechanisms (especially that  involved in linguistic  encoding) for  producing conscious 
icons are only activated under certain circumstances.
 5.2.4 Concepts and Categorization
The mind is able to construct images and categorize percepts based on very limited and 
often ambiguous sensory input.  Any theory of  cognitive  processing of  perceptions must 
account for how the mind recognizes these incomplete patterns of perceptual input and 
constructs from them coherent images. The mind generalizes by extracting similarities in 
input patterns and uses the generalizations (concepts) in higher-level cognitive processes. 
While  many  cognitive  psychologists  use  concept to  refer  to  a  structured  mental 
representation  (e.g.,  Carey  1991),  research  psychologists  are  generally  concerned  with 
finding explanations for categories that are reflective of a culture and are encoded in the 
language prevalent in that culture (e.g., Rosch 1978). The linguistic relativity principle, also 
known as linguistic determinism or the Sapir–Whorf hypothesis, goes so far as to claim that 
differences in how languages encode cultural and cognitive categories can affect how people 
view the world and, hence, affect conceptual content. The difference in approaches (the 
54 See pp:41-42, Illustration 7 on page 30, and section 4.3.1 
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study of mental representations versus the study of the cultural component of categories) is 
analogous to the I-language and E-language distinction55. Also related to this difference in 
approaches are the basic principles proposed by Rosch (1973b) to explain the formation of 
categories: one (internalist) principle is that categorization is a system that provides the 
maximum information using the least cognitive effort; while another (externalist) is that the 
information  perceived  through  the  senses  is  already  structured—the  structure  of  the 
information is reflective of the way the perceived world is structured. The second principle 
assumes that  each perceived material  object  possesses a highly correlated structure.  A 
supporter  of  the  internalist  principle  would  not  deny  that  perceptual  information  is 
structured, but claims that categorization of the structures is an internal process.
Clearly, the closer the resulting categories reflect the structure of the perceived world 
(what Kant would call “empirical reality”), the less cognitive effort will be required to obtain 
maximum information  either  through  mapping  categories  to  attribute  structures  or  by 
defining attributes in order to structure categories appropriately56. Rosch emphasizes that 
the reference is to the world as it is perceived; the kinds of attributes that can be perceived 
and the way they are categorized are species-specific (Rosch 1978:383). An example of 
species-specific relationship to the world as-it-is-perceived is that of the ability possessed by 
rats (but not by humans) to distinguish between distilled normal water and heavy water 
(also  termed 'D2O'  or  'deuterium oxide')  based  solely  on  smell  and  taste.  The  human 
perception of water types is not so finely-grained as that of rats; sensory input is limited by 
the specific perceptual system.
Concepts and Connectionism
In  a  connectionist  model,  semantical  information  is  recorded  through  similarities  and 
differences between activation patterns in  the neural  network; meaning is fixed via  the 
similarity properties of neural activations. Clark and Elaismith (2002) have pointed out that 
connectionism “has been criticised for both holding and challenging representational views.” 
55Proposed by Noam Chomsky, “I-language” refers to the mentally-represented linguistic knowledge of a native 
speaker of a language. Chomsky maintained that this “internal language” is the proper object of study in linguistic  
theory. E-Language, on the other hand, covers all other notions of what a language is—a body of knowledge or  
communally-shared behavioural habits, for example—and has no utility for the study of innate linguistic knowledge. 
(Chomsky 1986)
56During the 1980's, developments in artificial intelligence on models of concept learning led to a machine-learning 
paradigm for unsupervised learning known as  conceptual clustering: the inherent structure of the data (plus a 
conjunctive or probabilistic description language) drives cluster formation with the aim of generating a concept 
description for each generated class (see, for instance, Michalski 1980; Michalski & Stepp 1983).
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While  most  connectionists57 postulate  representational  states  of  some  type,  there  are 
others, while appearing to reject the existence of representational states, actually reject the 
standard  computational  view  of  mental  representations  as  memory-intensive  and  all-
purpose  forms  of  internal  representation,  and  hold  instead  to  a  view  of  internal 
representations as sparse and action-oriented forms which exploit stimuli from both the 
body and the external world to produce a response from which is built the representation 
itself (see Clark & Eliasmith 2002). On this view, concepts correspond to patterns over large 
numbers of units. 
Connectionism has sometimes been viewed as a return to radical empiricism that 
would  only  be  of  use  in  discussions  of  neurological  implementation  as,  for  instance,  in 
analyses of how grammar could be realized in the brain (Pinker & Prince, 1988). Certainly 
some of the early connectionist models seemed to rely on a type of representation based on 
some form of associationism which had proved to be totally inadequate for the Classical 
Theory of concepts to provide an explanation of many aspects of cognition such as linguistic 
knowledge (Fodor & Pylyshyn, 1988; Pinker & Prince, 1988). The view of concepts for the 
Classical Theory of Concepts is that they are mentally-represented definitions that encode a 
set  of  necessary and jointly  sufficient characteristics.  Membership in  the extension of a 
concept, on this view, is strictly determinable; concepts are either applicable or not — the 
relevant category is “unfuzzy”. Concepts of this type, namely “unfuzzy”, definable concepts, 
could easily be instantiated in terms of inference rules and sentential representations in a 
classical symbol-manipulation computer. 
There  is,  nevertheless,  empirical  evidence  that  very  little,  if  any  knowledge  of 
categories is organized in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions. Knowledge seems to 
be more organized in terms of clusters of features such that only a sufficient number of 
features need be satisfied, and with some features considered to be more significant than 
others  –  some features  are  characteristic or  core-defining.  The  idea  that  knowledge  is 
organized in terms of features (rather than necessary and sufficient conditions) is basic to 
the Prototype Theory58 (and, to a lesser extent, the Exemplar Theory59) of concepts and 
lends itself to implementation in a connectionist network. In a connectionist model, some 
57As opposed to  eliminativism for which the appropriate level of psychological theorizing is neurological and the 
semantic notion of representation is, therefore, not required.
58 See Rosch (1973a) for a description of Prototype Theory.
59  See Medin & Schaffer (1978) and Nosofsky (1986). Exemplar Theory was used in psychology as a model of  
perception and categorization, and was later applied to speech perception (Pierrehumbert 2001). It and has also 
been used by linguists such as Johnson (1997) and Goldinger (1996, 1997).
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features  would  have  higher  connection  weights 
than others. On the connectionist view, instances 
cluster around the “prototype” which is the central 
region  in  a  hyper-dimensional  semantic  space60. 
Many  philosophers  and  cognitive  psychologists 
have argued that concepts and categories may be 
delimited through some kind of family resemblance 
or  similarity  to  a  prototype  (as  illustrated  in 
Illustration  14).  A  graded  notion  of  category 
membership,  such  as  that  proposed  by  the 
Prototype Theory, is well suited to implementation 
in  connectionist  models  given that  neural  nets  are  capable  of  “learning”  the  difference 
between subtle  statistical  patterns that  would be very hard to implement in  rule-based 
classical models. 
When  nets  of  different  structures  are  trained  on  the  same  task,  they  develop 
activation patterns which are strongly similar, thereby suggesting that it might be possible 
to produce empirically well-defined measures of similarity of concepts and thoughts between 
different individuals (Churchland 1989). It is possible to measure the degree of similarity 
between two conceptual frameworks, as Illustration 14 is purported to show61 (Churchland 
2007). Fodor and Lepore (1999) have pointed out, there are problems with developing a 
standard theory of meaning based on similarity: such a theory would need to be able to 
assign  truth  conditions  to  sentences  based  on  the  meaning  of  their  constituents,  but 
similarity alone, they claim, does not seem to be sufficient to fix denotation as would be 
required by any standard theory62. It should be emphasized, however, that many of the 
presuppositions  of  standard  theories  are  rejected  by  most  connectionists  who  advance 
similarity-based accounts of meaning. Such connectionists are attempting to develop an 
alternative theory of meaning which may reject or modify the presuppositions of a standard 
theory of meaning but which is still consistent with what is known about human linguistic 
60 This differs from the Exemplar Theory which allows only for actual instances to be stored in memory.
61 In this illustration (Churchland 2007:Fig 8.2), the top part of the diagram, labelled '(a)', shows two distinct 
networks which have been trained to discriminate photographs of faces belonging to one of four families; and the 
bottom diagram, labelled '(b)', shows the two resultant activation spaces of the respective middle layers of the two  
networks. Each network has acquired a structured family of "prototypical" family regions, within which facial inputs 
from each of the four families typically produce an activation pattern.
62 See the section “Connectionism and Concept Individuation“ on Page 116.
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Illustration 14: Churchland 2007 - Fig 8-2
abilities. Unlike the unstructured, mutually-independent concepts of informational atomism 
(IA), all  concepts, for connectionists,  have complex internal structure with no automatic 
referential connection to the external world. Furthermore, connectionist concepts are not 
acquired but  are  learned;  connections  are  formed  and  re-enforced  through  cognitive 
processes.  Changing  the  processing  or  knowledge  structure  in  a  connectionist  system 
involves  modifying  the  patterns  of  interconnectivity.  This  can  involve  three  kinds  of 
modification: development of new connections; loss of existing connections; or modification 
of the strengths of connections that already exist. A network's knowledge is stored in the 
strengths of its connections. 
Connectionism and Innate Concepts
Computational cognitive science tends toward the view that the mind is computational; that 
it is composed of distinct modules each of which specializes in the processing of distinct 
types  of  information,  has  specialized  functions,  and  is  informationally  and  functionally 
encapsulated  (Chomsky,  1980;  Fodor,  1983).  In  contrast  to  the  cognitivist  position  of 
evolutionary psychologists and many others who support at least some form of the modular 
mind hypothesis, connectionists tend to be non-cognitivist and anti-innatist, holding instead 
that  only  a  general  capacity  for  learning  is  genetically  inherited  and  that  all  cognitive 
capacities  are  the  result  of  learning  and  experience.  The  mind  functions  as  a  pattern 
recognition  system.  That  is  to  say,  there  are  perceptual  processes  that  match  limited 
sensory input to existing “patterns” in memory – a flash of yellow and black in a jungle 
setting is likely to be matched rapidly to a 'tiger' concept as long as such a concept had 
previously been acquired or learnt. In order for the pattern recognition system to perform 
initially,  however,  there would have to  be some innate patterns – such as the sensory 
concepts  proposed  by  British  Empiricists63.  Almost  all  theories  of  concepts  support 
innateness in this regard; they differ in how many and of what type these concepts might 
be. The idea that there may be innate concepts is not only applicable to humans. There is  
some evidence of innate concepts in non-linguistic species, a famous example of which is 
the Tinbergen/Lorentz hypothesis that some bird species have an innate recognition of the 
shapes  of  birds  of  prey.   Lorenz  and  Tinbergen  used,  in  their  1937  experiments,  a 
“hawk/goose dummy”, as rendered in Illustration 15, which, when flown to the right (as a 
“hawk”) elicited escape behaviour (“fixating, alarm calling and marching off to cover”) in 
63The British Empiricists, such as John Locke (1690/1975), held that human concepts are grounded in a set of 
innate primitive ideas in terms of which all complex concepts are defined. Concept acquisition is explained by the 
combination  of  a  subset  of  these  innate  primitives  with  associative  mechanisms by means of  which  complex 
concepts are constructed.
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young,  experimentally-naïve  turkeys,  whereas  no  escape 
behaviour was elicited, when the model was flown to the left 
(as a “goose”) (Lorenz, 1939). There are non-human species 
(some  primates,  dolphins,  and  elephants)  that  are  able  to 
recognize themselves in a mirror demonstrating that they have 
at least some rudimentary concept of self.
From a connectionist perspective, neural patterns are generally 
of three main types:
• Fused  (“hard-wired”)  neural  networks:  innate  concepts  (e.g.,  instincts)  and 
encapsulated modules might be of this type;
• Heavily weighted neural patterns which would include: innate capacities that need 
triggering  by  relevant  input  such  as  natural  language  and  bird-song;  “acquired” 
concepts, and those biases and beliefs that are not available to conscious awareness; 
and
• New patterns created by sufficient sensory input, including: “learned concepts” and 
beliefs and biases amenable to encoding as images in consciousness.
Connectionism and Concept Individuation
According to connectionist models, semantical information is recorded through similarities 
and differences between activation patterns in a network such that meaning is fixed through 
the  similarity  properties  of  neural  activations.  As  previously  stated,  Churchland  (1989) 
claims that,  when networks  of  different  structures  are  trained  on the  same task,  they 
develop activation patterns which are strongly similar, thereby suggesting that it might be 
possible to produce empirically well-defined measures of similarity of concepts and thoughts 
between  different  individuals.  Nevertheless,  semantic  identity  is  not  based  on  causal 
connections to the external world; it is based on an  internalist account of sameness and 
similarity (Churchland 2007:134). The brain of each person has a unique configuration of 
synaptic weights and connections which is a result of individual biology and, especially, of 
lived experience.  Each person's  empirical  reality  (the  reality  of  one's  experiences)  may 
nevertheless reflect enduring features (e.g., natural kinds) in the external world which may 
result in similarities in the structure of families of activation spaces in different individuals 
(Churchland 2007:34). Churchland (1995) has referred to mappings between referents and 
to  individuation  of  certain  types  of  computational  states  in  terms  of  their  role  in  a 
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Illustration 15: “Hawk/goose 
dummy” (Tinbergen 1951)
connectionist network. Rather than having a semantic and syntactic structure similar to that 
of a natural language, as some other theories of concepts posit, internal representations are 
sub-patterns that include the micro-features that are specific to the context. For instance: 
“The coffee in the cup” would...have a subpattern that stands for “coffee.” But 
that  subpattern  will  be  heavily  dependent  on  context  and  will  involve 
microfeatures that are specific to the in-the-cup context (Clark 1989:148).
Variations  between  and  within  groups  of  language  users  could  be  implemented  in  this 
manner. Zhang, Segalowitz, and Gatbonton have reported systematic differences in the use 
of linguistic expressions by Chinese (Mandarin) and English speakers for certain topological 
spatial relationships: for example, where an English speaker would say “the bird is  in the 
tree”, a Mandarin speaker would say the equivalent of the English “the bird is on the tree” 
(Zhang, Segalowitz, & Gatbonton 2010). The sub-pattern that stands for “tree” in the mind 
of an English-speaker would have micro-features specific to the “in-the-tree” context, and in 
the mind of the Mandarin-speaker micro-features specific to the “on-the-tree” context. From 
a connectionist perspective, there is not an equivalence  per se between the the Mandarin 
preposition translated as “on” in English and the English “on” – in fact, the prepositions 
themselves may not be represented at all. Systematic differences such as these may be, at 
least in part, responsible for the development of the linguistic relativity principle (or Sapir–
Whorf hypothesis) which holds that differences in the way languages encode cultural and 
cognitive categories affect thought processes. From a connectionist perspective, however, 
the  reverse  is  the  case:  cultural  and  cognitive  categories  affect  the  way  a  concept  is 
acquired, which results in differences in micro-features of the internal representation, and 
these differences are reflected in the natural language surface structure.
Computational states individuated by their role in a connectionist network could thus 
be able to differentiate MORNING STAR from EVENING STAR (Frege's famous example of co-
extensive concepts) by having two subpatterns that stand for STAR: one would include the 
micro-feature specific to the “in-the morning” context and the other would include the mi­
cro-feature specific to the “in-the-evening” context. In fact, Frege's Puzzle, which has been 
discussed at length in the philosophical literature, does not exist for connectionist  models. 
By treating internal representations as sub-patterns that include the micro-features that are 
specific to the context, a connectionist model could also explain how two different referents 
may result in the same activation pattern if the input stimuli are similar enough; it is there­
fore very likely that a connectionist network would treat jadeite and nephrite as the same, 
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namely as jade. An expert could “learn” to discriminate between jadeite and nephrite and, 
consequently, would develop two distinct activation patterns, a JADEITE prototype and a 
NEPHRITE prototype. We can restrict the use of a term by stipulation but require learning to 
restrict application of the concept; to refine conceptual content.
 5.3 Part II: Cognitive Attributes 
In this section I attempt to demonstrate that the proposed cognitive architecture has the 
attributes which are associated with standard views of the differences between the two 
systems of a dual-process theory.
 5.3.1 Conscious and Unconscious Processes
As discussed in the previous chapter, experiments using electroencephalography performed 
by H. H. Kornhuber and I. Deeke (1964), Libet (1999), Wegner (2002, 2003), Soon et al. 
(2008),  and  many  others,  support  the  claim  that  the  volitional  process  is  initiated 
unconsciously; that awareness is a unique phenomenon in itself which is distinguished from 
the contents of awareness; and that there is no difference between the experience of having 
personally  caused  an  action  and  the  experience  of  cause  and  effect  in  general.  These 
experiments lend support to the view that there are two related cognitive processes:
• in  one  process,  certain  unconscious  mental  events  cause  a  thought  while  other 
unconscious mental events cause actions; and
• in another process, the apparent (but not real) link between cause and action is 
experienced consciously. 
There is a considerable difference between discussing what we experience consciously and 
what  causes  the  experience,  and,  as  many  neuroscientific  studies  suggest,  conscious 
experiences are causally inert. The results of these studies negate the distinction between 
controlled (conscious) processing and automatic (unconscious) processing. The “inhibitory” 
function  usually  attributed  to  controlled  (conscious)  processing  is,  I  claim,  merely  the 
monitoring and verbalization of a subconscious “conflict” resolution resulting from much the 
same mechanism as an alarm call would in other species.
 5.3.2 Rational and Intuitive Reasoning
For most dual-process theorists, reasoning is a combination of fast, heuristic processes (of 
System 1)  which  may provide contextualized content  as input  to  a conscious,  analytic 
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process (of  System 2); thus,  System 2 provides normatively correct reasoning, whereas 
System 1 processes often result in cognitive biases. This division is highly questionable, 
especially in the case of expert reasoning and judgements. As the results of de Groot's 1965 
study (discussed previously, in more detail, in Chapter 4) demonstrate, expert performance 
is a question of (non-conscious) pattern-matching rather than conscious rule-following. Gary 
Klein  (1999)  has  termed this  expert  performance  “recognition-primed decision  making.” 
After studying the decision making of groups of firemen and paramedics, he concluded that 
experts typically:
• Recognize a situation as of the same type as one previously encountered; and then
• Rapidly retrieve a schema which provides a solution.
For Klein, the most cogent process in intelligent action is automatic retrieval. Non-conscious 
pattern-matching is very simply modelled by a connectionist network and is, in fact, crucial 
to the way connectionism handles prototypes.
The Wason Selection Task has been widely used to study conditional reasoning (see a 
detailed review in Evans & Over, 2004, Chapter 5), Many theories have been postulated to 
explain the results of the studies: for instance, Leda Cosmides and John Tooby (1987) state 
that  the results  of  the Wason Selection  Task justify  their  claim of  a  so-called “Cheater 
Detection Module”, suggesting that humans have no single “reasoning faculty” and that the 
brains  of  hominids have  evolved  a  cluster  of  cognitive  adaptations  to  deal  with  social 
interactions.  Wason  (1966)  originally  proposed  that  the  errors  were  the  result  of  a 
confirmation  bias:  the  subjects  were  trying  to  prove  the  conditional  true.  More  recent 
studies (see Evans & Over 2004) suggest that errors are actually caused by a  matching 
bias: subjects tend to select the options matching the entities explicitly given in the rule 
regardless of the logical appropriateness of doing so. The underlying causes of matching 
bias may reflect a general phenomenon which applies to many other types of logical rules in 
addition to conditionals (Roberts 2002). The Wason Selection Task has been modelled by 
different  connectionist  systems  with  some  success.  In  particular,  BioSLIE  (BIOlogically-
plausible  Structure-sensitive  Learning  Inference  Engine),  which  is  a  low-level,  spiking 
neuron model of a high-level cognitive behaviour, has been applied to the Wason Selection 
Task (Eliasmith 2005). Chris Eliasmith reports that a detailed computational model, such as 
BioSLIE,  demonstrates how a domain general  mechanism can account for  the observed 
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cognitive behaviour of the subjects, and, further, that each subject can solve the problem 
idiosyncratically rather than in accordance with a pre-specified, discrete set of “schemas”:
At  the  behavioral  level,  the  model  not  only  meets  Cosmides’  challenge  of 
specifying an inductive, domain general inference mechanism, it also makes it 
possible to predict behavioral variations on the task given a learning history. For 
instance,  it  should  be  possible  to  predict  the  effects  of  varying  the  kind  of 
feedback that a subject receives in similar and dissimilar contexts. (Eliasmith 
2005)
A “matching bias” is highly consistent with such a model.
 5.3.3 Preference and Inference
The division by dual-process theorists between two  systems of processes, one of which 
often results  in  cognitive  biases (System 1)  and the other  which provides normatively 
correct reasoning (System 2), is similar to that made by many contemporary psychologists 
who  distinguish  between  the  processes  of  preference and  inference.  The  traditional 
psychological  view,  is  not,  however,  the  either/or  view  represented  by  dual-process 
theorists,  but  that  both  preference  and  inference  are  part  of  cognitive  processing  with 
preference (affective reaction) following after inference (analytic computation). As reported 
by R. B. Zajonc (1980), the traditional view is that  affect is post-cognitive, that cognition 
precedes evaluation. Zajonc argues strongly against this view, reversing the order so that 
preference  precedes  inference  whenever  the  information  being  processed  has  affective 
qualities. His points out that:
It is much less important for us to know whether someone has just said “You are 
a friend” or “You are a fiend” than to know whether it was spoken in contempt or 
with affection. (Zajonc 1980)
The intention of a someone speaking ironically or sarcastically is conveyed by context and 
by the intonation of the speaker rather that by the symbols and syntax he used. Several 
studies (such as those by Dawes and Kramer, 1966; and Scherer, Kolvumaki, and Rosenthal, 
1972) demonstrate that we can reliably encode the emotions expressed in an utterance 
even when the content of those utterances are almost completely obliterated by electronic 
“noise” or random splicing, or even when the utterance is in a language unknown to us. We 
evolved to make rapid judgements with very limited perceptual input for, as Kant observed, 
rational processing would be too slow and unreliable in dangerous situations that are very 
likely to arise in natural environments (Kant 1785/1956:395). We are more likely to survive 
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if  our experience of a flash of black and yellow in a jungle results  in a fear and flight 
response even if we are never sure what caused the sighting. Even in normal, everyday 
situations, most of  our perceptions have at least some emotional  component:  “affect  is 
always present as a companion to thought, whereas the converse is not true for cognition. 
In fact, it is entirely possible that the very first stage of the organism's reaction to stimuli 
and the very first elements in retrieval are affective” (Zajonc 1980). For a connectionist, this 
claim is not surprising as the weighting of neural connections are likely to be stronger for 
emotional components. Even though Zajonc's position is that preference precedes inference, 
he  does  note  that  all  cognitions  are  accompanied  by  the  form of  experience  generally 
termed “feeling” and that feeling derives from a system that is parallel and separate from 
that responsible for inference. His view is thus consistent with a connectionist model in 
which  processing  is  massively  parallel  and  holistic;  it  is  merely  a  question  of  which 
processing,  preference or inference, dominates in a particular  situation,  of  which neural 
pathway  has  the  higher  weighting.  Psychotropic  drugs64 are  often used to  “excite”  one 
pathway at the expense of another, acting as a sort of “counter-irritant” and behavioural 
therapy works in a similar way.
 5.3.4 Natural Language and Reasoning
There are two basic assumptions behind most dual-process or dual-system theories such as 
that  proposed  by  Kahneman:  first,  that  logical  reasoning  is  conscious,  that  rational 
judgement,  in  general,  takes  place  consciously,  and,  secondly,  that  such  reasoning  is 
associated  with  language.  Several  studies  have  demonstrated  that  pre-linguistic 
preschoolers  demonstrate  deductive  reasoning  skills  (see  Dias  &  Harris,  1988,  1990; 
Hawkins, Pea, Glick, & Scribner, 1984; Richards & Sanderson, 1999). On the Piaget account 
of sensori-motor development, symbolic problem solving is manifest in infants from 18 to 
24 months of age. 
A proponent of the view that the brain is a symbol-manipulation device (the Symbol 
System Hypothesis),  tends  to  claim  that  sentences  (and  linguistic  symbols  in  general) 
provide a model of how a fact can be represented, and, further, that the brain must contain 
representational states. It is natural to theorize that these states literally are sentences (or 
sentence-like), that representations are sentence-like strings of symbols. But what does it 
mean to say that the brain literally contains sentences? According to the Symbol System 
64Psychotropic drugs are chemical substances that influence brain function, thereby altering perception, cognition, 
mood, and behaviour.
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Hypothesis (SSH) symbols are realized in the brain by some sort of electrical or chemical 
activity. How they are actually realized in the brain is an empirical matter. When we think, 
do we always do so in a language? SSH supporters do not claim that cognition occurs in a 
natural language, such as English, even though thinking in a natural language may seem to 
be what is happening at a conscious level. Below consciousness (and below the level of 
mental imagery) the language of the brain cannot be a spoken language. After all, infants 
who have not yet acquired a native language can nevertheless form mental representations 
and there is evidence from the behaviour of many non-linguistic species that they, too, form 
mental representations. It is claimed that the language of thought is some kind of innate 
brain code, sometimes called 'Mentalese' (discussed previously, in more detail, in paragraph 
2.6.2). On the SSH view, cognitive processes invoke explicit rules operating on syntactically 
structured representations. 
A  contrary  view  is  held  by  connectionists  for  whom these  processes  should  be 
understood instead in terms of the activation of nodes or patterns of nodes in neural nets 
that are not governed by explicit rules nor have any syntactic structure. Perceptual pattern 
recognition,  for  instance,  cannot  be  modelled  by  a  symbol-manipulation,  Language  of 
Thought (LOT) system – Fodor (1983) proposed a combination of specialized transducers 
and encapsulated modules to perform such cognitive functions. There is much empirical 
evidence showing that the brain, when physically damaged, exhibits graceful degradation; 
connectionist systems exhibit a similar response to physical damage but such is not the case 
for  symbol-manipulation,  LOT  systems.  Much  of  the  input  we  receive  is  “noisy”  or 
incomplete but, unlike symbol-manipulation, LOT systems, degraded input can be managed 
by the pattern recognition power of connectionist systems. Further, as Fodor (2000:47) 
himself has recognized, a major failure of computational cognitive psychology is its inability 
to provide a convincing account of abduction, an account that connectionism can provide. 
Thus, connectionism is more biologically plausible than symbol-manipulation systems.
Support  for  the connectionist  position are provided by recent fMRI experiments65 
which  strongly  suggest  that  logical  reasoning does not  rely  on the grammar of  natural 
language and,  along with other neuroimaging and neuropsychology evidence, appear to 
show that high-level cognitive functions, such as arithmetic, problem-solving, and theory of 
mind,  are  remarkably  language-independent.  That  our  awareness  of  rule-following  is 
encoded in the grammar of a natural language cannot be used as a justification for claiming 
65As reported by Martin M. Monti at the  Interdisciplinary Workshop on the Notion of Thought, Ruhr-Universität 
Bochum, 5th - 7th June 2008
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that logical reasoning itself relies on the grammar of a natural language. The appearance 
that it is so reliant is the result of reverse engineering: the form of the reasoning as it 
appears to  consciousness is  taken to  be the form of  the reasoning processes.  But this 
reverse-engineering is no more justified than using it to claim that the structure of the 
output from a digital computer is the structure of its internal processes.
 5.3.5 Consciousness and Volition
Almost  all  dual-processing  theorists  claim  volition to  be  a  cognitive  correlate  of 
consciousness or, at least, that the associated attributes are of Type 2. Consequently, it is 
reasonable  to  question how it  is  possible  to  have  free-will  if  all  thought  processes  are 
unconscious as I am proposing. In response to such a question, I would ask why free-will  
has to be a  conscious process and why satisfying the metaphysical requirement of being 
responsible for one's actions would necessarily have to be controlled consciously. Whether 
we accept that free will is merely the ability by which we select a course of action in order to 
fulfil some desire or that we require the selection of a course of action based on our desires 
and values be deliberative, we are still not committed to the selection process itself being 
controlled  by  the  conscious  mind.  As  discussed  in  the  preceding  chapter,  there  is 
considerable empirical evidence supporting the view that the conscious exercise of free will 
is an illusion.
Many neuroscientific experiments, most notably those performed by Libet, Wegner, 
and others cited in the preceding chapter, support objections to the traditional view of free 
will. In particular, these experiments demonstrate that our brains prepare to act before we 
are conscious of the decision to act.  If  such is the case, then we cannot be making a 
conscious decision to act. New studies by Jesse Bengson, et al., appear to show that "brain 
noise" might actually create a possibility of “free will” in so far as it "inserts a random effect 
that allows us to be freed from simple cause and effect":
This finding provides evidence for a mechanistic account of decision-making by 
demonstrating  that  ongoing  neural  activity  biases  voluntary  decisions  about 
where to attend within a given moment. (Bengson et al 2014)
That “free will” is just the result of random effects would not satisfy those believers in a 
free-will for which consciousness is causally-efficacious. Bengson's results merely provide a 
means for  explaining why we are not always able to  recreate the reasoning behind an 
apparent act of free-will. In any case, the effect of “brain noise” is unconscious and random 
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neural firings can more easily be explained using the connectionist model than the symbol 
manipulation model of cognition. 
 5.3.6 Consciousness and Natural Language
On the psychological view of the relationship between memory and cognitive processing 
(Illustration 16 above), relevant cognitive processes retrieve the same body of knowledge, 
the  same  mental  representation  of  an  entity,  from  long-term  memory  whether  we 
categorize the entity, draw an inductive inference about the extension it belongs to, draw an 
analogy between it and some other entity or entities, or even understand a sentence in 
which a term referring to the entity appears. In other words, a concept is moved from a 
class of concepts stored in semantic memory to short-term memory, perhaps along with 
other non-conceptual knowledge of the item in question, for use in a cognitive process (e.g., 
deduction, induction, categorization). To summarize, according to this view concepts are 
characterized as bodies of knowledge stored in long-term memory. 
Using Chomsky's theory of a Universal Grammar (Chomsky 2006:124) as a basis, I 
support  the position that  language-related (usually  speech) input is  “decoded” by being 
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Illustration 16: Psychological View of Memory and Cognitive Processing
input to the Universal Grammar (UG) which takes the linguistic representation, transforms it 
to the surface structure, and then to the deep structure which, along with a mapping to a 
semantic structure (using semantic memory which consists of the class of concepts, the 
lexicon,  and  encyclopaedic  knowledge,  and  is  found in  long-term memory as  shown in 
Illustration 16 above), and becomes input to the cognitive systems. The encoder does the 
reverse: the internal deep structure is transformed to the surface structure which, in turn, is 
converted, by the phonological component, to the phonic representation, and, if the relevant 
semantic  information  exists,  the  deep  structure  is  also  mapped  to  a  semantic 
representation. If the UG is able to assign a semantic representation to the input, then the 
thought is experienced as meaningful. A highly simplified diagram of this process is given in 
the following diagram (Illustration 17). The link to external behaviour is not shown.
In the situation given in the preceding diagram, the  form of the experience is a linguistic 
“speech” icon. As also proposed by Jackendoff  (1990, 2011), I contend that the linguistic 
icon is linked to a thought; it provides a form of the experience; and is a cognitive correlate 
of  consciousness.  Semantic  representations  are  encoded  as  icons  with  a  “meaningful” 
feature.  It  should  be  noted,  that  neither  the  semantic  representations  nor  speech 
representations  themselves  are  cognitive  correlates  of  consciousness.  The  form  of  the 
experience as it appears to the conscious mind depends on the input modality; it may be 
tagged with a type of “external” feature for aural input as well as being linked to one or 
more phenomenal  features, such as “meaningful”, all of which contribute to the conscious 
experience.  Internal  speech  follows  a  similar  process  except  for  being  tagged  with  an 
“internal” feature, although this feature may be absent or replaced with a false “external” 
feature  for  people  suffering  from delusional  disorders  like  schizophrenia.  The  “internal” 
feature is usually absent during the dream state – the exception is the rare case of “lucid” 
dreaming. Of course, some people might deny that the conscious mind is active at all during 
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Illustration 17: Natural Language Speech Input Processing and the Conscious Mind
non-lucid dreaming, but such a denial would be based on a conflation of consciousness and 
awareness. I would suggest that our conscious mind  is active during dreaming and the 
differences  between  the  dreaming  and  awake  states  are  all  at  the  unconscious  level. 
Dreams are often defined as “vivid, sensorimotor hallucinations with a narrative structure” 
which  are  experienced  consciously.  Consciousness  during  dreams  is  unlike  wakeful 
consciousness  given  the  usual  absence  of  the  ability  to  introspect  except  during  lucid 
dreaming. During sleep, many unconscious processes cease temporarily, or mental states 
cease  temporarily  to  be  in  the  same causal  relations  as  they are  in  the  awake  state. 
Nevertheless, some of these mental states may still be encoded in a form that is a cognitive 
correlate  of  consciousness.  That  is  to  say  that  'consciousness'  and  'awareness'  are  not 
synonymous. Being aware of a conscious icon is a different process from having an icon in 
consciousness. Becoming aware requires two (unconscious) synergistic processes (one that 
produces the encoded icon of the thought of which one is “aware” and one that produces 
the linguistic or a non-linguistic icon produced by the monitoring process). In the awake 
state, it possible to be aware of being conscious, but, in the dream state, it (usually) is not. 
In the dream state, the linguistic encoding and other encoding processes are highly 
active without any external input. Clearly, aural input is not the only initiator of the linguistic 
encoding process. For advocates of the “Language of Thought Hypothesis” (Fodor 1975), the 
type of cognitive processes that would be amenable to the linguistic encoding of internal 
speech are those conducted (non-consciously) in a “language of thought”. The Cluster 1 
“features” of System 2, listed in the table on page  103, may provide some indication of 
which  thought  processes  are  amenable  to  such  encoding  given  that  the  types  of 
representations considered to belong to  System 2 appear to have have a combinatorial 
syntax and semantics and thus to belong to a representational or symbolic system (c/f. 
Fodor and Pylyshyn 1988:12–13). It should be emphasized that speech encoding does not 
always occur even when the input is aural. We are not always conscious of sensory input yet 
the input may be registered in semantic memory and later linked to a thought process. 
There have been several experiments (see, e.g., Allport 1977; Maki et al. 1997; Besner & 
Stolz 1999) that indicate that printed words do not require attention or task relevance for 
their  meanings  to  be  accessible;  semantic  access  occurs  for  printed  words  even  when 
spatial  attention,  task  relevance,  or  awareness  for  these  words  are  lacking.  Semantic 
representations are still activated even when the words are presented peripherally and no 
attention  is  drawn  to  them.  These  results  are  similar  to  those  for  dichotic  listening 
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experiments  which  demonstrate  that  it  is  possible  to  extract  meaningful  content  from 
irrelevant or unattended inputs depending on the strength of distracting stimuli (see, for 
example, Corteen & Dunn 1974; Rees et al. 1999).
On the construal of consciousness that I am proposing,  qualia (“the introspectively 
accessible, phenomenal aspects of our mental lives”) are features of mental states which 
may, or may not be encoded. Without this encoding, we are unaware of pain, for instance, 
even though the nervous system acts in response to the stimuli that caused the mental 
states.  The case  of  an athlete  who is  not  conscious  of  an injury  while  performing but 
becomes conscious of the injury when the performance is over can be explained by other 
mental processes taking priority over the encoding process during the performance. When 
discussing concepts like qualia, we have to be careful not to commit what U. T. Place (1956) 
called the “phenomenological fallacy” which is confusing properties of objects experienced 
with  properties  of  experiences.  The  encoded  icons  of  mental  states  with  phenomenal 
features (qualia) are not the mental states themselves but are the haptic icons of those 
mental states. Just as internal speech aids in memory consolidation through a “feedback 
loop” by which experiences are encoded in speech icons66 and fed back into the unconscious 
thought  process,  qualia,  such  as  the  feeling  of  pain,  unfortunately,  may  also  be  “re-
enforced” through such a feedback loop. 
Also  on  this  construal  of  consciousness,  pre-linguistic  children  and  non-linguistic 
species are not precluded from having a conscious mind. Conscious imagery is not limited to 
linguistic icons. Nor, as Fodor himself has suggested, is the language of thought limited to 
humans: some species may have a proto-LOT even if encoding in a natural language form is 
limited to humans (according to current evidence, at least). The claim that almost all the 
features  attributed  to  Type  2 by  most  dual-process/dual-system  theorists  are  actually 
features of the non-conscious (Type 1) does not detract from the claim that there is  a 
considerable evolutionary advantage to being able to encode thought processes linguistically 
whether or not the results also appear as icons in the conscious mind: not only are we 
individually aware of many of our thought processes but we are able to communicate them 
to our conspecifics; and the encoding of the output of a thought process in a form that can 
be used internally as input to cognitive processes improves learning and abstract thought.
66These proposals also apply to sign-language in which case the icons are haptic or, perhaps, visual.
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 5.3.7 Implicit and Explicit Learning
As  discussed  in  Section 4.3.3  “Implicit  and  Explicit  Learning“,  the  distinction  between 
implicit  and  explicit  learning  is  predominantly  a  distinction  between  non-conscious  and 
conscious learning, of non-conscious knowledge and concept acquisition and conscious rule-
following.  As previously  noted,  it  is  possible  to  acquire  implicit  knowledge without ever 
being able to state any related explicit rule (see Reber 1993, Sun et al. 2005) but, while 
implicit  processing  proceeds  by  chance  without  accompanying  awareness,  explicit 
processing proceeds deliberately and is always accompanied by awareness (Reber 1993). 
For connectionist models of learning, there are two types of feedback: external and internal. 
In either case, if there is an internal measure of error, the learning is called “monitored”. 
There  are,  usually,  internal  consistency/coherence  measures  which  can  be  used  in  the 
improvement  of  internal  representations  and  which  can  be  internally  monitored;  “error 
detected by a monitor in one part of the nervous system is a plausible teaching signal for 
another part of the nervous system” (Churchland & Sejnowski 1992/1999:97). I postulate 
that “conscious rule-following” is actually “being conscious of following rules”. It should be 
noted that connectionist models are able to produce rule-following  behaviour. Difficulties 
encountered at the non-conscious level, especially by novices, result in activation of the 
encoding (or “monitoring”) systems, producing (usually linguistically-encoded) icons in the 
conscious mind and, hence, in an impression of rule-following. Because the same type of 
difficulties  are  less likely  to  arise  in  the non-consciousness  of  experts,  their  monitoring 
systems are rarely activated. The following diagram illustrates the position of the conscious 
mind in a learning process.
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Illustration 18: Learning and the Conscious Mind
“Feedback” is part of a normal learning process and avoidance behaviour is a normal 
response to an unpleasant experience. There is strong evidence that even crustaceans such 
as shore crabs feel pain and learn to avoid causes of the pain (Magee & Elwood 2013). The 
experience of pain is part of avoidance learning: animals, including humans, learn from 
pain; they do not just continue to respond to a stimulus. Stress of any kind can be part of a 
learning experience. An emotional response occurring in response to stress, whether from 
an environmental or psychological cause, results in a sequence of hormonal changes and 
physiological  responses.  I  contend  that  activation  of  an  emotional  response  to  a 
subconscious  reasoning  “conflict”  may  result  in  the  linguistic  encoding  of  parts  of  the 
reasoning process that are amenable to symbolic and syntactical expression. Whether or not 
the learning processes are encoded as icons in the conscious mind accounts, at least in part, 
for the apparent division between implicit and explicit learning.
 5.3.8 Evolutionarily Old versus Evolutionarily Recent
Until  recently,  scientists  believed that  the  more  developed prefrontal  cortex  in  humans 
explained humans' unique abilities for planning and abstract reasoning, but further studies 
(see  Dunbar  2001)  have  questioned  this  belief.  Recent  studies  have  used  magnetic 
resonance imaging to measure the relative size of the prefrontal cortex in all  species of 
great apes (chimpanzees, bonobos, gorillas, and orangutans) as well as humans. The results 
show that the relative size of the prefrontal cortex was almost the same in humans as in the 
great apes. The superior abilities of humans to anticipate and to plan has, in more recent 
studies, been attributed to other specialized regions of the cortex and also to the fact that 
the  larger  volume  of  white  matter  (composed  of  myelin-covered  axons)  in  the  human 
prefrontal cortex provides greater connectivity between the prefrontal cortex and the rest of 
the brain (Smaers et al. 2010). The type, number, and complexity of the neural connections 
in  different  species  are  a  matter  of  degree  and  hence  there  is  no  justification  for 
distinguishing between evolutionarily old and evolutionary recent areas of the brain, nor, in 
particular, for dividing types of cognition based on such areas. The claim that there are two 
cognitive system types, where  Type 1 cognition operates rapidly and unconsciously and 
Type 2 operates slowly and consciously using the medium of language, cannot be supported 
by proposing that two different areas of the brain have distinct histories of evolution. That 
there are specialized regions of the cortex, for example, can be justified but these are still  
neural networks distinguished by the number and type of connections. There is no area of 
the brain that is uniquely human.
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 5.3.9 Modularity and Dual-Process Theories
The inability of the symbol-manipulation system of human cognition to model all types of 
cognitive functions – of which perceptual pattern recognition is a prime example – has led to 
proposals for models that include multiple different cognitive processing systems, ranging 
from  dual-process  and  dual-system  models  to  the  massively  modular,  and  various 
combinations  of  these.  In  principle,  there  is  nothing  about  dual-process  theories  that 
precludes modularity; the modules could be of just two types: for instance transducers and 
encapsulated, domain-specific  modules for  input processing, along with central,  domain-
general,  unencapsulated  systems  (see  Fodor  1983).  The  proliferation  of  views  about 
different types of processing systems is, however, indicative of basic problems with viewing 
the mind as a  symbol-manipulation computer. Classical, symbolic-processing systems are 
too slow to  correctly  model  reflexive and direct  reasoning processes and such systems 
cannot account for the contextual, parallel processing required for non-local reasoning. 
In  addition,  attempts  by  Artificial  Intelligence  researchers  to  model  symbol 
manipulation have often resulted in a version of the Frame Problem because of the difficulty 
of drawing on the relevant background knowledge – accessing relevant information among a 
vast  store  of  linguistically-encoded structures  is  highly  problematic.  The  frame problem 
cannot be avoided by a massively modular mind, despite what supporters of the Massively 
Modular  Mind  Hypothesis  (MMM)  might  claim,  because  there  would  have  to  be  some 
mechanism whereby input  to  these encapsulated,  domain-specific  modules  is  limited to 
relevant information only (Fodor 2001), and no such mechanism, consistent with a symbol-
manipulation model, has been found. Even though some Artificial Intelligence researchers 
have developed a variety of adequate, but not necessarily biologically-plausible, means for 
avoiding the frame problem, the epistemological frame problem remains for philosophers of 
mind: Dennett (1978:125) asks how “a cognitive creature … with many beliefs about the 
world” updates those beliefs when it performs an act so that they remain “roughly faithful to 
the world”; and Cosmides and Tooby, strong supporters of massive modularity of mind, note 
that the more a cognitive creature inferentially integrates information, the more it risks 
error propagation (Cosmides & Tooby, 2000). Connectionist systems, on the other hand, are 
not subject to the frame problem because the received information results in an almost 
instantaneous activation of a prototype and, in consequence, a cognitive system is able to 
access  the  relevant  consequences  of  a  change  in  the  environment  almost  immediately 
(Churchland 1989:178).
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 5.3.10 Cognitive Correlates of Consciousness
Many dual-process theories identify, albeit implicitly, several cognitive attributes that appear 
to be correlates of consciousness67. These include: conscious reasoning; judgements based 
on  critical  examination;  reasoning  that  requires  effort  and  control;  logical  reasoning, 
inhibition used when  System 1 fails  to form a logical/acceptable conclusion; intentional 
thinking; analytic  and reflective reasoning; and so on. An examination of each of these 
leads to the conclusion that each of these may become encoded in the conscious mind but 
that each of these could be performed without conscious awareness at all. Experts are rarely 
able to express the reasoning processes they use; expert judgements are most often made 
non-consciously  with  only  the  results  appearing  to  consciousness.  Most  people  have 
experienced reaching a solution to a problem without being at all aware of how the solution 
was reached. When we catch a ball, or cross a road in heavy traffic, we are making highly  
complex calculations but would fail miserably if we had to be conscious of the calculations. 
It is unlikely that, without advanced mathematical knowledge, we could even state what 
calculations have to made when judging the point at which we should catch the ball or what 
distance from oncoming cars and what speed we should walk to make it safely to the other 
side of the road. These calculations are performed non-consciously; although the result of 
failure in our calculations will be encoded in consciousness!
I suggest that the only cognitive correlates of consciousness are the encoded icons 
which  appear  to  the  conscious mind.  When some thoughts,  phonetic,  haptic,  and aural 
images are encoded in a form for input to consciousness, then these are cognitive correlates 
of  consciousness  for,  without  them,  there  would  be  no  consciousness  at  all.  The  same 
cannot be said for the correlates of consciousness associated with the attributes identified in 
Cluster 1 of System 2, even if problems encountered during a reasoning process may well 
trigger the encoding of the thoughts in a form for input to the conscious mind. 
 5.4 PART III: POSSIBLE CRITICISMS
Chapter 3 of this dissertation contains a comparison of the strengths and weaknesses of the 
Classical  (aka  “computational”,  “symbol-manipulation”)  and  connectionist  cognitive 
architectures68. In this section, I will concentrate on criticisms related to connectionism as a 
theory of mind rather than as a cognitive architecture implementation model.
67See  the  table  “Dual-Process  Theory  –  Differences  between System 1  and System 2”  in  Section  4.2  of  the 
preceding Chapter.
68 See the table on page 81.
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 5.4.1 Connectionism and Computation over Symbols
Fodor (1975) presented a major argument for the Language of Thought Hypothesis (LOTH) 
which was to the effect that a computational/representational medium is required for our 
best  models  of  higher  cognition  to  be  true.  He  considered  three  types  of  cognitive 
phenomena: perception as the fixation of perceptual beliefs; concept learning as hypothesis 
formation and confirmation; and decision-making as a form of representing and evaluating 
the consequences of possible actions carried out in a situation using a pre-existing set of 
preferences. These “best” cognitive models, he argued, all accept mental processes as being 
computational processes defined over representations. He concluded that, if these models 
are correct in their treating mental processes as computational,  then there has to be a 
language of thought (LOT) over  which they are defined.  Hence,  for  Fodor,  there is  “no 
computation without representation.”  According to Pylyshyn (1993), human thought is the 
manipulation of sentences of an internal mental language or code; and this 'Mentalese' (or 
LOT), may, but is unlikely to, resemble the binary code of today's computer systems. Some 
of what makes minds rational is their ability to perform computations on thoughts, where 
thoughts,  like  sentences,  are  assumed  to  be  syntactically  structured  and  where 
‘computations’ means formal operations in the manner of Turing. 
In  supporting  this  position,  Fodor  and  Pylyshyn  wrote  an  influential  critical 
examination  of  the  difference  between  computational  (à  la  Turing)  and  connectionist 
cognitive architectures (Fodor & Pylyshyn 1987). They claim that the architecture of the 
mind/brain  cannot  be  connectionist  at  the  cognitive  level  and  that  connectionism may 
provide at most an account of the neural structures in which the Classical, computational 
cognitive architecture is implemented. They have to accept the latter possibility given that 
the  brain  itself  is  composed of  neural  structures.  Fodor  and Pylyshyn (henceforth  F&P) 
outline what they consider to be serious flaws in a connectionist theory of mind but most of 
their  arguments  rest  on  what  they  see  as  a  failure  of  connectionism  to  support  a 
compositional semantics whereby the meaning of an expression is a function of the meaning 
of its constituent parts. This is a curious claim since there is at least one example of a 
neural  network that  supports  compositional  semantics,  namely the brain itself,  and F&P 
themselves accept that there are connectionist implementations of the Classical architecture 
that support compositional semantics. Nevertheless, F&P claim that connectionist models, as 
a theory of mind,  cannot,  in  principle,  have compositional  semantics.  They use a “toy” 
localist network to support their claim:
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To  simplify  the  exposition,  we  assume  a  'localist'  approach,  in  which  each 
semantically  interpreted node corresponds to  a single Connectionist  unit;  but 
nothing relevant to this discussion is changed if these nodes actually consist of 
patterns over a cluster of units. (Fodor & Pylyshyn 1988:15n)
Again, it is curious that F&P would assume a localist approach given that a central tenet of 
connectionism  is  that  an  atomic  token,  or  node,  is  not  capable  of  carrying  sufficient 
information to make it useful in a discussion of human cognition. Connectionists place a 
strong emphasis on the distinction between local and distributed representations and there 
are examples of the connectionist approach to compositionality being used successfully to 
operate directly on distributed representations (see examples in Pollack 1988 and 1990, and 
Smolensky 1990). It is significant that Fodor himself later argued that Turing's account of 
computation is, in at least two respects, local given that it does not look past the form of 
sentences to their meanings, and that it assumes that the role of thoughts in a mental 
process is determined entirely by their internal (syntactic) structure. Unfortunately, there 
are some rational processes which are not local in either of these respects. For Fodor, it may 
be that:
Wherever either semantic or global features of mental processes begin to make 
their presence felt, You reach the limits of what Turing's kind of computational 
rationality is able to explain. As things stand, what's beyond these limits is not a 
problem but a mystery. (Fodor 1998a)
 5.4.2 The Mind as Computer
The symbol-manipulation hypothesis is basically that we have mental states in virtue of 
symbol-processing operations performed by the brain, and, hence, that all creatures with 
mental  states  are  symbol-processing  systems.  The  fundamental  assumption  of  Artificial 
Intelligence (AI) is the symbol system hypothesis which claims that the computer is an 
appropriate  kind  of  machine  to  think;  and,  further,  a  physical  symbol-system has  the 
necessary and sufficient means for general and intelligent action. This leads to treating the 
brain of all thinking creatures as symbol-manipulating computers.
Compared to a digital computer, however, the brain is very slow. For example, the 
brain takes a million times longer than a personal computer to perform a basic electrical 
operation. Hence the brain cannot be running traditionally conceived AI programs. Even if 
they  are  considerably  faster  than  a  human  brain,  traditional  computers  are  sequential 
processors – they perform their instructions serially. This fact constitutes strong evidence 
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that the brain is some kind of parallel device: anatomical studies show that the pattern of 
parallel, simultaneously operating layers of neurons is repeated throughout the brain:
If current estimates of the number of [connections] in the brain are anywhere 
near  correct,  it  would  take even the fastest  of  today's  computers  something 
between several years and several centuries to simulate the processing that can 
take place within the human brain in one second. (Rumelhart, McClelland, et al. 
1986)
A cursory examination of the differences in how a classical, von Neumann computer and a 
human brain performs memory recall operations demonstrates significant differences:
• Each specific memory location in a computer has a unique address, but the human 
brain retrieves a memory using a description of the information required;
• A piece of information in a computer can only be retrieved if its unique numerical 
address is stated in the program, but the human brain can use any one of an open-
ended collection of descriptions to retrieve the same information – memories are 
content-addressable – they are stored holistically in networks of memories.
Through content-addressability, humans have an open-ended access to memories. There 
has been no success,  so  far,  in  reconciling the computer's  “content-blindness”  with the 
open-endedness of human recall. In a computer, each string of symbol tokens exists at a 
specific physical location in the hardware, whereas the human memory system makes a 
very large use of distributed storage. This difference in how memories are stored makes 
computer hardware very subject to memory loss through hardware damage; the human 
brain, on the other hand, can withstand injury: its distributed storage of memories allows 
for a “graceful” degradation. As damage increases, the performance of a brain degrades 
gradually but computers “crash” very easily. 
As  yet,  no  AI  system has  been able  to  perform such common human cognitive 
functions as abduction. The cognitive processes that prove so difficult to implement in a 
classical computer system are those that rely on parallel processing but also those whose 
mechanisms we still do not understand. Trying to understand human cognition using the 
computer model is, in my opinion, fruitless. If we must continue using technology as an 
analogy, then the Internet might be more productive. It is, like the brain, massively-parallel, 
and we could view the individual computers in the network as analogous to neural nuclei. 
Nonetheless, I contend that our time would be better spent attempting to understand the 
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mind  using  the  results  of  such  empirical  research  areas  as  neuroscience  and 
neurophysiology.
 5.4.3 The Computational Brain
That the brain is a computational device is non-tendentious. The disagreement between 
supporters of the symbol-system hypothesis (aka computationalists) and connectionism lies 
in how and over what computation is performed. Both theories accept the existence of 
representational mental states but supporters of the former position hold to a symbol-level 
of  representation and,  even,  to  the idea that  there is  a  correspondence between these 
representations and actual brain circuits. As discussed previously, some early supporters of 
the symbol-system hypothesis have expressed misgivings about the ability of the hypothesis 
to explain many crucial aspects of human cognition, but they (e.g., Fodor, Putnam) are not 
willing to reject the hypothesis completely in what they see as an absence of an viable 
alternative.  Recently,  cognitive  scientists,  such  as  C.  R.  Gallistel  and  Adam Philip  King 
(2010), have argued strongly in support of the hypothesis and believe that it can present a 
fruitful  direction  for  neuroscientific  research.  In  examining  their  arguments,  it  must  be 
emphasized that both they and connectionists can talk about the “computational brain”, but 
they do not agree on what form the computing takes. For supporters of the symbol-system 
hypothesis,  the  computation  is  à  la  Turing  (computation  over  symbols),  and  for 
connectionists, the computation is over neural networks (computational neurobiology). At 
first glance, they appear to be talking at different levels of explanation (cognitive versus 
implementation),  but  Gallistel  and  King  (2010)  appear  to  argue  for  computation  over 
symbols as  more  than  a  cognitive  level  of  explanation;  they   also  see  it  as  an 
implementation research strategy:
there  must  be  an  addressable  read/write  memory mechanism in  brains  that 
encodes  information received by  the  brain  into  symbols  (writes),  locates the 
information  when  needed  (addresses),  and  transports  it  to  computational 
machinery that  makes productive  use of  the information (reads).  (Gallistel  & 
King 2010:Preface)
Fodor and Pylyshyn (1988) noted that a symbol-manipulating device could be implemented 
in a connectionist system, but stated that the mind/brain architecture is not connectionist at 
the cognitive level. Gallistel and King (2010) attempt to show how the mind as a symbol-
manipulation  computer  could  be  realized  in  the  brain.  In  doing  so,  they  criticize 
connectionist models for relying too heavily on neuroscience for evidence of how neural 
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mechanisms might mediate computation rather than on the architecture that a powerful 
computing machine requires as demonstrated by “well-established results in theoretical and 
practical computer science” (Gallistel & King 2010:ix).
In the previous section,  5.4.2  “The Mind as Computer”, I present arguments against 
viewing the mind as a computer à la Turing or von Neumann, but Gallistel and King (2010) 
not only accept such a view of the mind but also attempt to show just how it could be in­
stantiated in the  brain. The connectionist and neural network approach is that a memory 
consists of neurons distributed throughout the brain69, but Gallistel and King claim that the 
existence of a neurobiological read-write memory mechanism is indispensable for explana­
tions of psychological phenomena (Gallistel & King 2010:xii; Gallistel 2014:5). They do ac­
knowledge, however, that neuroscience has not yet proved that such a memory exists (Gal­
listel 2014:5). The existence of such a memory is essential to their arguments concerning 
how computations are carried out in the brain; this is because of their assumption that the 
brain is a Turing-style, digital computing machine for which a read/write, sequentially struc­
tured symbolic memory is an essential component:
to get machines that can do computations of reasonable complexity, a specific, 
minimal  functional  architecture  is  demanded,  an  architecture  that  includes  a 
read/write memory (Gallistel & King 2010:128)
 Gallistel  (2014)  proposes  that  the  way  information  is  stored  in  DNA may  provide  an 
indication of how a read-write memory may be neuro-biologically realised. He describes the 
indirect addressing process whereby a transcription factor initiates the reading of a codon 
sequence to specify a protein which leads to the synthesis of still other proteins which may 
yield further transcription factors. The example he provides is:
The eye gene codes only for one protein. That protein does not itself appear 
anywhere in the structure of the eye. It is a transcription factor. It gives access 
to the addresses of other transcription factors and, eventually, through them, to 
the addresses of the proteins from which the special tissues of the eye are built 
and to the transcription factors whose concentration gradients govern how those 
tissues are arranged to make an organ. (Gallistel 2014:29)
He  suggests  that  the  brain  would  need  a  similar  architecture  for  accessing  stored 
information. The suggestion indicates a view that memories are stored hierarchically rather 
69 For the connectionist and neural network approach, memories are content-addressable and meaning is holistic. 
When trying to retrieve a memory, we may use many different means: we may go through the alphabet hoping 
that a letter of the alphabet will trigger the memory of a name; we may use the memory of a particular context in 
which we learnt the name; we may use a mnemonic (such as a “memory palace”); and so on. We are able to do  
this because each memory structure is linked in a neural network of memory structures.
136
than in networks and, hence, it  is  unclear to me how we could take different paths to 
retrieve the same information or the same starting information to retrieve different memory 
structures: how, for example, I could use the letter of an alphabet to trigger the memory of 
someone's name, or how I could use the memory of a smell to retrieve the memory of a 
location. 
Gallistel and King contend that neither connectionism nor neuroscience can account 
for the existence of such a read/write memory but, in fact, they themselves note that it is 
possible to realize it using accepted neural mechanisms such as a “reverberating” neural 
activity (which functions in connectionist models as working memory) and in the connection 
strengths between neurons in a network (which functions in connectionist models as long 
term  memory)  (Gallistel  &  King  2010:285).  Thus,  their  requirement  for  a   read/write 
memory cannot be used as a criticism of connectionist models, even though they continue 
their arguments as if it is.
In order to support their position and show that connectionism, and neural network 
approaches in general, are unsatisfactory, they use the example of dead reckoning (path in­
tegration) and the model developed by Samsonovich and McNaughton (1997):
This model relies on the only widely conjectured mechanism for performing the 
essential memory function, reverberatory loops. We review this model in detail 
because it illustrates so dramatically the points we have made earlier about the 
price that is paid when one dispenses with a read/write memory. To our mind, 
what this model proves is that the price is too high. (Gallistel & King 2010:xv)
They criticize the “enormous” complexity of the model (the “amount of computation that 
must be done rapidly gets out of hand”), the “ad hoc fixes” it requires, and its inability to 
handle “noisy” input (Gallistel & King 2010:254-256). These criticisms are specific to the 
model under consideration and do not apply to connectionist models in general: ad hoc fixes 
are not specific to connectionism; and some of the strengths of connectionist models are 
their ability to handle complex problems with limited numbers of neurons and pathways, 
their  ability  to  handle  “noisy”,  degraded,  or  limited  input,  and  their  resistance  to 
“computational  explosion”.  As  concerns  dead  reckoning,  later  connectionist  models  (see 
Mole 2014 for a discussion) are not subject to the same criticisms. It is, hence, questionable 
to  present a criticism of  neural  network  architecture  that  is  based on the failings of  a 
particular model. In addition, it is, in my opinion, unwise to ignore the empirical evidence 
that neuroscience has and continues to produce when constructing a theory of cognitive 
architecture.  I  contend  that  greater  advances  will  result  by  using  the  results  of 
137
neuroscience to aid computer science in developing more “human-like” architectures for 
computing machines, rather than the other way around.
 5.4.4 Neuroscience and Cognition
As stated previously, Gallistel and King (2010:ix) criticize connectionist models for relying 
too  heavily  on  neuroscience  for  evidence  of  how  neural  mechanisms  might  mediate 
computation. Their criticisms, I claim, result from their applying computation as understood 
by  supporters  of  the  symbol-manipulation  hypotheses:  they  are  seeking  evidence  from 
neuroscience of how neural mechanisms might mediate computation over symbols, a type 
of computation that connectionists do not accept. Supporters of the symbolic-manipulation 
paradigm posit symbolic models that, they contend, have a similar structure to underlying 
brain structures; connectionists, on the other hand, use "low-level" modelling with the aim 
of  producing  models  that  resemble  neurological  structures.  It  is  clear,  therefore,  that 
connectionists would rely consistently on the results of neuroscience to refine their models. 
In  the  domain  of  psycholinguistics,  for  example,  the  search  for  neural  architecture 
underlying  such  areas  as  written  word  processing  and  spoken  word  forms  would  be 
influenced by which paradigm is supported. For example, Broca's Area is purported to be 
the centre of language production, although there is disagreement about its precise location 
(Poeppel,  1996).  For  connectionists,  mental  processes  are  distributed  and  massively 
parallel, and this view is supported by results of neural imaging which purport to show that 
every lobe of the brain is involved in some measure in language production (Pulvermüller, 
1999). 
There has been skepticism as to the direction being taken by some of the research 
combining the study of language and the the brain. David Poeppel and David Embick, in 
particular, have identified what they considered to be serious problems with these research 
programs (see, especially, Poeppel 1996, Poeppel & Embick 2005). They identify two  main 
problems, the first of which is the:
Granularity Mismatch Problem (GMP): Linguistic and neuroscientific studies of 
language  operate  with  objects  of  different  granularity.  In  particular,  linguistic 
computation  involves  a  number  of  fine-grained  distinctions  and  explicit 
computational  operations.  Neuroscientific  approaches  to  language  operate  in 
terms of broader conceptual distinctions (Poeppel & Embick 2005:2-3);
Their complaint is that the elemental concepts of neurobiology and cognitive neuroscience 
are “coarse-grained” relative to the corresponding linguistic primitives, it is not possible to 
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formulate hypothesis that link neuroscience and linguistics (Poeppel & Embick 2005:2-3). It 
is interesting to note that Poeppel and Embick explicitly question whether there is any point 
to a science of language and brain which does not advance the understanding of either. 
They contend that this situation will not be resolved “until certain fundamental problems are 
identified, acknowledged, and addressed” (Poeppel & Embick 2005:2). 
I suggest that this granularity mismatch is likely to result from a (perhaps implicit) 
acceptance of a form of the symbol-system hypothesis which has lead many philosophers, 
psychologists, and others to think of the brain as modular. The level of cognitive analysis 
adopted by the sub-symbolic paradigm, favoured by connectionists, is lower than the level 
traditionally adopted by the symbolic paradigm for which processes are sensitive to the 
structure of the symbols that are conceptual-level representations. For connectionists, entit­
ies are represented by a large number of sub-symbols, operations on which “often consist of 
a large number of finer-grained operations” (Smolensky, 1988:§1.3).
The second problem they identify has to do with whether the fundamental units of 
linguistic theory can be reduced to the biological units identified by neuroscience: 
Ontological  Incommensurability  Problem (OIP):  The  units  of  linguistic 
computation  and  the  units  of  neurological  computation  are  incommensurable 
(Poeppel & Embick 2005:4).
This problem is a result, they contend, of the independence of the development of the two 
ontologies,  and  claim  that  the  problem  will  never  be  resolved  as  long  as  the  current 
conceptual architectures of linguistics and neuroscience remain as they are. I contend that a 
resolution would be for linguistic theory to discard the symbol-system hypothesis.
 5.4.5 Non-conscious and Conscious Mind Distinction
Most arguments against the thesis that all thinking is non-conscious tend to be of the form: 
“but  when I  make logical  inferences,  I  am conscious  of  so  doing.”  As discussed in  the 
previous chapter, the results of neuroscientific studies (by Kornhuber et al., Libet, Wegner, 
and others) indicate that the impression that we think consciously is an illusion. I contend 
that  all  cognitive  processes  are  performed non-consciously  and,  while  we  may become 
consciously aware of some aspects of a thought process, the consciousness itself is causally 
inert. What I am proposing is that the encoded images that appear in consciousness may 
become  input  to  further  cognitive  processes  and  hence  give  the  impression  that  the 
conscious mind is causally efficacious. The benefit of the encoding process is that aspects of 
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a cognitive process are produced in a form that makes them suitable as input for further 
processing, whether or not we become consciously aware of them. This is of significance 
during learning.
 5.5 PART IV: CONCLUSIONS 
Currently,  the  thesis  that  the  human brain  is  a  symbol-manipulating  computer  can  be 
neither confirmed nor refuted by empirical means. Most support for such a position relies on 
philosophical arguments one of which is notably incorrect: many aspects of brain function, 
such as vision, clearly do not involve symbol manipulation. As Dreyfus and Dreyfus (1986) 
noted, human intelligence and expertise appear to depend on non-conscious instincts and 
not on conscious symbol-manipulation. Thus, there are, at least some, mental states which 
do not arise as the result of the manipulation of symbols. Many problems of cognition, such 
as the frame problem, arise for the Classical model as long as we adopt its assumption of 
the explanatory value of computation over representations. Yet, many philosophers of mind 
still support the view that human cognitive processes are, for the most part, inferences over 
a set of propositions using some type of computation. Some philosophers such as Fodor 
(1998a) have more recently accepted that the Classical, computational model has serious 
limitations, yet it still remains for many philosophers and other cognitive scientists “the only 
game in town.” The Symbol-System Hypothesis, on which the Classical model is based, is an 
empirical theory – its credibility can only be established by careful study. Understanding 
human cognition is not a topic for armchair philosophical speculation but requires empirical 
research especially by neuroscientists. No existing digital computers are able to compete 
with  the  human  brain  in  such  areas  as  abductive  reasoning  or  computing  reasonable 
solutions based on very limited information. The failure of artificial intelligence research to 
produce machines that  match the computing power  of  the human brain  suggests  that, 
rather  than  modelling  human  cognition  on  the  Turing  machine  or  on  a  von  Neumann 
symbol-manipulation  system,  a  more  fruitful  approach  would  be  to  develop  computing 
systems that more closely simulate what we have learnt about the brain from neuroscience 
and neurobiology. 
Fodor's “mystery” concerning the limits of what the Computational Theory of Mind is 
able to explain is, on my view, a result of insisting on the idea that the brain is, at least in  
most respects, some kind of Turing-style computer; that is, of insisting that computation 
over  symbols  is  the best  model  of  human cognition.  Connectionism supports  the  more 
biologically-plausible position that variously weighted elements are the principal means of 
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computation  as  well  as  constituting  the  main  memory  store  (Churchland  2007:33). 
Connectionism  provides  a  more  explanatory  model  of  cognition  and  the  intuition  that 
cognitive  processes  constitute  computation  over  symbols  arises  from  the  way  these 
processes appear to  the conscious mind. As well  as dispensing with Fodor's “mystery”, 
connectionism  also  avoids  the  linguistic  puzzles  discussed  in  section 2.3.9  “Externalist
Semantics and Linguistic Puzzles“.
In offering an explanation of consciousness, I propose a mechanism of encoding and 
decoding such that the conscious mind is like a computer screen in being an “interface” to 
the hidden,  non-conscious,  cognitive processes.  On this analogy,  whatever thoughts are 
encoded in a form that can appear in the conscious mind are like computer interface icons. 
The “icons” that appear in the conscious mind, like the icons on a computer screen, are 
causally-inert – recent evidence from neuroscience supports the view of the conscious mind 
as causally inefficacious.
Empirical  research  will  be  required  to  substantiate  the  claims  made  in  this 
dissertation. One research project might be to determine whether the “appearance” of icons 
in the conscious mind results from the activation of a form of “alarm” system which is 
normally the result of a physiological reaction. Ethology studies like that of the Brosnan & 
de  Wall  (2001)  study  on  capuchin  monkeys  (discussed  on  page  67)  and  the  study  of 
learning in the shore crab (Magee & Elwood 2013), mentioned in section 5.3.7 “Implicit and
Explicit Learning“ might be of use in this respect. In addition, there is a need for more 
research in linguistics and neuro-linguistics as to how connectionist models might handle 
such topics as wh-movement – the ability to explain how connectionism would handle such 
topics is crucial if linguists are to accept the cognitive model presented in this dissertation. A 
related  topic  is  that  of  variable  binding which  is  an essential  component  for  modelling 
human cognition, especially for modelling the language capacity (Pinker & Prince 1988). 
Connectionists have already developed several  solutions to the variable binding problem 
which offer promising directions for future research (see Browne & Sun 2001) 
Recent progress in neurophysiology and the understanding of neural networks has 
led to connectionist models that have overcome many of the early problems noted by critics 
of connectionism. The parallel distributed processing of connectionist models reflects the 
massively parallel nature of the brain, whereas symbol-manipulation models have no re­
semblance whatsoever to underlying brain structure.  Finally, I contend that classical sym­
bol-manipulation, computational models and cognitive science, in general, rest on Cartesian 
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assumptions that need to be rejected.  There is, on my view, a very limited consciousness 
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